PROSPECT OF FORMING A COMMON CURRENCY AREA IN ASEAN-10 COUNTRIES by ISLAMI, Dinar Rindi Pawitra & KODOATIE, Johanna Maria
 
 
PROSPECT OF FORMING A COMMON CURRENCY 
AREA IN ASEAN-10 COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
Submitted to conclude the Bachelor Studies 
 At The Faculty of Economics  
Diponegoro University 
 
 
 
 
Written By: 
 
 
DINAR RINDI PAWITRA ISLAMI 
NIM. C2B605125 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC FACULTY 
DIPONEGORO UNIVERSITY 
SEMARANG 
2010 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study aims to examine the feasibility and prospect of ASEAN-10 countries for 
common currency area. According Sigma Convergence Criteria defined by Chowdhury (2004), 
sigma convergence model is proposed whereby available convergence played as a good model to 
examine the feasibilities of economic indicators to support the prospect of ASEAN-10 countries 
to create common currency area. 
Method that is used in this research consists of the EMU (European Monetary Union) 
model principle in launching their single currency (Pitchford and Cox, 1997) and the sigma 
convergence model (Chowdhury, 2004). Pitchford and Cox (1997) edited the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) principles for launching single currency for Europe. This research 
studies economic indicators that have been used, according to the editors of EMU principles for 
launching single currency for Europe, there are; Consumer Price Index (CPI), Real Exchange 
Rate in US dollars (RER), Growth rates of Foreign Exchange Reserves (GFER), Growth rates of 
Real Volume of Trade (GRVT), Growth rates of Real Relative Volume of Trade (GRRVT), and 
Growth rates of Per Capita Real GDP at factor cost (GRYPC). 
Through Eviews-6 this research studies examined the panel data cross section sigma 
convergence econometrics model, in which the result shows that the β coefficient of all economic 
indicators value are negative, whether this result according to Chowdhury (2004) show signs as 
convergence over the whole period of 1992s through 2009s, which means that the six indicators 
that examined by this research support the feasibility of ASEAN-10 countries to create common 
currency area. This convergence result also convinces that ASEAN-10 countries have a good 
prospect of forming a common currency area as their single currency to enhance their economic 
performance to a brighter future.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
Instability in International monetary arrangements has been a fact of life 
for policy makers since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreements in the 
early 1970s. The 1980s in particular were characterized by an exceptional 
misalignment of the major currencies. The decade saw massive capital flight 
towards the United States and other industrialized countries from the developing 
world, particularly after the debt crises and the cutting-off of new loans. 
Macroeconomic policies improved in the majority of developing countries in the 
1990s, but the expected growth benefits failed to materialize, at least to the extent 
that many observers had forecast. In addition, a series of financial crises severely 
depressed growth and worsened poverty (World Bank, 2005, excerpt from 
Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA III), 2008). In the words of 
Mundell (excerpt from Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA III), 
2008) 
“The period since floating began has proved to be one of the most unstable 
periods in monetary history. For the developing countries, the last three 
decades have been characterized by high inflation, exchange rate instability and 
low growth. A substantial part of the blame for this situation must lie with the 
deterioration in the global international environment and especially the lapse in 
discipline due to the absence of an international monetary system.” 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the economies of the most developed capitalist 
countries (North America, Western Europe, Japan and Australasia), as well as a 
great deal of developing countries, enjoyed an unprecedented boom, commonly 
 
 
 
 
designated as “the Golden Age”. It was characterized by low unemployment, low 
inflation and rapid growth of living standards, and one of its cornerstones was the 
monetary arrangements outlined at the famous meeting in Bretton Woods in 1944, 
the penultimate year of the Second World War. In so far as it eliminated the 
spectrum of global economic insecurity that predominated in the 1930s, it was 
extremely successful. As table 1.1 illustrates, the mean average growth rate for 
both output and trade reached historically unprecedented levels, with more than 
three times higher than the pre-war level for output and fifteen times higher for 
trade. Pointedly, the coefficient of variation, which reflects the dispersion around 
the mean in the performance of these variables, also declined significantly during 
the Bretton Woods period. In the second half of the 1960s and through the 1970s, 
however, the whole structure of profitable growth threatened to fall apart (Glyn, 
2006, excerpt from Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA III), 2008).             
Table. 1.1 
Growth and Volatility of World Output and Trade 
1870-1990 
 
Output Trade 
  Mean Average Coefficient of  Mean Average Coefficient of  
  Growth Rate (%) Variation Growth Rate (%) Variation 
Pre-War         
1870-1913 2.8 0.75 3.6 0.71 
Interwar         
1924-1929 3.7 0.22 5.7 0.39 
1929-1937 1.3 4.53 0.5 16.65 
Post-war         
1950-1973 4.7 0.34 7.5 0.56 
1973-1990 3.1 0.53 4.5 1.09 
Source: Kitson and Michie, 1995, (excerpt from Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA III), 2008) 
In 2007, The U.S economy lost its seat to the European Union as the 
world’s largest economies. The EU’s economy produced $14.4 trillion in goods 
 
 
 
 
and services, while U.S GDP came in at $13.86 trillion. Combined, the two 
produce over 40% of the world’s economic power, which totals $65.82 trillion 
(source: CIA World Factbook, Rank Order GDP excerpt from Kimberly, 
about.com guide to US economy, Tuesday, February 12, 2008). These figures are 
measured using purchasing power parity, which takes into account the standard of 
living of each country. This provides a more fair and relevant measured of GDP. 
However, the U.S. still has the largest economy of any single country. The next 
largest is China, at $7 trillion, followed by Japan at $4 trillion. The largest single 
EU country is Germany, at $2.8 trillion, which has been surpassed by India, where 
GDP was $2,965 trillion in 2007. The U.S. economy is growing, but just not as 
fast as the EU. Many analysts initially said that the EU “experiment” was doomed 
to failure, since these vastly different countries could never work together as a 
unified economy. Instead, the EU is so successful that areas such as Southeast 
Asia and Latin America are considering unified economies. The EU now has an 
economy of scale that eats into the comparative advantage the U.S. has 
traditionally enjoyed. Furthermore, the EU’s currency, the Euro, is now 
competing with the dollar as a global currency. Thanks to these competitive 
pressured, a U.S. recession could be the precursor to a lower standard of living 
that may not return to previous, stronger levels (Kimberly, 2008). Although 
financial markets rose sharply after George Bush’s decisive re-election, the huge 
imbalances plaguing the US economy have not gone away. Attention has now 
refocused on these structural problems, hence the renewed pressure on the dollar. 
America has a massive deficit in its current account, where the importing more 
 
 
 
 
goods and services than it is exporting. The size of the gap in dollar terms which 
is the amount often called “red ink”, is close to $600bn (£325.6bn) in 2004, this 
condition described that it is reached almost 6% of America’s overall economic 
activity. In some ways, America’s deficit has served the global economy well. By 
acting as a consumer of goods produced in Europe and Asia, the US has fulfilled 
its traditional function as an engine of growth. The countries with a current 
account surplus, particularly those in Asia, in turn send the proceeds back to the 
US as investments, mostly in US treasury bonds. These investments help to keep 
US interest rates low, which in turn sustains American consumption. The 
imbalance goes hand in hand with huge indebtedness. At the end of year in 2003 
there is America’s net financial deficit happened that amounted to nearly 30% of 
the country’s total output (Tran, 2004). 
The dollar’s long-run prognosis is negative. In the wake of the crisis, a 
retrenchment in cross which had border financial flows will mean less demand for 
dollar which is denominated asset. And with Uncle Sam’s printing press running 
overtime to cover the government’s trillion dollar deficits, the currency is 
expected to be further cheapened (Eichengreen excerpt from Lynch 2009). The 
decline in the dollar’s value in the past seven months in 2009 there largely reflects 
an unwinding of the “light to quality” that occurred during the most panicked 
crisis phase. Since then, the Euro has regained the lost ground and then some. A 
Euro, which settled at $1.50 in the last Wednesday of November 2009 was down 
became $1.43 in December 2009. In the political realm, the dollar’s weakness is 
interpreted as a referendum on American declined (Lynch, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
  Singapore was the first East Asian country to fall into recession from the 
current global economic crisis in July 2008. It was projected that the Singapore 
economy worked grow by -1.0 to 2 percent in 2009. As compared to Singapore, 
the Hong Kong economy contracted later and only declined into a recession in the 
middle of November. Hong Kong is projected to grow by 2 percent in 2009 from 
5.6 percent in 2007 (Regional Economic Outlook, 2008; excerpt from 
Thangavelu, 2008). This clearly reflects the greater vulnerability of the 
Singaporean economy to external conditions and global economic shocks. The 
economic condition in Singapore is further accentuated by the huge loss in wealth 
(large negative wealth effect) from the rapidly declining a Singaporean stock 
market from the global financial crisis, whereas the Singapore Stock Index was 
above 3500 points in December 2007 and as of November 2008 it was hovering at 
around 1700 points (Thangavelu, 2008). 
ASEAN is Singapore’s hinterland with a population of nearly 540 million 
in ASEAN-10. Thus a larger single market such as ASEAN will provide stronger 
economic base to ride out global shocks. The ASEAN region could play an 
important role in the stabilization and growth of the South-east Asian countries. 
Intra-regional trade in ASEAN and Asia will be one of the key factors for export 
growth as the key export markets in United States and European Union flattens. 
Intra-regional trade in Asia accounted for nearly 50 percent of the total trade in 
Asia in 2006. In ASEAN-10, the share of intra-ASEAN trade increased from 17 
percent in 1990 to nearly 26 percent in 2005. The share of intra-regional trade 
among ASEAN+3 (ASEAN-10 including, China, Japan, and Korea) in 1990 was 
 
 
 
 
nearly 29 percent and it increased to 39 percent in 2005. As countries are 
contemplating greater regulation to protect their market from financial crisis, it is 
imperative that ASEAN emphasize greater regional trade and integration in terms 
of removing trade restrictions and behind border barriers to trade. In particular, 
there could be a greater harmonization of technical standard and regulations 
within ASEAN, which allows for a greater vertical and horizontal integration of 
firms in the global production network (Thangavelu, 2008). 
   Table. 1.2 
Average Annual Net FDI Flows 
1980-2007 
Country 
Average Annual Net FDI Flows (US$, Millions) 
1980-1989 1990-1995 1996-2001 2001-2007 
Brunei 1 103 625 942 
Indonesia 326 2,164 251 3,633 
Malaysia 965 4,655 4,095 4.786 
Philippines 318 1,028 1,367 1,737 
Singapore 1,907 6,24 13,239 16.917 
Thailand 515 2,004 4,702 6,844 
Vietnam 6 947 1,694 2,563 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2008 (excerpt from Chaudhury, 2009)  
Since ASEAN matured in the post-Bretton Woods era of financial and 
trade liberalization, there was a little risk of the bloc imposing externally 
protectionist policies. Its economic clout was small relative to the European Union 
(EU) and the dominant development strategy in the region was export-oriented 
industrialization (EOI), which had a proven track record in Japan, as well as 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea (the latter four 
constituting the original Asian ‘tiger’ economies). As Such, these economies 
established their major exports markets outside of ASEAN-5 and encourage extra-
 
 
 
 
ASEAN flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to finance the current account 
deficits run-up through purchases of capital goods and technology needed to 
improve factor productivity (see Table 1.2). Apart from Singapore, the ASEAN-5 
either pegged their currencies to the U.S. Dollar or maintained a managed float 
regime in order to create an environment conducive to investment and maintain 
export price competitiveness. During the boom years, the depreciating effect of 
consistent current account deficits on the exchange rate was offset by both FDI 
and portfolio investment flows as well as active intervention in the foreign 
exchange markets by central banks. The power of monetary authorities to 
maintain exchange rates within an acceptable band depended primarily on the 
volume of foreign exchange reserves they were willing to sacrifice in currency 
markets. As would later be seen however, it also depended on the credibility of 
the authorities committing to the exchange rate policy, as perceived by global 
capital markets (Chaudhury, 2009).  
The current global crisis provides an ideal opportunity for ASEAN to 
increase its monetary and economic policy coordination in the region. The greater 
economic and social cooperation in ASEAN could be effective in managing 
systemic external shock such as the current global economic crisis and could help 
in providing greater economic stability in the region. In terms of economic 
cooperation, ASEAN could accelerate the technology transfer from more 
technologically advanced countries to the latecomers within ASEAN. The current 
global crisis could stall the development of vulnerable countries within ASEAN 
and widen the development gap, thereby decelerating the integration process. 
 
 
 
 
ASEAN could also provide development and social support for the less vulnerable 
countries to maintain the pace of economic development within the region 
(Thangavelu, 2008). 
Table. 1.3 
ASEAN Intra and Extra Trade 
  2006 
Country 
Exports Imports 
Intra-ASEAN Extra-ASEAN Intra-ASEAN Extra-ASEAN 
Value 
(US$ 
million) 
Share to 
Value 
(US$ 
million) 
Share to 
Value 
(US$ 
million) 
Share to 
Value 
(US$ 
million) 
Share to 
Country Country Country Country 
Total  
(%) 
Total  
(%) 
Total  
(%) 
Total  
(%) 
BRUNEI 1,887.3 24.8 5,732.0 75.2 745.8 50.1 743.1 49.9 
CAMBODIA 235.4 6.7 3,279.1 93.3 991.2 33.9 1,931.8 66.1 
INDONESIA 18,483.1 18.3 82,315.5 81.7 19,379.2 31.7 41,686.3 68.3 
LAOS 289.8 72.0 112.8 28.0 500.7 85.2 86.8 14.8 
MALAYSIA 40,979.6 26.1 116,247.3 73.9 32,290.7 25.2 96,025.5 74.8 
MYANMAR 2,149.7 61.2 1,365.0 38.8 1,174.7 55.5 940.8 44.5 
PHILIPPINES 8,192.2 17.3 39,217.9 82.7 10,218.3 19.7 41,555.3 80.3 
SINGAPORE 83,801.6 30.9 187,806.3 69.1 62,300.4 26.1 176,181.6 73.9 
THAILAND 26,944.2 22.2 94,635.3 77.8 23,539.8 18.5 103,569.0 81.5 
VIETNAM 6,214.0 16.8 30,819.7 83.2 12,453.7 31.0 27,783.1 69.0 
ASEAN 189,176.8 25.2 561,531.0 74.8 163,594.5 25.0 490,503.3 75.0 
 Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 2006 (excerpt from Thangavelu, 2008) 
 
The key to ASEAN Economic Community is in removing barriers to trade 
and investment in services. Services trade is expected to provide dynamic growth 
effects in the region and provide important linkage for manufacturing production 
networks. The liberalization of services in the region is slow and it is important to 
accelerate the liberalization of services in the region. A larger single market such 
as ASEAN will provide stronger economic base to ride out global shocks and thus 
the integration of ASEAN into ASEAN Economic Community will be crucial for 
the long term sustainable growth for Singapore and the region. The integration of 
 
 
 
 
the ASEAN as a single market will provide a larger base to smooth out global 
shocks and increase the ability of the region to ride external shock more 
effectively. In this respect, the region should increase its intra-regional trade in 
ASEAN and Asia (Thangavelu, 2008). 
The history of the yen/dollar rate over the few decades confirms the 
instability of major exchange rates. In the summer of 1985 the dollar was 250 yen 
and on the eve of the plaza Accord in September 1985, the rate was decreased to 
239 and further fallen unprecedented in 1995 to 78 yen. The dollar appreciated 
from 78 yen in April 1995 to 148 yen in June 1998 in a period of East Asian 
financial crisis. The low yen shut off Japanese foreign direct investment in East 
Asia and close down its engine of growth (Mundell, 2003, excerpt from Choo and 
Choong, 2009). At the same time the rising dollar appreciated the currencies of 
ASEAN economies, especially Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia to overvalued 
positions that led them under the pressure of speculation. Indeed, there is strong 
evidence from the existing studies to support the idea that the instability of the 
dollar-yen exchange rates was a main factor in contributing to occurrence of the 
crisis (Choo and Choong, 2009). 
In responding to the crisis, ASEAN heads of governments in December 
1997 set out their ASEAN ‘Vision 2020’ statement. The vision contained a 
message in favor of moving towards closer cohesion and economic integration. It 
was soon followed by an action plan concluded in the following year at the 
ASEAN summit in Hanoi. The action plan among other things, calls for a 
strengthening of the financial system in the region to maintain regional 
 
 
 
 
macroeconomic and financial stability, and to intensify cooperation on money, tax 
and other financial related matters. Prior to East Asia crisis, economic integration 
in East Asia has been enhancing via the market driven forces such as cross-border 
trade, FDI (foreign direct investment) and finance. Over the past 20 years, 
international trade and FDI activities have expanded rapidly through multilateral 
international institutions such as World Trade Organization (WTO), Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) as well as unilateral (or multilateral) trade 
liberalization processes. Nevertheless, the patterns of economic cooperation in 
East Asian countries have been changed, especially after the East Asia financial 
crisis erupted in mid-1997. The rapidly changing international environment and 
East Asia crisis have emerged a common interest amongst East Asia countries in 
creating a strong impetus for regional cooperation. This has led to the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) agreement on bilateral swaps and discussion of the possibility of 
creating a monetary union among the ASEAN+3. Indeed, there have been few 
attempts proposed to create cooperative frameworks that help to prevent and 
manage future currency crises and to promote economic efficiency by developing 
sound financial systems. Japan, for example, has proposed to create an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF) in September 1997. The members of this Fund would 
contribute some portion of their international reserves to a central fund, which 
would be utilized to provide a financial assistance to countries affected by 
external crises such as financial and currency crises. However, the United States, 
China and the IMF against the establishment of the AMF proposal on two 
reasons: soft conditionality and duplication. As a further step in promoting Asian 
 
 
 
 
economic integration, Japanese finance minister Miyazawa has made a proposal 
that is called “New Miyazawa Initiative” in October 1998, which aimed to set up a 
financial assistance scheme totaling 30 billion US dollars. This Initiatives, 
however, has met with strong criticism because the proposal is too Japan-centered, 
and the attitude of Japan in regional initiatives is rather ambiguous (Moon, 2000, 
excerpt from Choo and Choong, 2009). Although this proposals were rejected, 
there were few more successful initiatives had been proposed towards a closer 
monetary cooperation in Asian. For example, a conference was held in Manila in 
November 1997, which consisted of deputy finance ministers and central bank 
governors from 14 mostly Asian countries. The outcome of the conference was 
the establishment of Manila Framework Group (MFG), a new framework to 
enhance Asian Regional cooperation and to promote financial stability in the 
region. In addition, the ASEAN finance ministers agreed to establish the ASEAN 
Surveillance Process (ASP) in October 1998 to encourage policy dialogue based 
on the peer review and mutual interest among ASEAN member countries. In 
November 1999, China, Japan, and South Korea had been invited to join ASP, 
which making “ASEAN+3” reality in financial surveillance (Choo and Choong, 
2009).         
To reinforce the Hanoi action plan in order to achieve this goal, ASEAN 
nations have also moved forward by looking at a wider region in terms of 
economic and financial cooperation through the Chiang Mai Initiatives (CMI) that 
was launched in May 2000. The initiative aimed to develop a network of bilateral 
swap agreements (local currency to US dollar or Japanese) among Northeast 
 
 
 
 
Asian countries, and strengthening an intra-ASEAN swap agreement. In May 
2002, bilateral swap agreements between Japan, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and China were initiated. Also the ASEAN swap agreement was 
extended to cover all the 10 member countries. The CMI represents the first 
milestone towards constructing a coordinated intervention policy and currency 
arrangement regionally. Nevertheless, this step is more likely to be more a case of 
“pooling reserve” in dealing with external instability or crises than a commitment 
to bilateral intervention to stabilize regional bilateral exchange rates. Obviously, 
financial cooperation has seen some positive progress among East Asia countries; 
however, incentives for monetary cooperation are still lack (Choo and Choong, 
2009).    
 The East Asian crisis, obviously, has demonstrated the dangers of pegging 
exchange rates in the presence of liberalized international capital markets without 
the requisite political commitment (Chow and Kim, 2003, excerpt from Choo and 
Choong, 2009). Although Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) present as financial and 
monetary cooperation between ASEAN and Japan, China, Korea commit to 
bilateral intervention to stabilize regional bilateral exchange rates, but however 
incentives for monetary cooperation are still lack. Since the introduction of the 
Euro as the sole currency of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the currency 
has became the second most important currency in the world and has been one of 
the most significant developments in international monetary relations in the 
present and future. As consequences, three-currency triad formed by the dollar, 
euro and yen currency areas now dominates the international monetary core. The 
 
 
 
 
success of the EMU has provided a useful and convincing framework in 
investigating the possibility of forming a single currency area or monetary union 
in East Asian region generally and ASEAN economic particularly. The formation 
of single currency area or currency union in East Asia covers many advantages. 
Firstly, the existence of a common currency area is thought to be one of the main 
resolutions to minimize the exchange rate fluctuation that has significant impact 
on both macroeconomic stability and balance of payment position. Secondly, the 
major advantage of the union is that it facilities and promotes a greater trade and 
investment among the members of the union and therefore, stimulates economic 
growth by reducing transaction costs in cross-border activities and minimizing 
exchange rates volatility across the union. Finally, the union aims to strengthen 
economic and financial surveillance and exchange of information by hoping that 
the bilateral swap-arrangements and regional surveillance could beneficial crisis 
countries in East Asia (Choo and Choong, 2009). 
The issue of financial integration in East Asia has received growing 
attention in recent decades. Since the beginning of the 1990s some authors started 
to look at issues related to monetary integration in East Asia, for example Frankel 
(1991,1993), Frankel and Wei (1994), Goto and Hamada (1994), Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1994). However, in the case of ASEAN nations, the issues of 
monetary integration was almost unimaginable, at least until the 1997-1998 
financial crisis hit most of its member countries. The crisis had persuaded the 
ASEAN nations to think of themselves more in terms of a region, and musings 
about the idea of having a common currency for ASEAN surfaced (Ramayandi, 
 
 
 
 
2005). Although European Monetary Union has 12 members, the total area of 
these countries is only 40% of total area of China, and most of which locate in the 
central Europe Continent and share a similar culture and economic development. 
But East Asia is more characterized by diversity in terms of size, levels of 
economic development and political and social system. Table 1.4 shows the 
divergence of country size and population among China, Japan, and Korea. 
Table. 1.4 
ASEAN Key Trade by Region 
(Value in US$ million; share in percent) 
 2006 
Partner Value Share to total ASEAN trade 
Country/region Exports Imports Total Trade Exports Imports Total Trade 
ASEAN 189,176.8 163,594.5 352,771.4 25.2 25.0 25.1 
JAPAN 81,284.9 80,495.6 161,780.5 10.8 12.3 11.5 
USA 96,943.5 64,252.5 161,196.0 12.9 9.8 11.5 
EUROPEAN UNION 94,471.8 66,118.1 160,589.9 12.6 10.1 11.4 
CHINA 65,010.3 74,950.9 139,961.2 8.7 11.5 10.0 
KOREA 25,670.0 26,849.7 52,519.6 3.4 4.1 3.7 
AUSTRALIA 23,148.5 13,262.8 36,411.4 3.1 2.0 2.6 
INDIA 18,928.1 9,774.6 28,702.7 2.5 1.5 2.0 
CANADA 3,916.4 2,970.3 6,886.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 
RUSSIA 1,583.0 2,841.1 4,424.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 
NEW ZEALAND 3,018.6 1,531.2 4,549.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 
PAKISTAN 2,986.2 296.1 3,282.4 0.4 - 0.2 
Total Selected Partner  606,138.2 506,937.5 1,113,075.7 80.7 77.5 79.2 
countries/regions 
Others 144,569.6 147,160.4 291,730.0 19.3 22.5 20.8 
Total Selected Partner  750,707.8 654,097.8 1,404,805.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 
      Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 2006 (excerpt from Thangavelu, 2008)     
 
 
 
 
  Table. 1.5 
Basic Characters of 
China, Japan and Korea 
 2005 
Country 
Area Population Population Density  
Human 
Development 
Index 
(sq. km) (million people) (people per sq. km.) (%) 
China 9,598,050 1,297 135 0.525 
Japan 377,800 127 336 0.943 
Korea 99,260 48 484 0.707 
 Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator and HDI, 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
             Table. 1.6 
Basic Characters of 
Germany, France and Italy 
 2005 
Country 
Area Population Population Density  
Human 
Development 
Index 
(sq. km) (million people) (people per sq. km.) (%) 
Germany 357,030 82 230 0.93 
France 551,500 59 107 0.93 
Italy 301,340 58 191 0.92 
   Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator and HDI, 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
China is the largest country in both terms of area and population but with a 
relatively lowest population density of 135, while Korea is the smallest country 
with more than 480 people per sq. km. According to Human Development Index 
(2005), which indicates the level of human and economic development of a 
country, Japan enjoys an advanced status with a high score of 0.943 out of 1, 
whereas China and Korea still belong to medium level. Comparing to Table 1.6 
 
 
 
 
which gives the relevant information of Germany, France, and Italy, we can see 
that every indicator appears more harmony among EMU (European Monetary 
Union) members (Jikang and Yin, 2005). 
Figure. 1.1 
GDP 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1979-2004(Constant 2000) 
(Million US$) 
 
      Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005)                                          
                Figure. 1.2 
GDP per capita PPP 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1979-2004(Constant 2000) 
(International $) 
                    Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
China experienced a vigorous growth since the economic reform in 1978. 
After more than two decades of expansion, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
totaled 1,506 billion USD in 2004, which is nearly 10 times as much as that in 
1979. In spite of enjoying the highest economic growth, China’s GDP and GDP 
per capita is still far less than Japan and Korea. Figure 1.1 and 1.2 shows the huge 
differentials in GDP size among China, Japan and Korea. In 2004, China’s GDP is 
30% of the GDP of Japan, and 2 times that of Korea. But when it comes to GDP 
per capita, China had the bad performance among the three, which accounts for 
18% of GDP per capita of Japan and 27% of Korea (Jikang and Yin, 2005). 
 Figure. 1.3 
GDP 
Germany, France, and Italy 
1972-2000(Constant 2000) 
(Million US$) 
 
                                Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 1.4 
GDP per capita PPP 
Germany, France, and Italy 
1975-2000(Constant 2000) 
(International $) 
 
                             Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Figure 1.3 and 1.4 give the GDP size and GDP per capita of the 3 EMU 
members. Figure 1.2 shows a similarly ascending trend of GDP size among 
Germany, France and Italy, and figure 1.3 displays a coherency of GDP per 
capita. Comparing to those figures of China, Japan and Korea, we have to say that 
there is much less similarity of economic size among these East Asia countries. 
 
 
 
 
   Figure. 1.5 
China, Japan, and Korea 
GDP Growth (annual %), 1979-2004 
 
                             Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 1.6 
GDP Growth 
Germany, France, and Italy 
1972-2000 
(annual %) 
 
                             Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
           Table. 1.7 
GDP Growth Correlation 
China, Japan, and Korea 
 1979-2004 
Country China Japan Korea 
China 1 - - 
Japan -0.12 1 - 
Korea 0.18 0.41 1 
  Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
          Table. 1.8 
GDP Growth Correlation 
Germany, France and Italy 
 1972-2000 
Country Germany France Italy 
Germany 1 - - 
France 0.59 1 - 
Italy 0.58 0.76 1 
  Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Other than GDP sizes, GDP growth patterns are different among China, 
Japan and Korea. Figure 1.5 illustrates the economic growth paths during the last 
25 years, where China’s have an average GDP growth of 9.5% while Japan 2.7% 
and Korea 6.7%. When we comparing them to those of EMU members (see 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5), we have to agree to the less similarity of GDP growth among East 
Asia countries (Jikang and Lin, 2005). Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 contain the 
Pearson correlation of two groups, which give a quantitative description of 
different extent of GDP growth coherence. The correlation between China and 
Korea is only 0.18 while between China and Japan is negative. The correlation of 
economic growth between Japan and Korea is relatively high, but still much lower 
than those between Germany, France, and Italy. Labor mobility helps members of 
a monetary union to adjust to asymmetric shocks by allowing labor mobility 
varies across countries. Although the level of labor mobility is rather low in East 
Asia relatively to that of Europe, it had been rapidly increasing since 1990s. In 
1991 there were 1.2 million foreign residents in Japan, which was less than 1% of 
Japan's population. Of this number, 693,100 (about 57%) were Koreans and 
171,100 (some 14%) were Chinese According to data from Ministry of Justice of 
Japan (excerpt from Jikang and Lin, 2005), registered Chinese increased from 
150,000 in 1990 to 462,000 in 2003, and registered Korean increased more than 
60,000. In 2003, around 8,300 Koreans went abroad to permanently settle in a 
foreign country. According to government surveys of emigrants, China is the 
second popular destination (16.8%) and Japan the third (12.6%). Of course, 
currently, the degree of labor mobility is still rather low comparing to that of 
EMU members before their forming European Monetary Union (Jikang and Lin, 
2005). 
Despite relatively low level of labor mobility, capital mobility East Asia is 
high. Moon, 2000 (excerpt from Jikang and Lin, 2005) indicate that, in the mid-
 
 
 
 
1990s, the ratio of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow to regional GDP was 
the highest in East Asia (1.56%), followed by the EU (1.26%), and the ratios of 
outflow to regional GDP show the same order: 1.74% in East Asia, 1.59% in EU. 
Intra-Asia FDI accounts for more than 60% of China’s total FDI inflow, and the 
number of Japan is 7.9% in 2002 and 9.5% in 2003. South Korea’s FDI to China 
increased even strong from 5.2% in 2002 to 8.4% in 2003. Figure 1.8 shows that 
Japan’s FDI to China growing strongly after 1999. Trade openness indicates the 
extent of an economy’s openness to the whole world. According to McKinnon, 
1963 (excerpt from Jikang and Lin, 2005) the higher the openness levels of 
potential members, the lower the demand for autonomous monetary policy, and 
the more suitable to form a monetary union. As we can see from figure 1.8, 
China’s trade openness increased dramatically from a little than 10% of GDP in 
1979 to nearly 70% in 2004. Korea has been a high openness country in the term 
of trade, with a trade volume accounted for more than 50% for 25 years. Whereas 
Japan is more inclined to use protective trade policy, whose total trade volume has 
been less than 30% of GDP all these time, and came to around 20% of GDP since 
middle 1980s. In this aspect, China and Korea are sharing more and more 
similarity, with the trade openness of more than three times that of Japan, which 
indicates the international exposures of these three economies are quite different, 
and in turn may cause different performance when hit by external shocks. When 
we come to the trade openness of Germany, France and Italy (see Figure 1.9), we 
find the openness level and moving trend of these EMU members, unlike the East 
Asia group, are in agreeable harmony (Jikang and Yin, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 1.7 
FDI Outflow 
Japan 
(million US$) 
 
                                 Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 1.8 
Trade  
China, Japan, and Korea 
1979-2003 
(% of GDP) 
 
                                    Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Figure. 1.9 
Trade  
Germany, France, and Italy 
1772-2000 
(% of GDP) 
 
                                 Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.9 
Trade Intensity Index 
1999 
Country China Japan Korea 
China 0 - - 
Japan 2.5 0 - 
Korea 2.7 2.5 0 
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 
   Statistics Bureau of Japan 
   Korea National Statistical office 
   World Trade Union database  
(excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Table 1.10 
Trade Intensity Index 
            2004 
Country China Japan Korea 
China 0 - - 
Japan 4.8 0 - 
Korea 3.0 4.6 0 
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 
   Statistics Bureau of Japan 
   Korea National Statistical office 
   World Trade Union database 
(excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005)  
Figure 1.10 
Trade Intensity Index 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1991-2004 
 
             Source: Direction of Trade Yearbook, IMF (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.11 
Trade Intensity Index 
Germany, France, and Italy 
1988-2000 
 
Source: Direction of Trade Yearbook, IMF (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Trade intensity among China, Japan and Korea is rather high comparing to 
that among Germany, France and Italy. But at the same time we find the intensity 
is much more volatile in the East Asia group than the EU group. Of course high 
trade intensity indicates high interdependence between economies, which is 
favorable in order to form a currency union, but at the same time high fluctuation 
is obstacle. But at the same time, although intra-regional trade increases by 
numbers, all these countries were beginning to diversify their trade partners, this 
leads to the result of decreasing bilateral trade share among total trade that shown 
in Figure 1.12 (Jikang and Yin, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.12 
Bilateral Trade Share of Total Trade 
1995-2004 
Source: 
Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 
Statistics Bureau of Japan 
 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office 
               Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 
               Statistics Bureau of Japan  
(excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
Figure 1.13 
Structure of Output 
2004 
(% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development and Policy (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Figure 1.14 
Structure of Output 
2000 
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
Due to the difference in development stage, China’s productive structural 
is quite different from that of Japan and Korea. Figure 1.13 shows that agriculture 
sector still accounts for 15% of total output of China in 2004, whereas the 
corresponding figure of Japan 1%, and Korea 3%. Service sector dominates 
Japanese and Korean economy by contributing more than 60% of GDP, while for 
China as the largest share comes from industrial production. Economic structure 
of Japan and Korea are more close to each other, but different from that of China. 
Comparing with figure 1.14, which illustrates the outcome structure of Germany, 
France and Italy in 2000, the productive structure of the latter group displayed 
much more similarity (Jikang and Yin, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.15 
Money and Quasi Money (M2) 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1979-2004 
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
Depth of financial development, exchange rate regime arrangement and 
policy monetary preference are major differences in financial aspect among the 3 
countries. Figure 1.15 describes financial depth process of China, Japan and 
Korea. We can see that although Korea bears many similarities in other aspects 
with Japan, the financial depth indicator of Korea in 2004, evaluated from money 
and quasi money to GDP, is only half of that of Japan and 40% of China. China’s 
M2 maintain strong growth during the past 25 years, and first excelled Japan in 
1997, but this is much more because of its exchange rate policy than financial 
development. Table1.11 lists relevant information about differentiations in 
exchange rate regime and monetary policy (Jikang and Yin, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.11 
Exchange Rate Arrangements and Anchors of Monetary Policy 
Country Exchange Rate Regime Monetary Policy Framework 
China 
De facto peg arrangement under a 
formally announced policy of 
managed of independent 
floating(against dollar) 
Exchange rate anchor, Monetary 
aggregate target 
Japan Independently floating 
Has no explicitly stated nominal anchor, 
but rather monitors various indicators in 
conducting monetary policy 
 
 
Korea 
 
 
Independently floating Other (not specific) 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Inflation rates differentials will change the purchasing power of currencies 
of potential members disproportionably. The more convergent inflation rates are 
among economies, the more suitable for them to form a currency union. Here, we 
use GDP deflator as an indicator of inflation rate. As we can see from Figure 1.16, 
inflation rate fluctuated dramatically in China and Korea in the past three decades, 
while Japan successfully controlled inflation under 5%, but this is partly because 
of the stagnation of economic growth. As a contrast, inflation levels among the 
EMU members (see Figure 1.17) converging steadily after 1980, being controlled 
fewer than 5% since 1992 and below 2% in the late 1990s. Table 1.12 and Table 
1.13 provide the Pearson correlation of inflation among China, Japan, and Korea, 
versus Germany, France and Italy. The correlation among East Asia group is 
 
 
 
 
similar to the level of the EMU group, which is positive evidence for suitability of 
forming monetary cooperation (Jikang and Yin, 2005). 
Figure 1.16 
Inflation (GDP Deflator) 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1979-2004 
 
        Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
Figure 1.17 
Inflation (GDP Deflator) 
Germany, France, and Italy 
 
      Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.12 
Inflation (GDP Deflator) Correlation 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1979-2004 
Country China Japan Korea 
China 1 - - 
Japan 0.69 1 - 
Korea 0.998 0.70 1 
Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
Table 1.13 
Inflation (GDP Deflator) Correlation 
Germany, France, and Italy 
1972-2000 
Country Germany France Italy 
Germany 1 - - 
France 0.71 1 - 
Italy 0.67 0.95 1 
Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
Figure 1.18 
Money and Quasi Money Growth 
China, Japan and Korea 
1979-2003 
                 
         Source: World Bank; World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.19 
Money and Quasi Money 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1979-2003 
(% of GDP) 
    
           Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Figure 1.20 
NER (Nominal Exchange Rate) 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1979-2003 
       
           Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.21 
REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate) 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1980-2004 (2000=100) 
          
        Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.14 
REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate) Correlation 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1979-2004 
Country China Japan Korea 
China 1 - - 
Japan -0.87 1 - 
Korea -0.47 0.45 1 
Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
Table 1.15 
Descriptive of REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate) 
China, Japan and Korea 
1979-2004 (2000=100) 
Country Mean Std. Deviation 
China 130.92 65.06 
Japan 80.73 14.29 
Korea 92.45 11.00 
Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
Table 1.16 
REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate) Correlation 
Germany, France and Italy 
1975-2000 
Country Germany France Italy 
Germany 1 - - 
France 0.64 1 - 
Italy 0.35 0.1 1 
Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.17 
Descriptive of REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate) 
Germany, France, and Italy 
1975-2000 (2000=100) 
Country Mean Std. Deviation 
Germany 115.42 8.24 
France 109.92 6.81 
Italy 105.65 8.71 
Source: World Bank, World Develop Indicator 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Figure 1.20 and Figure 1.21 explicate the Nominal Exchange Rate (NER), 
vis-à-vis the US dollar, and Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) of China, 
Japan, and Korea over the period of 1979-2004. The first figure shows remarkable 
divergence of nominal exchange rate, while the latter shows an amazing 
convergening trend in REER of China, Japan and Korea. But this may be an 
illusion since we set the REER in 2000 equals to 100. At the same time, REERs of 
these countries fluctuate differently during the observing period. Table 1.14 gives 
the Pearson correlation of REERs of East Asia group; we find that the correlation 
of REER is negative between China, Japan, and China and Korea; while Japan 
and Korea have a correlation of 0,45. We believe this lack of synchronization in 
REER movement is a great obstacle of forming a currency union between China 
and Japan and Korea. Table 1.15 also shows the volatility of REERs, among 
which Chinese Yuan is the least stable currency with a standard deviation of 65, 
which is another drawback in monetary cooperation. When comparing to the 
REER correlation (see Table 1.16) of Germany, France and Italy, we cannot find a 
strongly evidence that they share more similarity in REER movement among the 
 
 
 
 
EMU members, but surely, the correlation between Germany and France, 0.64 is 
40% higher than that of Japan and Korea. Table 1.17 shows the descriptions of 
REER historical data, where the volatilities of these currencies are greatly lower 
and closer to each other than those of the East Asia group (Jikang and Yin, 2005). 
Table 1.18 
Correlation of Real Supply Shock 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1980-2000 
Country China Japan Korea 
China 1 - - 
Japan 0.09 1 - 
Korea 0.12 0.42 1 
Source: Ding and Li, 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
 
Table 1.19 
Correlation of Real Supply Shock 
Germany, France and Italy 
1980-2000 
Country Germany France Italy 
Germany 1 - - 
France 0.31 1 - 
Italy 0.62 0.5 1 
Source: Ding and Li, 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Table 1.20 
Correlation of Real Demand Shock 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1980-2000 
Country China Japan Korea 
China 1 - - 
Japan 0.18 1 - 
 
 
 
 
Korea 0.60 0.41 1 
Source: Ding and Li, 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Table 1.21 
Correlation of Real Demand Shock 
Germany, France, and Italy 
1980-2000 
Country Germany France Italy 
Germany 1 - - 
France 0.44 1 - 
Italy 0.44 0.32 1 
Source: Ding and Li, 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Table 1.22 
Correlation of Monetary Shock 
China, Japan, and Korea 
1980-2000 
Country China Japan Korea 
China 1 - - 
Japan -0.12 1 - 
Korea 0.09 -0.06 1 
Source: Ding and Li, 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Table 1.23 
Correlation of Real Supply Shock 
Germany, France and Italy 
1980-2000 
Country Germany France Italy 
Germany 1 - - 
France 0.67 1 - 
Italy 0.67 0.46 1 
Source: Ding and Li, 2005 (excerpt from Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
Table 1.18 to Table 1.23 display correlations of real supply shock, real 
demand shock and monetary shock among East Asia group and EMU member 
 
 
 
 
group. Real supply shock correlation and real demand shock correlation between 
Japan and Korea is close to those among EMU members, however the correlation 
between China and Japan and China and Korea show less symmetry. As far as 
monetary shock correlation is concerned, we find China, Japan and Korea still 
have a long process to go in order to reach the precondition of OCA criteria. 
Monetary shock correlation between China and Japan and Japan and Korea is 
negative; the correlation between China and Korea is less than 0.1 whereas the 
correlations among EMU members are 0.67 and 0.67 and also 0.46 during 1980-
2000 (Jikang and Yin, 2005). 
From Jikang and Yin (2005) research result, we can comprehensively 
examine the economic suitability for forming a monetary union within China, 
Japan and Korea, the three major economies in East Asia. We can also compare 
the many economic indicators stressed by OCA theories of China, Japan, and 
Korea over the period of 1979 to 2004 to that of Germany, France and Italy from 
1972 to 2000. This research found that capital mobility is high, intra regional 
trade is intensive between China, Japan and Korea, but economic development, 
productive structure, financial development, and exchange rate correlation, 
comparing to those of the three EMU members, East Asia group are less favorable 
to OCA criteria. This research also compare the correlation of real supply shock, 
real demand shock and monetary shock between two groups; that founded the 
correlation between Japan and Korea is close to those among EMU members in 
terms of real supply shock and real demand shock, but the economic adjustment 
mechanisms to monetary shock bear great difference and correlations among the 
 
 
 
 
three East Asia country is extremely low. Therefore Jikang and Yin (2005) believe 
China, Japan and Korea are less ready for a monetary cooperation than Europe 
was in terms of economic conditions. 
The trade intensity index between the five ASEAN economies in Table 
1.24 shows that each country (except for the Philippines and Indonesia) has been 
intensively trading with the others. In most cases, the trade intensity index figures 
also show an increasing trend and the highest value of the index is found in the 
case of trading with Singapore. Those trends indicate the tendency that recently 
the five ASEAN economies are trading more intensively among themselves. Over 
the period 1996–2001, Indonesia experienced an increase in the trade intensity 
index with its four neighboring trade partners. The most dramatic trade intensity 
increase occurred in the case of trade with Malaysia (about 79 per cent increase), 
while the lowest increase occurred in the case of trade with Thailand (about 22 per 
cent). In most cases, the trade intensity improvement peaked in 1998 and slows 
down a bit in the following years. Malaysia’s case is similar to that of Indonesia. 
Here, the most dramatic increase in trade intensity occurred in the case of trade 
with Indonesia (about 88 percent), while the lowest occurred in the case with 
Thailand (about 7 per cent). Singapore and Thailand share similar patterns in 
terms of trends of their trade intensity with the neighboring economies. Both 
experienced the most dramatic increase in trade intensity index with the 
Philippines (about 83 per cent for Singapore and about 93 per cent for Thailand), 
while both also experienced a slow-down in trade intensity between each other 
(about -11 per cent for Singapore and -17 per cent for Thailand). It is noteworthy; 
 
 
 
 
however, that both Singapore and Thailand have been trading very intensively 
with each other throughout the period under consideration.4 Philippines, on the 
other hand, shows a slightly different pattern from its neighbors. Although it 
reciprocates the trade intensity with Singapore (the index increase by about 60 per 
cent over the period), it does not do so in the case of Indonesia. The trade intensity 
index for the Philippines with Indonesia decreases by about 3.5 per cent over the 
period, and its magnitude also suggests that Philippines is not intensively trading 
with Indonesia at this time. Table 1.24 also shows that trade complementarily acts 
as a relatively strong driver behind this more intensified trade in the region. All 
the economies in the region show a magnitude of trade complementarily index -
that is above one. This suggests that those economies are relatively ‘matched’ in 
terms of trade commodity compositions. An exception, however, is evident in the 
case of Indonesia. The magnitude of this index almost always lies below one in all 
cases. Therefore, in this instance, the increasing intensity of trade between 
Indonesia and its neighboring economies is not being driven by the matching of 
trade commodity composition, but rather by something else. As also evident from 
Table 1.24, the biggest contributor for the highly intensified trade in all cases 
comes from the trade bias effect. In all cases, the bias component plays a large 
role in increasing the trade intensity within the region (all figures for this index 
are larger than one). As mentioned earlier, this effect depends on various items 
like transport costs and the existence of discriminatory trade policies. It seems that 
the signing of AFTA and the 1997–98 financial crises are among the driving 
 
 
 
 
factors behind this trade bias effect. This bias effect in trade may be of particular 
importance in explaining the increasing intensity of trade between Indonesia and  
Table 1.24 
Trade Indices for ASEAN countries 
1996-2001 
Country Year 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
B C I B C I B C I B C I B C I 
Indonesia 
1996 0 0 0 2.94 0.51 1.50 2.41 0.85 2.05 4.53 0.78 3.53 2.73 0.52 1.43 
1997 0 0 0 3.01 0.60 1.81 3.02 0.70 2.11 5.70 0.73 4.14 2.05 0.68 1.40 
1998 0 0 0 3.90 0.68 2.65 3.68 0.68 2.52 8.40 0.72 6.00 3.16 0.79 2.51 
1999 0 0 0 3.61 0.65 2.36 3.26 0.69 2.26 6.97 0.71 4.95 2.40 0.79 1.89 
2000 0 0 0 3.57 0.70 2.51 2.69 0.94 2.52 6.43 0.76 4.90 2.18 0.79 1.73 
2001 0 0 0 3.72 0.72 2.68 2.95 0.96 2.84 6.64 0.74 4.93 1.98 0.88 1.75 
Malaysia 
1996 2.63 0.70 1.85 0 0 0 1.32 1.33 1.76 4.70 1.69 7.96 3.08 1.14 3.52 
1997 2.95 0.69 2.05 0 0 0 1.42 1.48 2.10 4.83 1.71 8.25 2.77 1.13 3.13 
1998 4.55 0.60 2.71 0 0 0 1.57 1.73 2.70 4.91 1.84 9.01 3.22 1.26 4.05 
1999 6.62 0.51 3.39 0 0 0 1.27 1.89 2.40 4.50 1.85 8.35 3.05 1.20 3.64 
2000 6.12 0.54 3.30 0 0 0 2.21 1.50 3.32 4.97 1.76 8.73 3.11 1.22 3.78 
2001 5.93 0.59 3.48 0 0 0 1.78 1.58 2.83 5.07 1.75 8.89 3.07 1.23 3.77 
Philippines 
1996 1.66 0.51 0.84 1.27 1.80 2.28 0 0 0 1.37 1.72 2.36 3.08 1.08 3.33 
1997 2.22 0.51 1.12 0.92 1.98 1.82 0 0 0 1.41 1.91 2.69 2.58 1.17 3.01 
1998 1.88 0.40 0.75 1.27 2.89 3.68 0 0 0 1.43 2.34 3.34 1.74 1.60 2.78 
1999 1.37 0.26 0.35 1.61 2.43 3.89 0 0 0 1.84 2.20 4.04 1.90 1.31 2.49 
2000 2.70 0.34 0.93 1.11 2.62 2.90 0 0 0 1.68 2.34 3.94 2.23 1.51 3.35 
2001 2.20 0.37 0.81 1.15 2.55 2.93 0 0 0 1.68 2.26 3.79 2.98 1.41 4.21 
Singapore 
1996 n.a n.a n.a 7.03 1.69 11.88 2.01 1.32 2.65 0 0 0 3.62 1.33 4.83 
1997 n.a n.a n.a 7.08 1.72 12.15 2.18 1.51 3.28 0 0 0 3.27 1.21 3.96 
1998 n.a n.a n.a 7.05 2.03 14.32 2.03 1.88 3.80 0 0 0 3.73 1.32 4.91 
1999 n.a n.a n.a 7.05 2.03 14.30 1.86 2.04 3.80 0 0 0 3.83 1.27 4.88 
2000 n.a n.a n.a 6.61 2.16 14.25 2.73 1.67 4.55 0 0 0 3.17 1.39 4.42 
2001 n.a n.a n.a 6.95 2.08 14.44 2.84 1.71 4.84 0 0 0 3.29 1.30 4.29 
Thailand 
1996 2.20 1.09 2.40 2.78 1.15 3.20 1.59 1.13 1.79 3.94 1.31 5.16 0 0 0 
1997 3.50 0.81 2.82 2.63 1.17 3.07 1.56 1.09 1.70 3.72 1.21 4.51 0 0 0 
1998 2.56 1.47 3.77 2.56 1.23 3.15 1.56 1.57 2.44 3.87 1.22 4.72 0 0 0 
1999 1.88 2.06 3.88 2.63 1.21 3.19 2.14 1.16 2.49 3.63 1.21 4.40 0 0 0 
2000 3.76 0.99 3.71 2.55 1.28 3.26 2.70 1.10 2.97 3.40 1.23 4.17 0 0 0 
2001 4.93 0.83 4.11 2.85 1.24 3.52 2.92 1.18 3.45 3.63 1.18 4.27 0 0 0 
Source: STARS, International Economic Data Bank (excerpt from Ramayandi, 2005) 
Note:  
I  = Trade Intensity Index 
 
 
 
 
C  = Complementary Index 
B  = Trade Bias Index 
 
its neighboring trade partners. In summary, in addition to any economic 
causes, the increasing trade intensity in ASEAN also seems to be supported by 
some institutionalized agenda to move towards a more integrated region. 
Therefore, if the picture from the recent development in the trade patterns in 
ASEAN continues, then the region may be able to capture the extra benefit of 
reduction in transaction costs and improvement in price transparency by forming a 
currency union (Ramayandi, 2005). 
An examination of the correlation coefficients for the aggregate supply 
shocks in ASEAN during 1960–1996 (just a year before the crisis started) 
suggests that the aggregate supply shocks across the five ASEAN nations are 
mostly not significantly correlated. Significant correlation is found for the cases of 
Table 1.25 
Correlation of Aggregate Supply Shocks across the ASEAN Nations 
 
Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand Philippines 
Aggregate Supply Shocks (1960-1996) 
     
Indonesia 1.00 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0.38* 1.00 0 0 0 
Singapore 0.16 0.36* 1.00 0 0 
Thailand 0.25 0.28 0.38* 1.00 0 
Philippines -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 0.08 1.00 
Aggregate Supply Shocks (1960-2002) 
     
Indonesia 1.00 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0.78* 1.00 0 0 0 
Singapore 0.40* 0.56* 1.00 0 0 
Thailand 0.46* 0.63* 0.45* 1.00 0 
Philippines 0.20 0.25 0.17 0.32* 1.00 
Source: Pacific Economic Papers, 2005 (excerpt from Ramayandi, 2005) 
*: Significance at 5% level 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia and Malaysia, Malaysia and Singapore, and Singapore and Thailand 
(see Table 1.25). The correlation between Malaysia and Thailand appears to be 
marginally significant. Although there are some significant correlations, the 
magnitude of the correlation coefficients itself are not particularly high. Those 
magnitudes are relatively low compared to the one for Western Europe for the 
period of 1969–1989. Regardless of the explanation behind such changes, the 
figures from Table 2 suggest that the region is now moving towards having more 
synchronized aggregate supply shock elements. As suggested by the theory of 
OCA, similarities in supply shocks plays a more important role in analyzing the 
economic disturbances. This then suggests that, based on this particular criterion, 
the five ASEAN economies (with some qualifications in the case of the 
Philippines) are now in a position to consider the possibility of introducing a more 
integrated monetary system (Ramayandi, 2005). 
Table 1.26 illustrates the magnitude of the correlation coefficients for the 
aggregate demand shocks in the five ASEAN economies. Except for the case of 
the Philippines, aggregate demand shocks in the five ASEAN countries look 
relatively synchronized, both before and after the post-crisis period. Those shocks 
were positively and significantly correlated within the region, with a relatively 
high magnitude. The pattern does not seem to change at all even after considering 
the post-crisis period. Although the correlation between aggregate demand shock 
in Indonesia and the Philippines ceases to be significant at the 5 per cent level 
under the sample for 1960–2002, it is still marginally significant at 10 per cent 
level. One interesting pattern that can be observed from Table 1.26, however, is 
 
 
 
 
that after expanding the series of observations, the magnitude of the Philippines 
aggregate demand correlation with the rest of the group tends to become lower. A 
possible explanation is that the impact of the 1997–98 crises on the Philippines is 
somewhat different from the other countries considered. The demand shocks 
essentially capture both the components of macro-policy shocks and the public 
preference shocks in private demand behavior. Relatively high and significantly 
positive correlation in the aggregate demand for the five economies, then suggests 
that the demand side behavior of those economies not only tends to be highly 
correlated but also evolved similarly over the observed period. In other words, the 
overall preferences on the demand side of those economies have already been 
closely and positively correlated during the period under consideration 
(Ramayandi, 2005). 
Table 1.26 
Correlation of Aggregate Demand Shocks across the ASEAN Nations 
 
Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand Philippines 
Aggregate Demand Shocks (1960-1996) 
     
Indonesia 1.00 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0.79 1.00 0 0 0 
Singapore 0.60 0.59 1.00 0 0 
Thailand 0.40 0.49 0.63 1.00 0 
Philippines 0.42 0.47 0.44 0.17 1.00 
Aggregate Demand Shocks (1960-2002) 
     
Indonesia 1.00 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0.71 1.00 0 0 0 
Singapore 0.59 0.52 1.00 0 0 
Thailand 0.56 0.56 0.67 1.00 0 
Philippines 0.28 0.32 0.45 0.16 1.00 
Source: Pacific Economic Papers, 2010 (excerpt from Ramayandi, 2005) 
*: Significance at 5% level 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.27 
Correlation of Exchange Rates per US dollar for Five ASEAN Nations 
 
Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand Philippines 
Indonesia 1.00 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0.91 1.00 0 0 0 
Singapore 0.91 0.92 1.00 0 0 
Thailand 0.88 0.93 0.93 1.00 0 
Philippines 0.83 0.81 0.93 0.89 1.00 
Source: Pacific Economic Papers, 2005 (excerpt from Ramayandi, 2005) 
*: Significance at 5% level 
Table 1.27 highlights a very high, positive and statistically significant 
correlation between each country exchange rate with respect to the US dollar. 
Indeed, the crisis period is the main contributor for such a high correlation. 
 
Table 1.28 
Correlation of Exchange Rates to US dollar for Five ASEAN Nations 
 
Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand Philippines 
Indonesia 1.00 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia n.a 1.00 0 0 0 
Singapore 0.76 n.a 1.00 0 0 
Thailand 0.81 n.a 0.77 1.00 0 
Philippines 0.33 n.a 0.45 0.61 1.00 
Source: Pacific Economic Papers, 2005 (excerpt from Ramayandi, 2005) 
*: Significance at 5% level 
 
However, even when one only considers the correlation of those countries 
exchange rates from the beginning of 2000, a highly positive correlation is still 
evident as shown in Table 1.28. This suggests that during the period under 
consideration, ASEAN currencies move similarly with respect to the US Dollar. 
The patterns, again, leaves some room for the harmonization of policies. The 
above account provides some analytical support for the proposition that the five 
ASEAN economies can move forward in integrating their monetary systems. 
 
 
 
 
However, as mentioned in the previous section, the five countries are facing 
disparities in the level of economic development. This issue may act as a natural 
stumbling block for any monetary integration process. Together with the relatively 
weak performance in meeting the political preconditions for forming an OCA, 
relative economic divergence can become the main potential impediment in 
realizing an ACU or any other kind of monetary arrangement in ASEAN. With 
such differences in the level of economic development, the participating countries 
may always be tempted to deviate from the aim of the agreed arrangement. This 
potential problem will be a lot more serious in the absence of strong political 
commitment in the background. Increasing interest in closer monetary cooperation 
in ASEAN is mainly driven by the common perception of a need to stabilize the 
exchange rates within the region. The issue starts to emerge right after the 
enormous currency crisis in 1997 and has been present as a topic of lively 
discourse since then. On the practical side, however, the discourse is not yet 
making an impressive progress. Apart from the potential impediment in the form 
of relative economic divergence, this situation also resulted from the relatively 
low level of political drive to move forward in each of the member country 
(Ramayandi, 2005). 
Ramayandi (2005) found that, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand 
and the Philippines appear to be relatively suitable to form a monetary union. This 
can be justified on least two grounds: the trade pattern among these economies, 
and the relative symmetry in the nature of their economic shocks. These five 
countries will potentially reap sizable benefits from having a cooperative 
 
 
 
 
monetary policy, or even from a common currency. Similarities in the recent 
pattern of demand shock components and exchange rate variations among them 
also suggest that the harmonization process in terms of macroeconomic policies 
may not be as hard as previously thought.  
The correlation matrix of Table 1.29 that shown below does however 
provide some evidence to suggest that a future ASEAN OCA might work best if it 
starts by including only the countries with at least a rough measure of business 
cycle synchronization. Given the significant values, such a bloc might initially be 
composed of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (Chaudhury, 2009). 
The evidence for ASEAN-7 suggests a fair degree of convergence with 
regards to inflationary movements, as shown in Table 1.30 below (Chaudhury, 
2009).  
Table 1.29 
Real GDP Growth Correlation in ASEAN-7 
1980-2007 
 Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
Brunei 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia -0.0622 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0.1188 0.8162*** 1 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 0.1219 0.2039 0.3687* 1 0 0 0 
Singapore -0.0308 0.5802*** 0.8423*** 0.4525** 1 0 0 
Thailand 0.0108 0.8096*** 0.7432*** 0.2267 0.5892*** 1 0 
Vietnam 0.2346 0.1776 0.3324 0.0599 0.1665 -0.1068 1 
Source: The Michigan Journal of Business, 2007 (excerpt from Chaudhury, 2009) 
*            : Significance at 10% level 
**  : Significance at 5% level 
***  : Significance at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.30 
Inflation Correlation Matrix 
1980-2007 
 
Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam 
Brunei 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia -0.3007 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0.1955 0.3378* 1 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 0.3374* 0.0354 0.3371* 1 0 0 0 
Singapore 0.4558** -0.0789 0.7607*** 0.3577* 1 0 0 
Thailand 0.2602 0.2882 0.7314*** 0.165 0.8041*** 1 0 
Vietnam 0.0601 -0.1628 -0.3549* -0.0672 -0.1944 -0.1219 1 
Source: The Michigan Journal of Business, 2007 (excerpt from Chaudhury, 2009) 
*                 : Significance at 10% level 
**  : Significance at 5% level 
***  : Significance at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.31 
Total Labor Productivity, Average Annual Growth Rate (%) 
 1991-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Brunei 0 0 0 
Indonesia 6.3 -1.6 3.5 
Malaysia 6.6 0.8 2.8 
Philippines 0 2.3 0.9 
Singapore 6.4 2 2.3 
Thailand 7.4 0.2 3 
Vietnam 6.3 4.2 4.8 
Source: UNESCAP Statistic Division (excerpt from Chaudhury, 2009) 
 
Table 1.31 shows that labor productivity has seen impressive gains over 
the years, though it can be argued that better targeted investment, particularly in 
education, where much of ASEAN lags behind the Asian tigers, could raise the 
gains several-fold. In the words of Chaudhury (2009),  
 
 
 
 
            While it is not entirely realistic to think that an ASEAN monetary union is likely 
to be implemented anytime soon, it is well worth considering the region’s 
suitability for greater policy coordination in the wake of the AFC and the onset 
of the global economic crises. The analysis conducted in this paper considers 
only one of a variety of macroeconomic issues relevant to a comprehensive 
discussion of a common currency. It finds that OCA (Optimum Currency Area) 
eligibility within ASEAN-7 is the highest it has been in its history, but because 
there is no single framework by which to evaluate the costs and benefits of a 
monetary union, it is still too soon to reach a definitive conclusion regarding its 
suitability. The uncertain economic times ahead however merit discussion on 
how further integration could help the organization maintain economic stability 
while raising its regional competitive profile. The study finds that while 
significant reforms can be made in the absence of such a union, there are likely 
to be considerable benefits that apply only after full integration takes place. 
        
The adoption of a common currency by ASEAN is formidable, the long-
run goal of a common currency for the region may be worth considering seriously, 
especially because, judged by the criterion of optimum currency area, the region is 
as suitable for the adoption of a common currency as Europe was prior to the 
Maastricht Treaty (Madhur, 2002). 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 stipulated that the transition to the final 
stage of monetary union was conditional on a number of “convergence criteria”, 
the designers of the treaty clearly thought that the main danger was that fiscal 
policy may indirectly put pressures on monetary policy. For instance, if a country 
got into trouble servicing its debt, the central bank might be led to ease monetary 
policy to lower the treasury’s interest costs and prevent a financial crisis. The 
stability and growth pact was aimed at minimizing that danger in Europe (Masson 
and Patillo, 2004(excerpt from Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA 
III), 2008). European Monetary System (EMS) report that, in 1989, set the 
blueprint for monetary unification emphasizing the choice of a gradual and 
institutional progression toward the introduction of a single currency: monetary 
 
 
 
 
union seen as the ‘crowning’ of a convergence process. The Maastricht Treaty 
organized this step-by-step process by imposing the famous ‘convergence criteria’ 
that were supposed to prepare future member countries for the uniform, ‘one-size-
fits-all’ monetary policy of the European Central Bank (Cacheux, 2009).   
Bayoumi and Mauro, 1999 (excerpt from Krawinee, 2003) have said that it 
may be easier to integrate countries that have a similar level of economic 
development. However, ASEAN nations are very different economically, Lim, 
2000 (excerpt from Krawinee, 2003) has pointed out that ASEAN countries are 
dotted with Internet-savvy professional, competent managers, surgeons, and 
engineers, and yet at the same time, a large number of cultivators and subsistence 
farmers exist in every country in Southeast Asia. This occupational diversity is 
not found in Europe. Not only do occupational levels vary widely, GDP per capita 
also has a wide range across the ASEAN region. In 2000, Singapore (the highest 
income country in the region) had a GDP per capita that was 167 times greater 
than that of Myanmar (the lowest income country). By comparison, the same ratio 
of extremes was a mere 2.4 in the EU (European Union) region in 1994, when the 
Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria took place. According to the World Bank’s 
classification of economies by income (Global Development Finance 2002) 
(excerpt from Krawinee, 2003): Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam fall into the low-income category, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Malaysia are classified in the middle-income group; and only Brunei and 
Singapore are in the high-income group. These marked differences make it more 
difficult to have a smooth process in forming a currency union. The disparities in 
 
 
 
 
income could lead to instability in both politics and economics. In the past, 
authors have conducted studies on the feasibility of a single currency for ASEAN 
by examining different criteria. Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994 (excerpt from 
Krawinee, 2003), Goto and Hamada, 1994 (excerpt from Krawinee, 2003), and 
Ngiam and Yuen, 2001 (excerpt from Krawinee, 2003), for example, looked at the 
symmetric and asymmetric shocks (Krawinee, 2003). The study by Ngiam and 
Yuen, 2001 (excerpt from Krawinee, 2003) also looked in depth at the issue in 
terms of labor mobility, exchange rate policy, and political will in East Asia. 
Yuen, 2001 (excerpt from Krawinee, 2003) used a structural vector auto 
regression analysis to look at the symmetric shocks. However, not many studies 
have used economic convergence modeling techniques to examine the prospects 
of having a common currency area in ASEAN (Krawinee, 2003). In addition, as is 
well-known, the ‘convergence criteria’ that were eventually included in the 
Maastricht Treaty were uniform, and were all about nominal convergence, in a 
very specific sense: exchange-rate stability, inflation-rate convergence toward the 
lowest ones, long-term, nominal interest-rate convergence also toward the lowest 
ones, and the famous public finance criteria (Cacheux, 2009).       
Based on all the fact that were described above, this study will apply 
convergence criterion by using panel data cross-country standard deviations of; 
Consumer Price Indices (CPI), Real Exchange Rate in US dollars (RER), Growth 
rates of Foreign Exchange Reserves (GFER), Growth rates of Real Volume of 
Trade (GRVT), Growth rate of Real Relative Volume of Trade (GRRVT), Growth 
rates of Per Capita Real GDP at factor cost (GRYPC). The six economic 
 
 
 
 
indicators as the focus of this study that were describe above were selected on the 
basis of EMU (Europe Monetary Union) standards for forming a currency union 
(Pitchford and Cox, 1997 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007)). Consumer 
price indices (CPI) in this research means as an inflationary indicator that 
measures the change in the cost of a fixed basket of products and services, 
including; housing, electricity, food, and transportation. Consumer price indices is 
also mean as an index of prices used to measure the change in the cost of basic 
goods and services in comparison with a fixed base period, which is also called, 
cost-of-living-index. Real exchange rates in US Dollar (RER) in this research 
means as the price of one currency expressed in terms of U.S. Dollar which is 
adjusted for inflation. Growth rates of foreign exchange reserves (GFER) in this 
research means as the amount of increase a deposit of a foreign currency of other 
countries as assets allow government to keep their currencies stable and reduce 
the effect of economic shocks. Growth rates of real volume of trade (GRVT) in 
this research means as the amount of increase the number of shares, bonds or 
contracts, traded during a given period, for a security, or an entire exchange that 
adjusted for inflation. Growth rate of a real relative volume of trade (GRRVT) in 
this research means the amount of increases a measurement of one investment or 
financial instruments value relative to another’s in the number of shares, bonds, or 
contracts which is, traded during a given period for a security or an entire 
exchange that adjusted for inflation. Growth rate of real per capita GDP at factor 
cost (GRYPC) in this research means as the amount of increase an approximation 
of the value of goods produced per person in the country’s GDP divided by the 
 
 
 
 
total number of people in the country at the total money, time and resources of a 
firm engaged in the business of financing accounts receivable which is the activity 
known as factoring with a purchase or activity that adjusted for inflation. The 
results of all economic indicators above can be used to examine the region’s 
suitability for forming a single currency area (Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007). 
This research paper attempts to investigate the feasibility and prospect of 
forming a common currency area in ASEAN countries. Quite different from 
previous studies of Chaudhury (2009) that observed the readiness of Seven 
ASEAN countries through OCA (Optimum Currency Area) criteria, this research 
attempts to observe Ten ASEAN countries through convergence model. However, 
not many studies have used economic convergence modeling techniques to 
examine the prospects of having a common currency area in ASEAN (Kraiwinee, 
2003). The focus of the study on six economic indicators that have been explained 
above to form the feasibility of common currency area in ASEAN countries by 
observing 1992-2009 time period for overall economic indicators except GFER 
indicator which was observed 1992-2007 time period. It is because Brunei 
Darussalam governance officially, has not published foreign exchange reserves in 
2008 and 2009 (Australian Government; Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 2010). This study estimation is used a panel data approach which refers to 
Islam, 1995 (excerpt from Young, Higgins and Levy, 2004). Regression tool that 
we will use is Eviews-6, is because it allow us to estimate panel equations 
(Eviews-6 User Guide, 2007). It is crucial that we differentiate the method of the 
 
 
 
 
study from the previous study of Chaudhury (2009), because we found out from 
EMU study by Kenen (2002) research in which the conclusion said;  
      ‘In its original form, OCA (Optimum Currency Area) theory does not tell us much 
about the macroeconomic costs of entering into a monetary union. That is 
because it dealt chiefly with the effects of entering into a simple currency union 
under conditions of low capital mobility and was, in that context, rightly 
concerned with the costs of forgoing recourse to exchange-rate changes as the 
first-best way to deal with expenditure-switching shocks-those we would 
describe today as asymmetric industry-specific shocks. It paid no attention 
whatsoever to the most prominent feature of a full-pledged monetary union-the 
introduction of a single monetary policy. Although we need still to worry about 
the ability of individual countries to cope with structural change, we no longer 
count on exchange-rate changes to facilitate that process. Instead, we stress the 
need for more flexible labor markets within individual countries and for 
improving the quality of the labor force itself. (EMU study by Keenan, 2002).’ 
 
Because of that reason above, there are no reasons for this study to follow 
the previous study of Chaudhury (2009) which used OCA, and latter we finally 
decide that it is better to use Convergence criterion with their whole advantages 
and benefits. 
 This paper contributes to the literature in the following aspects. First, this 
study examines the feasibility in term on prospect, of economic integration 
through common currency area by convergence criteria (Rasheed and Ahmed, 
2007). Second, This research develops the advanced or further research from 
previous studied that observed ASEAN-7, which suggests for advance study that 
cover full integration of Southeast Asian countries (Chaudhury, 2009).  Third, 
This paper also takes into account the impact of East Asian financial crisis in 
1997-1998 and Global financial crisis in 2007-2008, both of the historical crises 
combined become one in each of the time period observation in this figure, so 
there will be a comprehensive figure both of historical effect and impact to each 
 
 
 
 
economic indicators that have been observed in the correlation with the feasibility 
of ASEAN-10 to create a common currency area in the future. 
1.2 Research Problem Formulation 
Figure 1.22 
Research Problem Formulation 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1970 
Breeton Woods Break Down 
U.S No Longer World’s Largest Economy 
(Amadeo, 2008) 
Why is the U.S dollar weak? 
(Tan, 2004) 
Global Financial Crisis: Impact on 
Singapore and ASEAN 
(Thangavelu, 2008) 
Weak Dollar Raises Talk of 
Alternative World Currency 
(Lynch, 2009) 
The five largest ASEAN countries 
appear to be relatively suitable to 
form a monetary union and also 
they had appeared to meet some 
of the preconditions for forming a 
common currency area 
(Ramayandi, 2005) 
ASEAN-7 common currency area 
feasibility study by OCA is not 
entirely realistic to be implemented 
anytime soon but there will be 
benefit that apply only after full 
integration takes place 
(Chaudhury, 2009) 
An emergence of a 
common currency 
area in the selected 
East Asian economy: 
a Revisit 
(Soo&Choong, 2009) 
ASEAN+3 meets of OCA criteria to those of 
major EMU members, although some 
economic are agreeable, China, Japan and 
Korea do not appear to be economically 
suitable for monetary cooperation. 
(Jikang and Yin, 2005) 
The ASEAN region is as suitable for the 
adoption of a common currency as 
Europe was prior to the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
(Madhur, 2002) 
RESEARCH PROBLEM FORMULATION 
(1) 
 
IS THERE ANY FEASIBILITY FOR 
ASEAN COUNTRIES TO HAVE A 
COMMON CURRENCY AREAS AS 
THEIR OWN SINGLE CURRENCY? 
(2) 
 
IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY FOR 
CONVERGENCE MODEL TO BE 
ALTERNATIVE OF OCA (OPTIMUM 
CURRENCY AREA) MODEL? 
 
 
 
 
1.3 Objectives and Contribution of the Study 
The objectives of the research are: 
1. To apply the convergence criteria to evaluate the prospect of common 
currency area in ASEAN-10, consisting of; Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Laos, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Vietnam. 
2. To investigate the feasibility of ASEAN-10 common currency area 
through six economic indicators through time period 1992-2009 for almost 
all economic indicators, except GFER that were only available in 1992-
2007 because officially Brunei Darussalam government did not  publish  
foreign exchange reserves in 2008 and 2009 (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade of Australian Government, 2010), the six economic 
indicators are; 
a. CPI  : Consumer Price Indices 
b. RER  : Real Exchange Rate in US dollars 
c. GFER  : Growth rates of Foreign Exchange Reserves 
d. GRVT  : Growth rates of Real Volume of Trade 
e. GRRVT  : Growth rates of Real Relative Volume of Trade 
f. GRYPC  : Growth rates of Per Capita Real GDP at factor cost 
This study will contribute: 
1. This study examines the feasibility in term on prospect, of common 
currency area by convergence criteria, in which not many studies have 
 
 
 
 
used economic convergence modeling techniques to examine the prospects 
of having a common currency area in ASEAN (Kraiwinee, 2003). 
2. This research develops an advanced or further research from previous 
studied that observed ASEAN-7, which suggests for advance study that 
covers a full integration of Southeast Asian countries (Chaudhury, 2009). 
3. This paper also takes into account the impact of East Asian financial crisis 
in 1997-1998 and Global financial crisis in 2007-2008, both of the 
historical crises combined become one in each of the time period 
observation in this figure, so there will be a comprehensive figure both of 
historical effect and impact to each economic indicators that have been 
observe in the correlation with the feasibility of ASEAN-10 to create a 
common currency area in the future. 
1.4 Research Outlines 
CHAPTER I   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides general introduction on this 
topic. It is divided into four parts; Background of 
the Study, Research Problems Formulation, 
Objectives and Contribution of the Study, Research 
Outlines. 
CHAPTER II   LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents the Grand Theory and Prior 
Studies, Conceptual Framework, Hypothesis. 
CHAPTER III   DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
This chapter explains the Research Variables and 
Operational Definition, Population and Samples, 
Type of Data and Sources, Method of Collecting 
Data, Method of Analysis. 
CHAPTER IV   FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the results of this study. It is 
divided into four parts; Description of Research 
Object, Data Analysis, Result Interpretation. 
CHAPTER V   CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND  
FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
This chapter provides the Conclusion, Limitations 
and Future Research Agenda. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Grand Theory and Prior Studies 
2.1.1 Grand Theory of Economic Convergence    
Economic convergence is but one dimension of the European integration 
process and, although it may in many respects be deemed quite successful, it has 
gone through various setbacks and detours, even after the launching of the 
European monetary union. European Monetary System (EMS) report that, in 
1989, set the blueprint for monetary unification emphasizing the choice of a 
gradual and institutional progression toward the introduction of a single currency: 
monetary union seen as ‘crowning’ of a convergence process. The Maastricht 
Treaty organized this step-by-step process by imposing the famous ‘convergence 
criteria’ that were supposed to prepare future member countries for the uniform, 
‘one-size-fits-all’ monetary policy of the European Central Bank (Cacheux, 2009).  
The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 stipulated that the transition to the final 
stage of monetary union was conditional on a number of “convergence criteria”, 
and that a country could join the union only if:  
1. Its inflation rate is not more than 1.5 percent higher than the average of 
three lowest inflation rates among the EU member States; 
2. Its long-term interest rate is not more than 2 percent higher than the 
average observed in these three low-inflation countries; 
 
 
 
 
3. It has joined the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS and has not 
experienced a devaluation during the two years preceding the entrance 
into the union; 
4. Its government budget deficit is not higher than 3 percent of its GDP 
(if it is, it should be declining continuously and substantially and come 
close to the 3 percent norm, or alternatively, the deviation from the 
reference value (3 percent) should be exceptional and temporary and 
remain close to the reference value); and 
5. Its government debt should not exceed 60 percent of GDP (if it does, it 
should diminish sufficiently and approach the reference value 60 
percent at a stationary pace) De Grauwe, 2005(excerpt from Assessing 
Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA III), 2008).          
The designer of the treaty clearly through that the main danger was that 
fiscal policy many indirectly put pressures on monetary policy. For instance, if a 
country got into trouble servicing it debt, the central bank might be lead to ease 
monetary policy to lower the treasury’s interest costs and prevent a financial 
crisis. The stability and growth pact was aimed at minimizing that danger in 
Europe (Masson and Patillo, 2004 (excerpt from Assessing Regional Integration 
in Africa (ARIA III), 2008)). 
The idea of convergence in economics (also sometimes known as the 
catch-up effect) is the hypothesis that poorer economies' per capita incomes will 
tend to grow at faster rates than richer economies. As a result, all economies 
should eventually converge in terms of per capita income. Developing countries 
 
 
 
 
have the potential to grow at a faster rate than developed countries because 
diminishing returns (in particular, to capital) aren't as strong as in capital rich 
countries. Furthermore, poorer countries can replicate production methods, 
technologies and institutions currently used in developed countries. In the 
economic growth literature the term "convergence" can have two meanings 
however. The first kind (sometimes called "sigma-convergence") refers to the 
catch up effect between countries described above. "Beta-convergence" on the 
other hand, refers to a single country converging to its own steady state long run 
growth rate (www.wikipedia.com). 
Convergence is a concept that has gained popularity among economists, 
not only because of the importance of the issue about poor countries catching up 
with rich ones, but also because this analysis can serve as a way to verify the 
validity of different growth models. Convergence is a process that may be 
analyzed from various aspects. Real convergence describes the convergence of 
income levels, nominal convergence reflects the convergence of price levels, and 
institutional convergence implies harmonization of legislation. In addition one can 
also speak about the convergence of business cycles, consumer behavior, social 
stratification, and so on.  In the convergence literature this is known as the 
absolute or unconditional convergence hypothesis, Convergence in terms of both 
growth rate and income level is called β (beta) convergence. Beta-convergence is 
typically tested by regressing the growth measured as gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita purchasing power parity (PPP) on the initial relative level across 
a cross-section of countries (regions). The name of this type of convergence is 
 
 
 
 
derived from the coefficient of the initial income variable in these regressions (β) 
and is supposed to be negative if the hypothesis holds (Varblane and Vahter, 
2005).  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Sala-i-Martin (1996) (excerpt from 
Young, Higgins & Levy, 2004) draw a useful distinction between two types of 
convergence in growth empirics: σ-convergence and β-convergence (Young, 
Higgins and Levy, 2004). When the dispersion of real per capita income across a 
group of economies falls over time, there is σ-convergence. When the partial 
correlation between growth in income over time and its initial level is negative, 
there is β-convergence (Young, Higgins and Levy, 2004). Two main approaches 
are used to quantify the extent to which the growth process is leading to 
convergence or divergence in regional performance overtime. The traditional 
approached which is referred as to “sigma” convergence and the neo-classical 
approach known as the “beta” convergence. The “sigma” convergence measures 
the dispersion of real per capita income or product between regions based on the 
standard deviation of the cross-section series. When the standard deviation tends 
to fall over time, such a result indicates that the differences of the per capita 
income between regions in absolute terms decrease with the passage of time, 
which is an evidence of convergence. On the other hand, divergence implies that 
the standard deviation of the series in terms of per capita income increase over 
time. In the case where the standard deviation does not show any clear tendency, 
but instead, increases or decreases alternatively, we can say that a mixed process 
of convergence and divergence is taking place. An alternative way of measuring 
 
 
 
 
the “sigma” convergence is to use the coefficient of variation which is obtained by 
dividing the standard deviation of the series by the mean of the sample. Similarly, 
a decreasing value of the coefficient of variation over time reflects regional 
convergence, an increasing value reflects divergence, and a no stable tendency is 
taken as evidence of both, convergence and divergence during the period in 
consideration. The “beta” convergence of the neo-classical approach is obtained 
by a regression analysis estimating the growth of per capita income of a certain 
period of time on the initial level of per capita income. The regression coefficient 
“beta” with a negative sign indicates that regions with a lower initial level of per 
capita income grow more rapidly than regions with a higher initial level of per 
capita income (Marques and Soukiazis, 1998). 
      In Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991 (excerpt from Kraiwinee, 2003), 
adding regional dummies and additional explanatory variables yielded greater 
stability in the results. Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992 (excerpt from Kraiwinee, 
2003) also found a better fit for the regression after adding rates of investment, 
population growth, and human capital. Islam, 1995 (excerpt from Kraiwinee, 
2003) used a panel data approach and compared the findings with those of 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992 (excerpt from Kraiwinee, 2003). In general, 
Islam’s outcome is similar in spirit to that found by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 
1992 (excerpt from Kraiwinee, 2003) and other researchers: the inclusion of 
control variables leads to higher rates of convergence. 
Though intuitive simple, convergence is in effect a multidimensional and 
polymeric concept. Even the common sense notion of converging is usually 
 
 
 
 
associated with double meaning of getting closer, and becoming more similar, in 
some or all relevant dimensions. Most economists would probably agree that, as a 
first approximation, it refers to a process in which levels of aggregate indicators of 
national economic performance are getting closer. Even this broad definition 
could clearly be questioned on the grounds that, in a single market, national 
aggregates may have little meaning, and also that commonly used aggregates, 
such as gross domestic product (GDP) or consumer price indices (CPI) are subject 
to very severe limitations. In practice though, convergence often refers to 
percentage rates of change, rather than levels, implying that the latter will never 
converge. Looking at the nature of those aggregates that are supposed to coverage, 
a further distinction arises between nominal, real, and structural convergence. The 
latter, probably the most elusive in terms of precise definition and measurement, 
would mean that the structures of national economies are becoming more and 
more similar, which is probably true in a very broad sense when looking at 
processes of economic development: in terms of composition of production, for 
instance, developed countries do look very much alike. Nominal convergence is 
about monetary and financial indicators: usually, the notion is used in the context 
of monetary policy objectives, referring to inflation rates and or nominal interest 
rates, but may also include indicators of the public sector’s financial situation. By 
contrast, real convergence is commonly associated with a situation in which per 
capita real incomes and or living standards are getting closer, meaning that per 
capita GDP growth rates are dissimilar for countries or regions, in the context of 
European Union (EU) structural and regional policies having different initial 
 
 
 
 
conditions: the notion here is usually that of “catching up”, whereby poorer and 
relatively more backward countries or regions would need to enjoy faster growth 
rates in order to coverage in terms of income levels towards richer areas. In the 
context of European integration, these various notions of convergence all have 
been evoked at different stages and in different circumstances, often with a lot of 
confusion and misunderstandings. The real convergence, as defined above, should 
be regarded as at least one of the ultimate goals of European integration is hardly 
questionable.  
2.1.2 Prior Studies 
There are six previous studies that examined the feasibility of ASEAN 
common currency area, they are; 1) Kazushi, Shimizu. (2001). “Intra-ASEAN 
Economic Cooperation and Monetary and Financial Cooperation: Towards 
Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia”. Hokkaido University. 
Economic Journal of Hokkaido University, 30: 69-83, 2) Madhur, Srinivasa. 
(2002). “Costs and Benefits of a Common Currency for ASEAN”. Asian 
Development Bank. ERD Working Paper Series no.12, 3) Bunyaratavej, 
Kraiwinee. (2003). “Convergence and its implications for a common currency in 
ASEAN”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin. Tuesday, April, 4) Ramayandi, Arief. 
(2005). “ASEAN Monetary Cooperation: Issues and Prospects”. Australia-Japan 
Research Centre. Pacific Economic Papers, No. 349, 5) Thangavelu, Shandre M. 
(2008). “Global Financial Crisis: Impact on Singapore and ASEAN”. EABER 
Working Paper Series, no.49, 6) Chaudhury, Rafi. (2009). “Feasibility and 
Implications of a Monetary Union in Southeast Asia”. Middlebury College.         
 
 
 
 
The first previous study of Kazushi, Shimizu, (2001), that titled ‘Intra-
ASEAN Economic Cooperation and Monetary and Financial Cooperation: 
Towards Monetary and Financial Cooperation in East Asia’ is a qualitative study 
with the objectives to examine the possibilities of monetary and fiscal cooperation 
in ASEAN, as a first step towards monetary and financial cooperation in East 
Asia. The result of this paper is highlight that the ASEAN countries are still 
strongly connected to external markets, and have adopted FDI dependent and 
Export-oriented strategy. Latter this study suggest, rather than adopting monetary 
integration, it is more advantageous for ASEAN to have a degree of flexibility in 
implementing economic policies including monetary and financial policies. Then 
this study have opinion that monetary integration should be studied after 
deepening market integration by the development of AFTA, and should be 
considered in terms of their relationship with external markets. 
    The second previous study of Madhur, Srinivasa, (2002), that titled 
‘Costs and Benefits of a Common Currency for ASEAN’ is a qualitative study 
with the objectives to integrate and synthesize key conclusions in the literature 
and raise certain issues for further debate and research, rather than break new 
ground through fresh research. The assessment is largely organized around some 
of the well-known results, both theoretical and empirical, of works on optimum 
currency area (OCA). The result of this paper is described that the issue of the 
costs and benefits of a common currency for the ASEAN needs to be placed in a 
somewhat global perspective. As Barro, 2001 (excerpt from Madhur, 2002) 
observes, three sets of factors are likely to encourage the initiation of currency 
 
 
 
 
unions across the globe in the future: (i) the increasing number of countries in the 
world; (ii) globalization; and (iii) the diminishing role of independent national 
monetary policies, especially for small countries. At the end of World War II, 
there were 76 independent countries in the world. Today there are nearly 200. For 
many of the growing number of smaller countries, the costs of maintaining 
separate currencies and floating exchange rates are likely to be very high. For 
them, therefore, the net benefits from joining a monetary union (or simply using 
another country’s currency) are likely to be significant (Barro, 2001 (excerpt from 
Madhur, 2002). This could encourage the formation of an increasing number of 
currency union overtime. The increased pace of globalization (including the 
spread of trade in goods and services and financial transactions and the heightened 
diffusion of technology) is also likely to encourage the formation of currency 
unions. In an increasingly globalizing world, there is likely to be greater 
synchronization of business cycles across countries, and hence the net benefits of 
having fewer currencies to conduct cross-border business are likely to be larger. 
Moreover, as the world gets more integrated, the volume of transactions involving 
citizens of different countries will increase. As international transactions become a 
larger share of total global transactions, the attractiveness of common currencies 
relative to a multitude of sovereign currencies is likely to increase. The benefit 
that economists and central bankers attribute to national monetary policies is also 
diminishing. There is growing skepticism about the usefulness of independent 
monetary policies, especially to smaller developing economies, for counter-
cyclical stabilization purposes. All these factors have the potential to increase 
 
 
 
 
political support for monetary and economic integration across countries. Overall, 
therefore, events may become more favorable to the formation of currency unions. 
Going by international experience, the time required to complete the process is 
unlikely to be short either. Europe spent several decades in experimenting with 
regional monetary cooperation before adopting a monetary union. The task may 
be even more challenging for ASEAN. But it is important not to underestimate the 
Southeast Asian capacity for “time compression”. During the last few decades, 
time and again, these countries have turned in economic achievements at an 
unprecedented speed. That record of achievement earned some of them the 
coveted title of miracle economies. Despite the Asian crisis, the achievement of 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in early 2002, much in advance of the 
original deadline of 2008, is yet another pointer to their capacity for “time 
compression”. With the launching of the AFTA, ASEAN countries have crossed 
an important milestone: moving closer to what some would refer to as the “good 
neighbors’ stage” of regionalism, in which participating countries abolish trade 
barriers and create a level playing field for cross border of goods, services, and 
capital, but allow the pursuit of separate national economic agendas in other areas, 
especially in the areas of fiscal and monetary policies. It is certainly a very 
challenging task for the ASEAN to move from the “good neighbors’ stage” to the 
European “happy family stage” of regionalism, in which participating countries 
also share a common currency; free flow of people across borders; and common 
institutions, both economic and political, which are required to manage the 
common currency. But, as is well known, regional monetary integration, by its 
 
 
 
 
very nature, is a long process involving a series of small, incremental, steps over 
time. Viewed from this perspective, the launching of the AFTA and the regional 
resources sharing arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative may perhaps 
posses the potential to gradually lead to greater regional monetary cooperation. 
Moreover, the ASEAN countries have the European experience behind them, and 
that could be an added advantage (Madhur, 2002). 
The third previous study is a research paper that was written by Kraiwinee, 
(2003), which is titled ‘Convergence and its implications for a common currency 
in ASEAN’. This paper examines the convergence process of real GDP per capita 
among ASEAN nations, using such convergence modeling techniques. The results 
can be used to examine the region’s suitability for forming a single currency area. 
After considering all the factors involved, this research describe that it appears 
that the ASEAN region as a whole may not be an ideal candidates for forming a 
currency union, as GDP per capita displays a high degree of heterogeneity. Even 
when one examines countries separately by income levels (low, medium, and 
high), they still exhibit little evidence of convergence. In fact, sigma convergence 
analysis and both types of beta convergence analysis consistently point to the 
existence of economic divergence. We also find that many decades will be 
required for the low-income countries to catch up with the average income per 
capita in the ASEAN region. At a broader level, more opportunities for 
macroeconomic coordination should be taken advantage of prior to taking such a 
step as a currency union. However, given the promising evidence from the 
ASEAN currency map, a sub-group of ASEAN countries could begin taking steps 
 
 
 
 
towards a currency union, as a start. As in the case of the current monetary union 
between Brunei and Singapore, a sub-group could be arranged among countries 
with a similar income level. Alternatively, it could begin with a core group of 
countries that already have a supporting framework, in terms of more extensive 
transactional policy linkages. For example, the ASEAN-6 countries (that is, 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore) may be a 
particularly suitable candidate. The ASEAN-6 countries have already agreed to 
reduce tariffs in accordance with the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) arrangement. Creating a currency union in this subgroup would further 
facilitate free trade among them. This sub-group, rather than a Southeast Asian 
region-wide approach, is broadly consistent with Ngiam and Yuen, 2001 (excerpt 
from Kraiwinee, 2003). In summary of this paper suggest that, further study will 
certainly be required in order to choose which collection of countries is best 
positioned to take the next step forwards currency union. Nonetheless, the lessons 
learned from the euro experience will likely provide a valuable blueprint for the 
process of forming a currency union in ASEAN (Kraiwinee, 2003). 
The forth previous study is a research paper that written by Ramayandi, 
Arief, (2005), which is titled “ASEAN Monetary Cooperation: Issues and 
Prospects”. This paper aims to discuss the underlying economic issues and 
prospects, from both a theoretical and a practical point view. The analysis focuses 
only on the five largest ASEAN nations. Standard criteria suggested by the theory 
of Optimal Currency Areas are reviewed and applied to the region. The paper then 
provides a discussion on possible steps that can be pursued to realize currency 
 
 
 
 
unis research conclusion described that Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
and the Philippines appear to be relatively suitable to form a monetary union. This 
can be justified on least two grounds: the trade pattern among these economies, 
and the relative symmetry in the nature of their economic shocks. These five 
countries will potentially reap sizable benefits from having a cooperative 
monetary policy, or even from a common currency. Similarities in the recent 
pattern of demand shock components and exchange rate variations among them 
also suggest that the harmonization process in terms of economic policies may not 
be as hard as previously thought. Should these current trends continue into the 
future, practical steps toward full-fledged monetary cooperation may become 
likely, because of existing impediments, however, the process for integrating the 
monetary systems in the five ASEAN countries would neither be a smooth nor an 
easy process. However, the potential also exists for these countries to enjoy 
benefits from taking such an initiative. If any action is to be taken, attention needs 
to be carefully directed to the current dispersion in the level of economic 
development. This aspect alone is potentially harmful to any decision on 
integrating the monetary system. As has been acknowledged in the literature on 
monetary cooperation, in addition to the potential benefits, there will inevitably be 
costs associated with initiating such a process. These costs will not only be a 
direct cost from the process itself, but also the possibility of having a participant 
deviate from the agreed arrangement. As far as the level of economic development 
is concerned, a country may well be tempted to deviate from the agreement if it 
can capitalize on such non-cooperative action, given that the actions of every 
 
 
 
 
other participant would be known. The rest of the non-deviating participants 
would potentially bear the costs of such an action. This action could then 
jeopardize the process and threaten the sustainability of monetary integration at 
large. To avoid such an eventually, careful staging and strong institution for 
ensuring the smooth progress of integration needs to be designed. Careful study of 
the underlying incentive structure behind the process of integration for each 
potential participant needs to be carried out in order to identify the correct form of 
the institutional system. In summary, monetary integration in ASEAN, although 
not impossible, will have to go through a relatively long process before it can be 
realized. The five largest ASEAN countries seem to be suitable candidates to 
begin with. Further study concerning the proper institutional set-up and the 
preferred arrangement will hopefully shed light on the challenges identified 
(Ramayandi, 2005).            
The fifth previous study is a research paper that was written by 
Thangavelu, Shandre M. (2008), which is titled “Global Financial Crisis: Impact 
on Singapore and ASEAN”. This paper examines the current state of the 
Singapore economy and highlights several policy considerations as the city-state 
adjusts to the current global economic crisis. The paper also discusses the role of 
ASEAN in the current global economic crisis. A larger single market such as 
ASEAN will provide stronger economic base to ride out global shocks and thus 
the integration of ASEAN into ASEAN economic community will be crucial for 
the long term sustainable growth for Singapore and the region. The integration of 
the ASEAN as a single market will provide a larger base to smooth out global 
 
 
 
 
shocks and increase the ability of the region to ride external shock more 
effectively. In this respect, the region should increase its intra-regional trade in 
ASEAN and Asia. The paper has highlighted several areas where the pace of 
integration could be effectively increased. The paper also highlighted that the 
Singapore economy needs to address some of the domestic imbalances to 
smoothen out the down cycle and increase its opportunities in the upturn of the 
global economic cycle. In particular, the development of strong human capital and 
new industries encompassing SMEs will be very important for Singapore to 
couple itself to the new global production chain that might be emerging from the 
current global economic crisis, which is likely to be driven by primarily by China 
and India. The ability of Singapore to ride the current global crisis will depend 
critically in reducing the cost of the downturn by increasing the productivity of 
local workers and firms and concurrently enhancing the economic integration 
opportunities in ASEAN (Thangavelu, 2008).   
The sixth previous study is a research paper that was written by 
Chaudhury, Rafi, (2009), which is titled “Feasibility and Implications of a 
Monetary Union in Southeast Asia”. This paper attempts to examine the prospects 
for further monetary integration within the major economies of the ASEAN bloc, 
namely Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand 
and Vietnam (henceforth denoted as ASEAN-7). This research conclusion 
explained that the analysis conducted in this paper considers only one of a variety 
of macroeconomic issues relevant to a comprehensive discussion of a common 
currency. It finds that Optimum Currency Area (OCA) eligibility within ASEAN-
 
 
 
 
7 is the highest it has been in its history, but because there is no single framework 
by which to evaluate the costs and benefits of a monetary union, it is still too soon 
to reach a definitive conclusion regarding its suitability. The uncertain economic 
times ahead however merit discussion on how further integration could help the 
organization maintain economic stability while raising its regional competitive 
profile. This study finds that while significant reforms can be made in the absence 
of such a union, there are likely to be considerable benefits that apply only after 
full integration takes place (Chaudhury, 2009).  
Not only previous study that we found but also, ‘Submissions on EMU 
from leading academics’ that written by Peter Keenan as their revisit his 1969 
paper of ‘The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: an Eclectic View’ in 
December 2002. This paper conclusion found that in its original form, OCA 
(Optimum Currency area) theory does not tell us much about the macroeconomic 
costs of entering into a monetary union. That is because it dealt chiefly with the 
effects of entering into a simple currency union under conditions of low capital 
mobility and was, in that context, rightly concerned with the costs of forgoing 
recourse to exchange rate changes as the first best way to deal with expenditure 
switching shocks those we would describe today as asymmetric industry specific 
shocks. It paid no attention whatsoever to the most prominent feature of a full-
fledged monetary union the introduction of a single monetary policy. Although we 
need still to worry about the ability of individual countries to cope with structural 
change, we longer count on exchange rate changes to facilitate that process. 
Instead, we stress the need for more flexible labor markets within individual 
 
 
 
 
countries and for improving the quality of the labor force itself. When assessing 
the optimality of a full-fledged monetary union, we do need to worry about the 
impact of its monetary policy on individual countries and, for that reason, the 
likelihood that some members of the union will experience large expenditure 
changing shocks. But the trade promoting effects of the union will mitigate the 
consequences of those shocks their interaction with the single monetary policy 
(Kenen, 2002). 
Based on the previous study above, think that it is crucial that we 
differentiate the method of the study from the previous study of Chaudhury 
(2009), because we found out from EMU study by Kenen, 2002 research that 
written by Keenan that conclude the weaknesses of OCA, and now there are no 
reasons for this study to follow the previous study of Chaudhury (2009) that used 
OCA, and latter we finally decided that better use Convergence criterion with 
their whole advantages and benefits. For this purpose, Author decided to choose 
Farooq Rasheed and Eatzaz Ahmed (2007) journal that titled ‘The Convergence 
Criteria and The SAARC Common Currency’, as the main journal of this research 
study that titled ‘Prospect of Forming a Common Currency Area in ASEAN 
Countries’. The model of principle for launching single currency in Europe is was 
found in our main journal that titled “The Convergence Criteria and The SAARC 
Common Currency” that is written by Farooq Rasheed, Eatzaz Ahmed in October 
2007. This main journal consist of 7 cross-country standard deviations which are;  
1) call money rates, 2) consumer price indices, 3) real exchange rates, 4) growth 
rates of foreign exchange reserves, 5) growth rates of real volume of trade, 6) 
 
 
 
 
growth rate of relative volume of trade, 7) the growth rates of real per capita GDP. 
This main journal is investigating the possibility of a common currency formation 
in the SAARC region using the model of sigma convergence for selected 
economic indicators. SAARC region is consist of 7 countries, which are; 1) 
Bangladesh, 2) Bhutan, 3) India, 4) Maldives, 5) Nepal, 6) Pakistan, 7) Sri Lanka, 
8) Afghanistan. But in this research Afghanistan and Maldives are not included in 
the analysis. Methodology that used in this main journal consists of the EMU 
(European Monetary Union) model principle in launching their single currency 
(Pitchford and Cox, 1997; in Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007) and the sigma 
convergence model (Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 
2007)). Pitchford and Cox, 1997 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007), edited 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) principles for launching single currency for 
Europe. According to the editors the indicators like real income per capita, call 
money rate, consumer price index, real exchange rate, exports, imports and 
balance of payments are vital. In our study we have included the volume of trade 
both for the country specific and as a world relative index. They used the 
following data series to apply the beta convergence criteria to evaluate the 
possibility of the formation of a single currency in the SAARC region. The list of 
the selected variables is as follows; 
i. Call Money Rate (CMR) 
ii. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
iii. Real Exchange Rate in US dollars (RER) 
iv. Growth rates of Foreign Exchange Reserves (GFER) 
 
 
 
 
v. Growth rates of Real Volume of Trade (GRVT)  
vi. Growth rates of Real Relative Volume of Trade (GRRVT) 
vii. Growth rates of Per Capita Real GDP at factor cost (GRYPC) 
Where; 
GRYPC = Growth rate of (GDP/(population)) 
RER = Nominal Exchange Rate *CPIUS / CPI 
GRVT = Growth rates of {(Exports + Imports)/CPI} 
GRRVT = Growth rates of {(Exports + Imports)/CPI} / {(Exports W + 
Imports W)/CPIW}   
     Note; W = indicating world 
All estimations are based on quarterly in this main journal for the period 
1991:1 to 2006:3 for six SAARC members, i.e., Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Due to non-availability of the 
required data, Afghanistan and Maldives are not included in the analysis. It 
is expected, however, that inclusion of these two countries will not make a 
significant difference in the conclusions. All the data are taken from 
International Financial Statistics and Direction of Trades Statistics. 
This main journal latter following Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from 
Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007), the sigma convergence model used is given 
as; 
σj = α + βj t + εj  ……………………………………………………….(2.1) 
 
 
 
 
            Where; 
 σj  = is the standard deviations across the member countries 
 jth = indicator (j = 1 to 7) 
 α and β = are the parameters of the model 
 t = represents time period  
 ε = is a stochastic error term 
 Note: a significant negative value of β indicates the possibility of 
convergence, while any other value of β implies non-convergence. 
 Due to non-availability of the required data, call money rate is not 
included in the analysis of this research study that titled ‘Prospect of Forming a 
Common Currency Area in ASEAN Countries’. It is expected, however, that 
inclusion this indicator will not make a significant difference in the conclusions. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
Based on above prior studies, we can define the conceptual framework in 
this research as shown in the Figure 2.1. 
2.3 Hypothesis 
Hypothesis is defined as short explanation which is conclude from 
literature review (grand theory and previous study), in which created and is 
accepted as answer for temporary period in order to test the fact in the future 
(Economic Faculty, 2008). After conceptual framework has been made, the 
hypothesis of the research are; 
 
 
 
 
1.  There is a good prospect of forming a common currency area in ASEAN-
10 that consist of Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, where the six 
economics indicator that consist of; (1) Consumer Price Indices (CPI), (2) 
Real Exchange Rate in US dollars (RER), (3) Growth rates of Foreign 
Exchange Reserves (GFER), (4) Growth rates of Real Volume of Trade 
(GRVT), (5) Growth rate of Real Relative Volume of Trade (GRRVT), (6) 
Growth rates of Per Capita Real GDP at factor cost (GRYPC), are 
supporting the feasibility of ASEAN-10 countries to creating common 
currency area. 
2. There is possibility of convergence model to be alternative of OCA model. 
 
 
 
 
 
GRYPC1 
Figure 2.1 
Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
 
 
Note:         = independent variable             = dependent variable          = indicator process          = indicator result determination            = σ result       = result analysis              
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Table 2.1 
Prior Studies 
Research 
 
Objectives & 
Goals 
 
Research Model Result 
Rasheed 
and Ahmed 
“The 
Convergenc
e Criteria 
and The 
SAARC 
Common 
Currency”, 
2007 
This study explores 
prospects of forming a 
common currency area in 
the SAARC region by 
applying sigma-
convergence criteria on 
seven economic indicators 
selected on the basis of 
EMU standards for forming 
a currency union. 
Methodology that used in this main journal 
consists of the EMU (European Monetary 
Union) model principle in launching their 
single currency (Pitchford and Cox, 1997) and 
the sigma convergence model (Chowdhury, 
2004). Pitchford and Cox (1997) edited the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) principles 
for launching single currency for Europe. 
According to the editors the indicators like real 
income per capita, call money rate, consumer 
price index, real exchange rate, exports, 
imports and balance of payments are vital. In 
our study we have included the volume of trade 
both for the country specific and as a world 
For the most recent time 
period in this study i.e., 
2000:1 to 2006:3 this 
research found that interest 
rate, real exchange rate, 
growth rate of trade volume, 
growth rate of relative trade 
volume and growth rate of 
real per capita GDP show 
promising trends and some 
degree of synchronization is 
observed in the SAARC 
bloc, which is helpful for 
forming a currency union in 
 
 
 
 
relative index. They used the following data 
series to apply the beta convergence criteria to 
evaluate the possibility of the formation of a 
single currency in the SAARC region. The list 
of the selected variables is as follows; 
i. Call Money Rate (CMR) 
ii. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
iii. Real Exchange Rate in US 
dollars (RER) 
iv. Growth rates of Foreign 
Exchange Reserves (GFER) 
v. Growth rates of Real Volume of 
Trade (GRVT)  
vi. Growth rates of Real Relative 
Volume of Trade (GRRVT) 
vii. Growth rates of Per Capita Real 
GDP at factor cost (GRYPC) 
Where; 
GRYPC = Growth rate of (GDP/(population)) 
SAARC.   
 
 
 
 
RER = Nominal Exchange Rate *CPIUS / CPI 
GRVT = Growth rates of {(Exports + Imports)/CPI} 
GRRVT = Growth rates of {(Exports + Imports)/CPI} / 
{(Exports W + Imports W)/CPIW}   
 Note; W = indicating world 
All estimations are based on quarterly in this 
main journal for the period 1991:1 to 2006:3 
for six SAARC members, i.e., Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
Due to non-availability of the required data, 
Afghanistan and Maldives are not included in 
the analysis. It is expected, however, that 
inclusion of these two countries will not make 
a significant difference in the conclusions. All 
the data are taken from International Financial 
Statistics and Direction of Trades Statistics. 
This main journal latter following Chowdhury 
(2004), the sigma convergence model used is 
given as; 
σj = α + βj t + εj……(2.1) 
 
 
 
 
Where; 
σj            = is the standard deviations across   
               the member countries 
jth        =  indicator (j = 1 to 7) 
α and β =  are the parameters of the model 
 t =  represents time period  
 ε = is a stochastic error term 
 Note: a significant negative value of β 
indicates the possibility of convergence, while 
any other value of β implies non-convergence. 
Kazushi, 
Shimizu 
“Intra-
ASEAN 
Economic 
Cooperatio
n and 
Monetary 
and 
the objectives of this study 
is to examined the 
possibilities of monetary 
and fiscal cooperation in 
ASEAN, as a first step 
towards monetary and 
financial cooperation in East 
Asia 
 
 
 
This research method is qualitative study.  
The result of this paper is 
highlight that the ASEAN 
countries are still strongly 
connected to external 
markets, and have adopted 
FDI dependent and Export-
oriented strategy. Latter this 
study suggest, rather than 
adopting monetary 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
Cooperatio
n: Towards 
Monetary 
and 
Financial 
Cooperatio
n in East 
Asia”, 2001  
integration, it is more 
advantageous for ASEAN to 
have a degree of flexibility 
in implementing economic 
policies including monetary 
and financial policies. Then 
this study have opinion that 
monetary integration should 
be studied after deepening 
market integration by the 
development of AFTA, and 
should be considered in 
terms of their relationship 
with external markets. 
Madhur, 
Srinivasa  
 ‘Costs and 
Benefits of 
a Common 
the objectives to integrate 
and synthesize key 
conclusions in the literature 
and raise certain issues for 
further debate and research, 
 
 
 
This research method is qualitative study. 
The result of this paper is 
described that Europe spent 
several decades in 
experimenting with regional 
monetary cooperation before 
 
 
 
 
Currency 
for 
ASEAN’, 
2002  
rather than break new 
ground through fresh 
research. The assessment is 
largely organized around 
some of the well-known 
results, both theoretical and 
empirical, of works on 
optimum currency area 
(OCA). The result of this 
paper is described that the 
issue of the costs and 
benefits of a common 
currency for the ASEAN 
needs to be placed in a 
somewhat global 
perspective. 
adopting a monetary union. 
The task may be even more 
challenging for ASEAN.  
But it is important not to 
underestimate the Southeast 
Asian capacity for “time 
compression”. During the 
last few decades, time and 
again, these countries have 
turned in economic 
achievements at an 
unprecedented speed. That 
record of achievement 
earned some of them the 
coveted title of miracle 
economies. Despite the 
Asian crisis, the 
achievement of the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 
 
 
 
 
early 2002, much in advance 
of the original deadline of 
2008, is yet another pointer 
to their capacity for “time 
compression”. With the 
launching of the AFTA, 
ASEAN countries have 
crossed an important 
milestone: moving closer to 
what some would refer to as 
the “good neighbors’ stage” 
of regionalism, in which 
participating countries 
abolish trade barriers and 
create a level playing field 
for cross border of goods, 
services, and capital, but 
allow the pursuit of separate 
national economic agendas 
 
 
 
 
in other areas, especially in 
the areas of fiscal and 
monetary policies. Viewed 
from this perspective, the 
launching of the AFTA and 
the regional resources 
sharing arrangements under 
the Chiang Mai Initiative 
may perhaps posses the 
potential to gradually lead to 
greater regional monetary 
cooperation.  
Bunyaratav
ej, 
Kraiwinee 
“Convergen
ce and its 
implication
s for a 
This paper examines the 
convergence process of real 
GDP per capita among 
ASEAN nations, using such 
convergence modeling 
techniques. 
 
 
This research method is qualitative study. 
The results can be used to 
examine the region’s 
suitability for forming a 
single currency area. After 
considering all the factors 
involved, this research 
describe that it appears that 
 
 
 
 
common 
currency in 
ASEAN”, 
2003 
the ASEAN region as a 
whole may not be an ideal 
candidates for forming a 
currency union, as GDP per 
capita displays a high degree 
of heterogeneity. However, 
given the promising 
evidence from the ASEAN 
currency map, a sub-group 
of ASEAN countries could 
begin taking steps towards a 
currency union, as a start. In 
summary of this paper 
suggest that, further study 
will certainly be required in 
order to choose which 
collection of countries is 
best positioned to take the 
next step forwards currency 
 
 
 
 
union.  
Ramayandi, 
Arief 
“ASEAN 
Monetary 
Cooperatio
n: Issues 
and 
Prospects”, 
2005 
 
This paper objective is to 
discuss the underlying 
economic issues and 
prospects, from both a 
theoretical and a practical 
point view. The analysis 
focuses only on the five 
largest ASEAN nations. 
Standard criteria suggested 
by the theory of Optimal 
Currency Areas are 
reviewed and applied to the 
region. 
 
 
This paper is a qualitative study that provides a 
discussion on possible steps that can be pursued 
to realize currency union. 
This research conclusion 
described that Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and the 
Philippines appear to be 
relatively suitable to form a 
monetary union. This can be 
justified on least two 
grounds: the trade pattern 
among these economies, and 
the relative symmetry in the 
nature of their economic 
shocks. These five countries 
will potentially reap sizable 
benefits from having a 
cooperative monetary 
policy, or even from a 
common currency. 
 
 
 
 
Similarities in the recent 
pattern of demand shock 
components and exchange 
rate variations among them 
also suggest that the 
harmonization process in 
terms of economic policies 
may not be as hard as 
previously thought. 
However, the potential also 
exists for these countries to 
enjoy benefits from taking 
such an initiative. The five 
largest ASEAN countries 
seem to be suitable 
candidates to begin with.   
Thangavelu
, Shandre 
M. “Global 
This paper examines the 
current state of the 
Singapore economy and 
 
 
 
Result that larger single 
market such as ASEAN will 
provide stronger economic 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
Crisis: 
Impact on 
Singapore 
and 
ASEAN”, 
2008  
highlights several policy 
considerations as the city-
state adjusts to the current 
global economic crisis. 
This paper is a qualitative study that provides a 
discussion on possible steps that can be pursued 
to realize currency union. 
base to ride out global 
shocks and thus the 
integration of ASEAN into 
ASEAN economic 
community will be crucial 
for the long term sustainable 
growth for Singapore and 
the region. The integration 
of the ASEAN as a single 
market will provide a larger 
base to smooth out global 
shocks and increase the 
ability of the region to ride 
external shock more 
effectively. In this respect, 
the region should increase 
its intra-regional trade in 
ASEAN and Asia. 
Chaudhury, This paper attempts to The econometric model used in this study This research conclusion 
 
 
 
 
Rafi 
 
“Feasibility 
and 
Implication
s of a 
Monetary 
Union in 
Southeast 
Asia”, 2009  
examine the prospects for 
further monetary integration 
within the major economies 
of the ASEAN bloc, namely 
Singapore, Brunei 
Darussalam, Philippines, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Vietnam 
(henceforth denoted as 
ASEAN-7). 
draws from the “OCA Index” method 
established in Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1997).  
SD(eij) = α + β1 SD(Δyi - Δyj) + β2 DISSIMij+ β3 
TRADEij  + β4 SIZEij + ε 
Note: 
SD(eij) = standard deviation of the year-on-year 
(YOY) change in the logarithm of the 
nominal exchange rate between 
countries i and j. 
 SD(Δyi - Δyj) = is the standard deviation of 
the difference of the logarithm 
of real output between i and j. 
 DISSIMij = sums the absolute differences in 
the shares of agricultural, mineral 
and manufacturing trade in total 
merchandise trade.  
TRADEij = is the mean of the ratio of bilateral 
exports to domestic GDP for the 
explained that the analysis 
conducted in this paper 
considers only one of a 
variety of macroeconomic 
issues relevant to a 
comprehensive discussion of 
a common currency. It finds 
that Optimum Currency 
Area (OCA) eligibility 
within ASEAN-7 is the 
highest it has been in its 
history, but because there is 
no single framework by 
which to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of a monetary 
union, it is still too soon to 
reach a definitive conclusion 
regarding its suitability. The 
uncertain economic times 
 
 
 
 
two countries. 
SIZEij = is the mean of the logarithm of the two 
GDPs. 
 
ahead however merit 
discussion on how further 
integration could help the 
organization maintain 
economic stability while 
raising its regional 
competitive profile. This 
study finds that while 
significant reforms can be 
made in the absence of such 
a union, there are likely to 
be considerable benefits that 
apply only after full 
integration takes place. 
Keenan, 
Peter 
 “The 
Theory of 
Optimum 
This study objective to 
answer 4 questions, which 
are; (1) what were the main 
findings of OCA theory? (2) 
Are they truly applicable to 
 
 
 
This research method is qualitative study. 
This paper conclusion found 
that in its original form, 
OCA (Optimum Currency 
area) theory does not tell us 
much about the 
 
 
 
 
Currency 
Areas: an 
Eclectic 
View”, 
2002.  
the analysis of a full-fledged 
monetary union? (3) How 
were those findings applied 
by economists trying to 
decide whether the 
European Union is an 
optimum currency area? (4) 
Might the effects of a 
monetary union enhance the 
optimality of that union? 
macroeconomic costs of 
entering into a monetary 
union. When assessing the 
optimality of a full-fledged 
monetary union, we do need 
to worry about the impact of 
its monetary policy on 
individual countries. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Variables and Operational Definition  
Operational definition is a kind of definition which gives to some 
variables or the constructs meaning or activity specification, or gives an 
operational which is needed to measure the construct or the variables (Nazir, 
1998). As a guidance to this research and in order to create hypothesis test. It 
means that we need to explain the variable that we use. Pitchford and Cox, 
1997 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007) edited the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) principles for launched single currency for Europe. According 
to them, the indicators like real income per capita, call money rate, consumer 
price index, real exchange rate, exports, imports and balance of payments are 
vital. In this study we have included the volume of trade both for the country 
as a specific and as a world relative index. We used the following data series 
to apply the beta convergence criteria to evaluate the possibility of the 
formation of a single currency in ASEAN countries. The list of the selected 
variables is as follows; 
(1) Consumer price indices (CPI) 
Consumer price indices in this research means as an inflationary 
indicator that measures the change in the cost of a fixed basket of products 
and services, including: housing, electricity, food, and transportation. 
Consumer price indices also mean as an index of prices used to measure the 
 
 
 
 
change in the cost of basic goods and services in comparison to a fixed base 
period, which is also called, cost-of-living-index.  
(2) Real Exchange Rates in US Dollar (RER) 
Real exchange rates in US Dollar in this research means as the price 
of one currency expressed in terms of U.S. Dollar which is adjusted for 
inflation. 
(3) Growth rates of foreign exchange reserves (GFER) 
Growth rates of foreign exchange reserves in this research means as 
the amount of increase of a deposit of a foreign currency of other countries as 
assets which allow a government to keep their currencies stable and reduce 
the effect of economic shocks.  
(4) Growth rates of real volume of trade (GRVT) 
Growth rates of real volume of trade in this research means as the 
amount of increase of the number of shares, bonds or contracts, traded during 
a given period. For a security, or an entire exchange that are adjusted for 
inflation.  
(5) Growth rate of a real relative volume of trade (GRRVT) 
Growth rate of a real relative volume of trade in this research means 
the amount of increases of a measurement of one investment or financial 
instruments value relative to another’s in the number of shares, bonds, or 
contracts which were traded during a given period for a security or an entire 
exchange that adjusted for inflation. 
  
 
 
 
 
(6) Growth rate of real per capita GDP at factor cost (GRYPC). 
Growth rate of real per capita GDP at factor cost in this research 
means as the amount of increase an approximation of the value of goods 
produced per person in the country’s GDP divided by the total number of 
people in the country at the total money, time and resources of a firm engaged 
in the business of financing accounts receivable which is the activity known 
as factoring with a purchase or activity that were adjusted for inflation. 
3.2 Population and Samples  
The panel data from this research covers 10 countries in ASEAN, they are: 
1. Brunei Darussalam 
2. Cambodia 
3. Indonesia 
4. Laos 
5. Malaysia 
6. Myanmar 
7. Philippines 
8. Singapore 
9. Thailand 
10. Vietnam 
3.3 Type of Data and Sources 
All the data are taken from International Financial Statistics of IMF 
2004 and also taken from Nation Master, UN data, Asian Development Bank, 
CIA World Fact book of the year of observation from 1995 until 2003. 
 
 
 
 
We follow Alam (2001), which used panel data for his study of a 
common currency.  
3.4 Method of Collecting Data 
Data that are used in this research are secondary data, which are 
collected from literature that are related to this research. The literature data 
that we use in this research are; note, document, and also article data. 
All the data that we gained latter we are managed and processed in 
order to match it to be able to be used to answer the research question. 
For this research purpose we require data from the library of UNDIP 
(Diponegoro University) in Semarang City of the International Financial 
Statistics of IMF 2004 and we also searching data on-line through internet 
until finally we found the website of; Nation Master, UN data, Asian 
Development Bank, CIA World Fact book, Inflation Data, Economagic, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Fact Set, Asia Regional Integration 
Center, Federal Reserve of New York, National Bank of Cambodia, National 
Bank of Singapore, National Bank of Malaysia, National Bank of Philippines, 
National Bank of Thailand, National Bank of Indonesia, National Bank of 
Brunei Darussalam, National Bank of Vietnam, National Bank of Myanmar, 
National Bank Republic of Lao, that help us to complete the data that we 
gained before from UNDIP library. 
Data that we have collected from all sources are; 1) Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), 2) Nominal exchange rate, 3) Export, 4) Import, 5) Population, 6) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).    
 
 
 
 
3.5 Method of Analysis 
This research uses quantitative statistics in the form of panel data of 
economic regression method. Quantitative stages of analysis consist of 
regression model estimation which used panel data econometrics regression 
method through Chowdhury , 2004 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007), 
the sigma convergence model and also completed by a classic assumption test 
and statistically test. 
3.5.1 Panel Data Regression Model Specification. 
This research used Panel data. Panel data are a group of individuals, 
object, company and etc, in a current period of time of specific unit. Panel 
data are a combination of cross section data and time series data. As we 
know that this model is focuses on the regression analysis and the 
combination of time series and cross section, which is usually called as 
pooled time series. Panel regression models are based on panel data. Panel 
data consists of observations on the same cross-sectional, or individual, units 
over several time periods (Gujarati, 2003).     
Time series unique characteristic is numeric sequence which is the 
interval between observation on some variable identifying feature constant 
and fix, otherwise cross section is an analysis unit on the spot with an 
observation on some variables. Analysis unit example could be use such as, 
individuality, city, region, regency, province, country, business, household or 
industry. In short if some variables for some cross sections which have a 
 
 
 
 
differences in observation are specific periods of time, it means that it will 
gain pooling data. The reasons for using panel data are: 
1. It will help to increase the total samples or observations in otherwise it 
means it will help limitation data problems in a time series period of time. 
2. It will give a result which is a variation between different unit based on 
spatial and variation determination which rises based on time period. 
Therefore, pooling data will help the analytical process that will be 
explained, analyzed, and test for the hypothesis which is for the result or 
inside the in progress process to gained the result. Estimation model equation 
(depends on assumption that we made about the intercept, slope and error 
term. Where there are some possibilities (Gujarati, 2003): 
a) Assumption which is the intercept and the coefficient slope 
whether it is constant inter time period and inter space and 
supported by the error term which involves all along time 
differences and space in individuality. 
b) Slope coefficient is constant but there is a variation between the 
individual intercept. 
c) Slope coefficient is constant but there is a variation between a time 
intercept. 
d) Slope coefficient is constant but there is a variation between time 
and individuality. 
e) All coefficients which consist of intercept and slope coefficient are 
variations in individual region.     
 
 
 
 
There are several types and techniques in panel data, such as (Gujarati, 
2003); 
1. Fixed Effects Model (FEM) 
In FEM model, the intercept of regression model determine 
between one to another data, or cross-sectional, each unit has their 
own special characteristics. To calculate variable to another intercept, 
so we use dummy variable. FEM which is used dummy variables is 
called LSDV (Least-Squares Dummy Variables). 
Equation: Yit = α1+ α2 D2 + α3 D3 + α4 D4 + …..et. al.  (3.1) 
In which: 
Yit = Dependent variable 
α1 = constant 
α2-4 = coefficient 
D2-4 = dummy variable 
2. Random Effects Model (REM) or Error Components Model 
(ECM). 
REM or ECM is another alternative which assumes that 
intercept of each data individually selected by random or randomly 
selected in a large population have constant mean. 
Equation: Yit = α1+ α2 X2 + α3 X3 + α4 X4 + …..dst     (3.2) 
In which: 
Yit = Dependent variable 
α1 = constant 
 
 
 
 
α2-4 = coefficient 
X2-4 = Independent variable 
3. Common Model 
This model assumes that both intercept coefficient and slope 
coefficient are constant in cross of place and time. 
 Equation: Yit = α1+ α2 X2 + α3 X3 + α4 X4 + …..  + µ      (3.3) 
In which: 
Yit = Dependent variable 
α1 = constant 
α2-4 = coefficient 
X2-4 = Independent variable 
µ = error 
3.5.2 Estimation Model Determination in Panel Data 
From three panel data method approaches, there are two approaches 
that are commonly used to estimate the regression model in panel data, they 
are fixed effect model and random effect model. To determine the method 
between pooled least square and fixed effect we test it through F test, and 
Hausman test will be used to determine between random effect and fixed 
effect (Winarno, 2009). In fixed effect, the general regression equation panel 
data is (Gujarati, 2003): 
Yit = β1 + β2Xit + β3X3it + ... + βnXnit + uit                      (3.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
F test could be used to determine between pooled least square (PLS) 
model and fixed effect model. The equation is (Gujarati,2003) 
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In which: 
 R2r  = R2  PLS model 
 R2ur  = R2 FEM model 
 m = restricted variabel total 
 n = sample total 
 k = explained variable total 
Null Hypothesis of restricted F-test, is: 
H0 = Pooled Least Square (restricted) model 
H1 = Fixed Effect (unrestricted) model 
From the equation above, we can get the result of value F statistics > F 
table in certain degree of freedom ( α ). This result allows us to reject null 
hypothesis H0 which states to choose PLS model, because of the above result, 
we should choose  H1 which states that we must use Fixed Effect model 
estimation in this research. 
Haussman test is used to determine between fixed effect method and 
random effect method. Chi Square value equation of Hausman test, is: 
 Matrix b_diff  = b_fixed – b_random 
 Matrix var_diff = cov_fixed – cov_random 
 Matrix qform  = @transpose(b_diff)*@inverse(var_diff)*b_diff  
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis of Haussman test, is: 
H0 = random effect 
H1 = fixed effect 
Suppose Chi Square statistic > Chi Square table or in other word, while p-
value > 0.005. It means that we should reject null hypothesis H0 and 
determine that fixed effect model is the suitable model to use (Winarno, 
2009). Hausman test is also available through Eviews-6 command program. 
Slope coefficient is constant but there is a variation between individual 
intercept. 
3.5.3 Econometric Model of the Research Study 
The method that used in this research consists of the EMU 
(European Monetary Union) model principle in launching their single 
currency (Pitchford and Cox, 1997 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 
2007) and the sigma convergence model (Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from 
Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007)). Pitchford and Cox, 1997 (excerpt from 
Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007) edited the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
principles for launching single currency for Europe. According to the 
editors the indicators like real income per capita, call money rate, 
consumer price index, real exchange rate, exports, imports and balance of 
payments are vital. In this study, we have included the volume of trade 
both for the country specific and as a world relative index. They used the 
following data series to apply the beta convergence criteria to evaluate the 
 
 
 
 
possibility of the formation of a single currency in the Asia. The list of the 
selected variables is as follows; 
viii. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
ix. Real Exchange Rate in US dollars (RER) 
x. Growth rates of Foreign Exchange Reserves (GFER) 
xi. Growth rates of Real Volume of Trade (GRVT)  
xii. Growth rates of Real Relative Volume of Trade (GRRVT) 
xiii. Growth rates of Per Capita Real GDP at factor cost (GRYPC) 
In which; 
GRYPC = Growth rate of (GDP/(population)) 
RER = Nominal Exchange Rate *CPIUS / CPI 
GRVT = Growth rates of {(Exports + Imports)/CPI} 
GRRVT = Growth rates of {(Exports + Imports)/CPI} / {(Exports W + 
Imports W)/CPIW}   
 Note; W = indicating world 
This research follows Chowdhury (2004), in Rasheed and Ahmed 
(2007), the sigma convergence model used is given below; 
σj = α + βj t + εj  ….……………………………………………….(3.6) 
            In which; 
 σj  = the standard deviations across the member countries 
 
 
 
 
 jth = indicator (j = 1 to 6) 
 α and β = the parameters of the model 
 t = time period  
 ε = a stochastic error term 
Note: a significant negative value of β indicates the possibility of 
convergence, while any other value of β implies non-convergence. 
To process panel model above, Eviews 6.0 is used based on the reason 
that Eviews 6.0 is the newest version in this year which is much easier than 
the previous version and also is friendly user interface.   
3.5.4 Classic Assumption Test 
Related to OLS method use, to result a parameter value and model of 
probability in precisely, because of that reason we need to test it first is this model 
deviate or take a side route from classic assumption where is consist of; 
a. Normality Test  
Before hypothesis testing is done, we should do the classic assumption 
test first. Classic linear assumption is a model that is free from 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. There are some 
ways to examine classic linear assumption as below: (Gujarati, 2003) 
  Normality test goal is to find out is there normal distribution between 
dependent and independent variable. The good fit regression model 
which is had normal distribution. In this research we used Jarque-Bera 
test model. 
 
 
 
 
 
The JB test of normality is an asymptotic, or large-sample, test. It is also 
based on the OLS residuals. This test first computes the skewness and kurtosis 
measures of the OLS residuals by using the following test statistic:   
JB = n 
             (3.7)
 
In which: 
n = sample size 
S = skewness coefficient 
K = kurtosis coefficient 
Ho:  normal distribution data 
Ha: not a normal distribution data 
If the computed p value of the JB statistics in an application is sufficiently 
low, in which the value of the statistics is very different from 0, one can reject the 
hypothesis. But if the p value is reasonably high, in which the value of the statistic is 
close to zero, we do not reject the normality assumption. 
Or in short we can say that JB test method measures value of skewness and 
kurtosis if JB statistic < X2 Chi-square value table, it means that residual value 
distribution is normal (Firmansyah, 2000) 
b. Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity relationship to the linear situation which is to be sure 
or close to independent variable (Gujarati, 2003), multicollinearity problems 
rise when independent variables have a correlation among each other. 
Whether to decrease the ability to explain and predict multicollinearity, it also 
causes a mistake of t test coefficient to un-trust indicators. One of the 
assumptions of the classical linear regression model is that there is no 
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multicollinearity among the explained variables. The purpose of 
multicollinearity test is to know if there is relationship among independent 
variables where has a linear correlation inside the regression model used. If 
multicollinearity happens, it will cause prediction variable become higher, t 
statistic will be unbiased but not efficient. The term multicollinearity is due to 
Ragnar Frisch. Originally it meant the existence of a “perfect”, or exact, 
linear relationship among some or all explanatory variables of a regression 
model. For the k-variable regression involving explanatory variable 
X1,X2,…,Xk (where X1=1 for all observations to allow for the intercept term), 
an exact linear relationship is said to exist if the following condition is met:  
λ1X1 + λ2X2 + …. + λkXk = 0     (3.8) 
The consequences of multicollinearity are as follows: if there is 
perfect collinearity among the X’s, their regression coefficients are 
indeterminate and standard errors are not defined. If collinearity is high but 
not perfect, estimation of regression coefficients is possible but their standard 
errors tend to be large. As a result, the population values of the coefficients 
cannot be estimated precisely. However, if the objective is to estimate linear 
combinations of these coefficients, the estimable functions, this can be done 
even in the presence of perfect multicollinearity. The speed with which 
variances and covariances increase can be seen with the variance-inflating 
factor (VIF), Which is defined as: 
  VIF = 
      (3.9) 
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VIF shows how the variance of an estimator is inflated by the 
presence of multicollinearity. As 𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗2 approaches 1, the VIF approaches 
infinity. That is, as the extent of collinearity increases, the variance of an 
estimator increases, and in the limit it can become infinite. As it can be 
readily seen, if there is no collinearity between X2 and X3, VIF will be 1.  If 
the speed with which variances and covariance increase, which can be seen 
with the variance-inflating factor (VIF), it may be noted that the inverse of 
the VIF is called tolerance (TOL). That is: 
               𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗 = 1𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 = �1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗2�               (3.10) 
When 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗2 = 1  (i.e., perfect collinearity),  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗  = 0 and  𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗2 = 0 (i.e., 
no collinearity whatsoever), 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗   is 1. Because of the intimate connection 
between VIF and TOL, one can use them interchangeably. In this research 
multicollinearity test will be done through auxiliary regression to detect is 
there any multicollinearity. The criteria is if R2 of regression equation more 
than R2 auxiliary regression it means that there is no multicollinearity inside. 
Auxiliary regression model are, 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅2  ∙ 𝑋𝑋1 ∙ 𝑋𝑋2 ∙ 𝑋𝑋3 ∙∙∙ 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘(𝑘𝑘 − 2)(1 −  𝑅𝑅2 ∙  𝑋𝑋1 ∙ 𝑋𝑋2 ∙ 𝑋𝑋3 ∙∙∙ 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘)/(𝑁𝑁 − 𝑘𝑘 + 1) 
           (3.11) 
c. Autocorrelation Test 
Autocorrelation or serial correlation is a correlation which happens 
beyond observed items that are closed each other. If this assumption clays not 
as happen it cause OLS estimator  not efficient anymore, because of the width 
 
 
 
 
range of degree of freedom, it means that ‘t’ test and ‘F’ test will have 
become low validity and weak. Autocorrelation is defined as correlation 
between a group of observed items which are sorted based on time (such as 
inside the time series) or based on spaces (such as inside the cross section). 
Autocorrelation generally happens in time series data but it does not happen 
in cross sectional data. In time series data, observation sorted by 
chronological sequence which gives a high possibilities of inter correlation 
happen if the interval between both observations is very short. One of the 
famous tests to find out autocorrelation indication is Durbin-Watson test. This 
test is actually based on error model. The correlation equation is described 
below: 
µt = ρ µt-1 + vt                                                                    (3.12)   
Where: 
µt = error that happened in t time 
µt-1= error that happened in t-1 time 
ρ   = autocorrelation coefficient lag-1 (to measure correlation between 
residuals of t time and residuals of t-1 time) 
vt   = error which is independent characteristic and in a normal 
distribution which is with a median value equals to zero (median 
value = 0), and in σ2 varians. 
If ρ = 0, it can take as a result that is no serial correlation in residual, 
therefore this test uses this hypothesis: 
HO : ρ = 0 
 
 
 
 
H1 :  ρ ≠ 0 
Durbin-Watson statistics, are; 
 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 =  ∑ (𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡−𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡−1)2𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡−2
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡
2𝑛𝑛
𝑡𝑡−1        (3.13) 
 
Where: 
µt = Yt – β0 – β1 Xt = Yt – Yt , which is residual in t time 
µt-1 = Yt-1 – β0 – β1 Xt-1 = Yt-1 – Yt-1, which is residual in (t-1) time 
 
Equation (3.6) can be written in the form, below; 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 2[1−∑𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡∙𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡−1]
∑𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡2 = 2(1 − 𝜌𝜌)   (3.14) 
 
Equation (3.7) can be written in shape below; 
 
𝜌𝜌 = (𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡−𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡−1)2
∑𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡2       (3.15) 
 
As mentioned before that ρ is the autocorrelation coefficient which 
has a value -1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. Based on (3.15) they mean: 
1. If DW statistics value is 2, ρ is 0 (ρ = 0), it means there is no 
autocorrelation. 
2. If DW statistics value is 0, ρ is 1 (ρ = 1), where it means there is no 
positive autocorrelation. 
3.  If DW statistic value is 4, ρ is -1 (ρ = -1), where it means there is no 
negative autocorrelation. 
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If the assumption of the classical linear regression model that the error 
disturbance µi entering into the population regression function (PRF) are 
random whether uncorrelated is violated, the problem of serial or 
autocorrelation arises. 
The term autocorrelation may be defined as “correlation between 
members of time series of observations ordered in time (as in time series data) 
or space (as in cross section data).” In regression context, the classical linear 
regression model assumes that such autocorrelation does not exist in the 
disturbances µi . Symbolically, 
E(µi µj) = 0  i ≠ j                (3.16) 
 
 
 
 
Autocorrelation can arise for several reasons, such as inertia or 
sluggishness of economic time series, specification bias resulting from 
excluding important variables from the model or using incorrect functional 
form, the cobweb phenomenon, data massaging, and data transformation. As 
a result, it is useful to distinguish between pure autocorrelation and “induced” 
autocorrelation because of one or more factors just discussed. 
d. Heteroscedasticity Test   
A critical assumption of the classical linear regression model is that 
the disturbance µi has the same variance, σ2. If this assumption is not 
satisfied, there is heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity does not destroy the 
unbiasedness and consistency properties of OLS estimators. But these 
estimators are no longer minimum variance or efficient. That is, they are not 
linear, unbiased, efficient estimator (BLUE). The BLUE estimators are 
provided by the method of weighted least squares, provided the 
heteroscedastic error variances,   , are known. The most important in classic 
linear regression is that disturbance that rising inside population regression is 
heteroscedasticity which is all variable have a similar variation. In this 
regression might be found indication of heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity 
indication could be detected through Glejser test, if the value regress 
unstandardized residuals absolute value with their independent variable. 
E (u2i) = σ2          i = 1, 2, …, n                (3.17) 
Measurement which is used is by observing the ‘t’ value and ‘p’ value 
(probability value). If all independent variables are statistically significant, all 
 
 
 
 
of the regression models contain heteroscedasticity. The conclusion that can 
be taken is that if Sig t < α (0.05) the regression equation contains 
heteroscedasticity and otherwise if the value of Sig t > α (0.05) it does not 
contain heteroscedasticity. Another way that we can take to test whether 
heteroscedasticity is a serious problem in particular set of data or not is by 
White’s Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Variances and Standard Errors. White 
has shown that this estimate can be performed so that there is asymptotically 
valid (i.e., large-sample) statistical inference can be made about true 
parameter values. As the preceding result show, (White’s) heteroscedasticity-
corrected standard errors are considerably larger than the OLS standard errors 
and therefore the estimated t values are much smaller than those obtained by 
OLS. On the basis of the latter, both the regressors are statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level, whereas on the basis of White’s estimators they are not. 
However, it should be pointed out that White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected 
standard errors can be larger or smaller than the uncorrected standard errors 
(Gujarati, 2003).  
Since White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimators of the variance 
are now available in established regression packages, it is recommended that 
the reader report them. As Wallace and Silver note (Wallace and Silver in 
Gujarati, 2003); 
Generally speaking, it is probably a good idea to use the White option 
(available in regression programs) routinely, perhaps comparing the output 
with regular OLS output as a check to see whether heteroscedasticity is a 
serious problem in particular set of data.      
 
 
 
 
3.5.5 Regression Statistic Test Analysis 
After classical assumption test finishes and the result is free from 
classical assumption then regression statistic test analysis need to be done. 
a. Hypothesis Test Method   
If the result of the econometric model in this research is free from 
classical assumption, then hypothesis test needs to be done. Hypothesis test is 
made through significant test to each independent variable to dependent 
variable which is done partially or together by through t test and F test. 
b. Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F test)    
F test goal is to determine the significance of independent variable 
groups in influencing the dependent variable,  
H0 : β1 = β2 = β3 = βk = 0 
H1 : β1 ≠ β2 ≠ β3 ≠ βk ≠ 0 
      Suppose  this research results in  F0 ( F statistic ) < ( F table ), it means 
that null hypothesis ( H0 ) is accepted and the alternative hypothesis ( H1 ) is 
rejected. If this condition happens, it means that the regression model 
variation fails to explain the independent variable . Otherwise, if  F0 ( F statistic 
) > ( F table ) the null hypothesis ( H0 ) is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis ( H1 ) is accepted. If this condition happens it the model regression 
variation successfully explains the independent variable (Gujarati, 2003). 
F statistic equation, is; 
𝑉𝑉 = 𝑅𝑅2/(𝐾𝐾−1)(1−𝑅𝑅2)/(𝑁𝑁−𝐾𝐾)      (3.18) 
 
 
 
 
In which: 
K = total estimation of parameters including the constant inside 
N = total observation 
In the significant level of 5 %, the requirement criteria are below; 
1. Suppose from this research results in F0 (F statistic) < (F table), 
the that null hypothesis ( H0 ) is accepted and the alternative 
hypothesis ( H1 ) is rejected. If this condition happens, the 
regression model variation fails to explain the independent 
variables. 
2. Otherwise, if F0 (F statistic) > (F table) the null hypothesis (H0) is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis (H1) is accepted. If this 
condition happens the model regression variation successfully 
explains the independent variables. 
c. Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t test) 
t test goals is to determine the significance of independent variable 
individual influence an dependent variable. The hypotheses are below: 
 H0 : β1 = 0 
 H1 : β1 ≠ 0 
Suppose t0 (t statistic) < ( t table ) the null hypothesis ( H0 ) is accepted 
and the alternative hypothesis ( H1 ) is rejected. If this condition happens the 
model that is used is not good, because the independent variable could not be 
explained by the dependent variable or, it’s not significant. Otherwise, if t0 ( t 
 
 
 
 
statistic ) > ( t table ), the independent variable is success fully explains the 
dependent variable perfectly, or it’s significant (Gujarati, 2003).  
d. Determination Coefficient Test of R2 
R2 test goal, is to show whether independent variables are good to 
explain the dependent variable. R2 values are 0-1 (0 < R2 < 1). Suppose R2 
value = 1, it means that the independent variable perfectly explains the 
dependent variable. Otherwise, suppose R2 value = 0, the independent 
variable is not strong enough to explain the dependent variable. The basic 
weaknesses in using this determination coefficient it’s bias to dependent 
variable. R2 will increase no matter the independent variable impact 
significant or not to dependent variable, because of that reason so many 
researchers suggest to use adjusted R2 while regress the best of regression 
model. Adjusted R2 is very different from R2 value. R2 value can increase and 
decrease if one of the independent variables is added into the model. The 
main purpose of this test is to measure how the model can explain the 
independent variable variation. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Description of Research Objects 
ASEAN is a regional organization in South East Asia. It was established in 
1967 under the Bangkok Declaration, with five original member countries: 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia. Latter it is called 
ASEAN 5. Brunei Darussalam joined in ASEAN in 1984. ASEAN then is called 
ASEAN 6, with relatively developed economies in Southeast Asia. Now ASEAN 
has ten member countries with Vietnam joining in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 
1997 and Cambodia in April 1999. The latest 4 members are called ASEAN 4, or 
CLMV. The whole ASEAN member countries are called ASEAN 10, and if 
Vietnam and Laos are not included, it is called ASEAN 8. Nowadays, the ASEAN 
region has a population of about 500 million, a total area of 4.5million square 
kilometers, a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of US$737 billion, and a 
total trade of US$720 billion. ASEAN FTA (AFTA) is the earliest FTA in Asia, 
which was initiated in 1992 (Yi, 2005).   
Different from the two major regional integrations respectively in Europe 
and the North Americas, EU faced internal pressure politically in Europe internal 
security issue, namely to restrain Germany, and external pressure politically from 
former Soviet Union, and Economically from the U.S. , ASEAN  creation was not 
necessarily logical. If one considers the circumstances of the five original 
countries, each of which was widely diverse, and all of which were linked to 
 
 
 
 
external powers, mainly through former colonial channels. It is doubtful whether a 
clear identity as ASEAN or Southeast Asia, for that matter existed at the 
beginning. This was because that almost every original ASEAN member nation 
had recently gained independence from external powers, and had the extremely 
strong desire to be independent both in politics and economy. One may imagine, 
therefore, that ASEAN was a creation of the Cold War, supported by the U.S. 
strategy for a political and economic formation at the regional level. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that ASEAN had only limited success during its 
early era.  Although the member countries of ASEAN are geographically close, 
the interdependence in economy among ASEAN was minimal. Almost every 
ASEAN member nation adopted the import substitution model which is based on 
a closed economy. In addition, ASEAN was not established for economic 
purpose, so in the establishment stage, economic integration among ASEAN 
almost did not exist. Estimates during the establishment stage showed that the 
share of intra-ASEAN trade of the total trade of the member countries was 
between 12 and 15 percent. In summary, during the establishment stage of 
ASEAN, ASEAN was dominated by ideology, mainly for the purpose of political 
solidarity against communism rather than for the purpose of economic integration, 
although from neither aspects could the integrations be considered successful. 
Although the member countries of ASEAN are geographically close, the 
interdependence in economy among ASEAN was minimal. Almost every ASEAN 
member nation adopted the import substitution model which is based on a closed 
economy. In addition, ASEAN was not established for economic purpose, so in 
 
 
 
 
the establishment stage, economic integration among ASEAN almost did not 
exist. Estimates during the establishment stage showed that the share of intra-
ASEAN trade of the total trade of the member countries was between 12 and 15 
percent. In summary, during the establishment stage of ASEAN, ASEAN was 
dominated by ideology, mainly for the purpose of political solidarity against 
communism rather than for the purpose of economic integration, although from 
neither aspects could the integrations be considered successful (Yi, 2005). 
After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, with the retreat of U.S. power 
in southeastern Asia, the antagonism in ideology became less strong. The ASEAN 
member nations turned more to regional security concerns and domestic stability. 
Border disputes had long existed among ASEAN countries: Malaysia and 
Indonesia over two islands, Malaysia and Singapore over an island, Indonesia and 
the Philippines over some islands, the Philippines, Vietnam and China over some 
islands in the South China Sea. A domestic instability had also long existed in 
most of the member nations. There were many parties and religious factions in 
almost every member country. Some countries were controlled by military 
government, some countries cabinets were changed frequently, other countries 
anti-government armed forces and terrorist activities were furious. This led to the 
first heads of government’s meeting held in Bali in 1976 and the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The TAC is an 
important non-aggression political pact of ASEAN. It declared the following 
fundamental principles: 
 
 
 
 
• Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, 
territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; 
• The right of every State to lead its national existence free from 
external interference, subversion or coercion; 
• Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
• Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 
• Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 
• Effective cooperation among themselves. 
The TAC showed that domestic affairs should be free from external interference 
and that mutual disputes should be settled free from the force and threat. This 
demonstrated that the TAC was a political accord of landmark meaning, because it 
displayed the strong determination to be free from external powers interference, 
and to be respected and independent, dealing with the internal affairs among 
ASEAN through equal dialogue and peaceful means. This established a good 
political basis for southeastern regional security. Due to the TAC, ASEAN s 
regional security improved and the Regional security conditions could usually 
build confidence in promoting regional economic integration. In 1977, 
immediately after the conclusion of the TAC, the ASEAN member countries 
signed the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) of 1977, which accorded 
tariff preferences for trade among ASEAN economies, aiming at enhancing the 
economic cooperation among ASEAN. Ten years later, an Enhanced PTA 
Program was adopted at the Third ASEAN Summit in Manila further increasing 
intra-ASEAN trade (Yi, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
Substantial Integration Stage (1992-1997): from the Launching of AFTA 
to before the Eruption of Southeastern Asia Financial Crisis. During this period, 
the ASEAN member countries signed the ASEAN Declaration on the South China 
Sea, Manila, in July 1992. In the Declaration, Article 1 emphasizes by peaceful 
means, without resort to force to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues 
pertaining to the South China Sea; Article 3 resolves to explore the possibility of 
cooperation in the South China Sea relating to the security of maritime navigation 
and communication, protection against pollution of the marine environment, 
coordination of search and rescue operations, efforts towards combating piracy 
and armed robbery as well as collaboration in the campaign against illicit 
trafficking in drugs ; Article 4 advocates a code of international conduct over the 
South China Sea based on the principles contained in the TAC ; art. 5 invite all 
parties concerned to subscribe to this Declaration of principles.  Article 5 is worth 
notice: because China is a major party in the South China Sea. The Declaration, in 
fact, invites China to negotiate with the party concerned South China Sea among 
ASEAN. In December 1995 in Bangkok, in the foreign ministers meeting, 
ASEAN concluded the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. 
It was obvious that ASEAN s political integration still centered surround 
eliminating the regional security concerns. As the Treaty declared that the 
establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone will contribute 
towards strengthening the security of States within the Zone. In January 1992 at 
the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992, the Framework 
 
 
 
 
Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation was signed, which included the 
launching of a scheme toward an AFTA, aiming at the elimination of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers and promoting trade liberation among the member countries. In 
1995, the Fifth ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok adopted the Agenda for Greater 
Economic Integration, which included the acceleration of the timetable for the 
realization of AFTA from the original 15-year timeframe to 10 years. Economic 
integration in this period proved greatly successful. ASEANs economies 
developed at a surprising speed. Within the three years from the launching of 
AFTA, exports among ASEAN countries grew from US$ 43.26 billion in 1993 to 
almost US$ 80 billion in 1996, an average yearly growth rate of 28.3 percent 26. 
In the process, the share of intra-regional trade from ASEANs total trade rose 
from 20 percent to almost 25 percent. Tourists from ASEAN countries themselves 
have been representing an increasingly important share of tourism in the region. In 
1996, of the 28.6 million tourist arrivals in ASEAN, 11.2 million or almost 40% 
came from within ASEAN itself. During this period, ASEANs economic 
development obtained a strong reputation. It was called the miracle of Southeast 
Asia in the world. Correspondingly, ASEANs political status rose too (Yi, 2005). 
 Break of ASEAN Regional Economic Integration by the Southeast Asia 
Financial Crisis In February 1997, the Southeast Asia financial crisis (the 
financial crisis) erupted. The ASEAN economies were hit hard and suffered great 
losses, and at the same time the crisis had tremendous impacts on other Asian 
countries and regions and later on developed countries, including the U.S., Japan 
and Europe. The total economic loss of South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia approximated US$ 600 billion, the GDP per Capita in US$ of these 
countries decreased to the level of ten years ago. During only a few months, the 
currency in these countries was devalued by 50 percent, or even 80 percent. The 
financial crisis fully exposed the long-established weakness of ASEAN s regional 
economy. They are: 
1) Heavy Economic Dependence on the U.S. and Japan 
First, ASEAN member countries long and excessively depended on 
foreign capital, especially U.S. and Japanese capital, and the efficiency to 
make good use of the foreign loans was not high. So if the international 
balance of the ASEAN countries was a deficit, then the national currency 
should have devalued in terms of its real value. However, the national 
currency of most ASEAN s countries was pegged to U.S. dollar one way 
or another. Thus, when international balance of payments kept a deficit for 
a long time, the exchange rate of national currency with US dollar could 
not be maintained. The financial crisis erupted. Second, the previous rapid 
growth of ASEANs economy had been based on the export-processing 
model. In the 1970s and the 1980s, member countries processed 
downstream electronics products for Japan; when ASEAN went into the 
1990s, the Japanese economy began to decline and the U.S. economy 
began to rise, ASEANs export became dependent on the U.S. market. 
Once the demand of the two markets was insufficient, the ASEANs 
economy would be affected seriously. 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Excessively Open Capital Market 
The capital market in ASEAN country was excessively open. One World 
Bank study placed Malaysian and Thai trade policies as among the most 
open in developing economies. Opening domestic markets to outside 
money (under an early round of pressure from the IMF [the International 
Monetary Fund) brought a deluge of short term foreign investment and 
spurred heavy short-term borrowing from abroad, fueling a building boom. 
Take Thailand for example, by the mid 90s, a speculative binge in 
everything from high-rise office towers to condos to gold courses 
accounted for nearly 40% of growth in Thailand. 34 When the real estate 
bubble burst, conditioning the rather open capital market, too much capital 
rushed out, too quickly. The excessive inflow of capital reversed itself and 
fled with little regard for the actual strength of a particular economy.  
3) Weak Intra-Regional Economic Interdependence 
The economic interdependence among the member countries was weak. 
The intra regional trade among ASEAN accounted for a small portion of 
the total trade of ASEAN, about no more than 25 percent, far less than the 
level of 40% plus of intra-regional trade among EU and NAFTA; 
moreover, such small portion was mainly produced between Singapore 
and Malaysia,36 the intra-regional trade among other ASEAN s countries 
was even smaller. Therefore once the demand outside ASEAN sharply 
declined, the intra-regional demand could not be spurred to absorb part of 
 
 
 
 
the products diverted from the exportation, and then the national and 
regional economy collapsed together. 
4) Similarities in Industrial Structures Southeastern Asian export industries 
lay in the bottom layer of the global vertical division system, gathering a 
large number of labor-intensive and half capital-intensive industries. It 
became the weakest part in the global economy chains. ASEAN s member 
countries repeated the same development model: absorbed foreign capital, 
invested in the export-processing industries, and their products tended to 
be alike. Whether in their domestic economy or even in the intra-regional 
economy among ASEAN, the development layout of industrial hierarchies 
and diversities was not formed; almost none of the production chains were 
wholly shaped. When the global economic structures were adjusted and 
such adjustments caused the demand for ASEAN s exports to greatly 
decline, ASEAN s downstream processed products would be superfluous 
and ASEAN s economy would be damaged seriously. Due to the financial 
crisis, ASEAN s competition in exportation and attraction of foreign 
investment was unfavorably affected immensely. In addition, because its 
member countries had to engage in dealing with domestic problems caused 
by the financial crisis, the mutual cooperation and coordination among 
ASEAN were suspended. As a result, ASEAN s status and influence both 
in economy and politics declined rapidly either in Asia or in the world. 
The financial crisis provided ASEAN with many lessons. If in the future we are in 
retrospect of the process of ASEAN s regional economic integration and even of 
 
 
 
 
the later East Asian regional economic integration, we will discover that the 
financial crisis undoubtedly acted as a watershed and even a catalyze. Before the 
financial crisis, the rapid economic growth of ASEAN mainly depended on 
foreign capital and markets, based much less on intra economic interdependence 
among ASEAN and their domestic markets. The member countries had no strong 
motivations to enhance a complete integration to close their relationship in 
economy. The financial crisis confronted ASEAN with many new issues for 
discussion. First, the global IMF failed in the financial crisis. It suggested that a 
regional monetary and financial cooperation would be necessary. Second, unlike 
the developed countries, the door of the non-developed countries capital market 
can only open step by step, rather than too fast. Third, the simplification of 
monetary policy, which was only pegged to U.S. dollar, should be changed, 
because once the U.S. dollar s value fluctuates badly, the concerned countries 
monetary and financial system will suffer from great influence. Therefore the 
monetary policy should be diverse, for example, adopt a package of pegged 
moneys. Besides, the similarities of regional industrial structures and weak intra-
regional economic interdependence were viewed as the in-depth causes of the 
financial crisis. It was considered that establishing among ASEAN the diverse and 
hierarchical economies, stretching the production chains, strengthening economic 
complementarities and enhancing the intra-regional economic interdependence 
will effectively form regional competitive force to resist to the external economic 
impacts, making ASEAN a regional trade bloc in a genuine sense. So it was a 
logical consequence that after the financial crisis ASEAN began the complete 
 
 
 
 
intra-regional economic integration in a variety of areas to enhance the intra-
regional economic interdependence (Yi, 2005). 
In responding to the crisis, ASEAN heads of governments in December 
1997 set out their ASEAN ‘Vision 2020’ statement. The vision contained a 
message in favor of moving towards closer cohesion and economic integration. It 
was soon followed by an action plan concluded in the following year at the 
ASEAN summit in Hanoi. The action plan among other things, calls for a 
strengthening of the financial system in the region to maintain regional 
macroeconomic and financial stability, and to intensify cooperation on money, tax 
and other financial related matters. Prior to East Asia crisis, economic integration 
in East Asia has been enhancing via the market driven forces such as cross-border 
trade, FDI (foreign direct investment) and finance. Over the past 20 years, 
international trade and FDI activities have expanded rapidly through multilateral 
international institutions such as World Trade Organization (WTO), Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) as well as unilateral (or multilateral) trade 
liberalization processes. Nevertheless, the patterns of economic cooperation in 
East Asian countries have been changed, especially after the East Asia financial 
crisis erupted in mid-1997. The rapidly changing international environment and 
East Asia crisis have emerged a common interest amongst East Asia countries in 
creating a strong impetus for regional cooperation. This has led to the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) agreement on bilateral swaps and discussion of the possibility of 
creating a monetary union among the ASEAN+3. Indeed, there have been few 
attempts proposed to create cooperative frameworks that help to prevent and 
 
 
 
 
manage future currency crises and to promote economic efficiency by developing 
sound financial systems. Japan, for example, has proposed to create an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF) in September 1997. The members of this Fund would 
contribute some portion of their international reserves to a central fund, which 
would be utilized to provide a financial assistance to countries affected by 
external crises such as financial and currency crises. However, the United States, 
China and the IMF against the establishment of the AMF proposal on two 
reasons: soft conditionality and duplication. As a further step in promoting Asian 
economic integration, Japanese finance minister Miyazawa has made a proposal 
that is called “New Miyazawa Initiative” in October 1998, which aimed to set up a 
financial assistance scheme totaling 30 billion US dollars. This Initiatives, 
however, has met with strong criticism because the proposal is too Japan-centered, 
and the attitude of Japan in regional initiatives is rather ambiguous (Moon, 2000 
(excerpt from Choo and Choong, 2009)). Although this proposals were rejected, 
there were few more successful initiatives have been proposed towards a closer 
monetary cooperation in Asian. For example, a conference was held in Manila in 
November 1997, which consists of deputy finance ministers and central bank 
governors from 14 mostly Asian countries. The outcome of the conference was 
the establishment of Manila Framework Group (MFG), a new framework to 
enhance Asian Regional cooperation and to promote financial stability in the 
region. In addition, the ASEAN finance ministers have agreed to establish the 
ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) in October 1998 to encourage policy 
dialogue based on the peer review and mutual interest among ASEAN member 
 
 
 
 
countries. In November 1999, China, Japan, and South Korea have been invited to 
join ASP, which making “ASEAN+3” reality in financial surveillance (Choo and 
Choong, 2009).         
To reinforce the Hanoi action plan in order to achieve this goal, ASEAN 
nations have also moved forward by looking at a wider region in terms of 
economic and financial cooperation through the Chiang Mai Initiatives (CMI) that 
was launched in May 2000. The initiative aimed to develop a network of bilateral 
swap agreements (local currency to US dollar or Japanese) among Northeast 
Asian countries, and strengthening an intra-ASEAN swap agreement. In May 
2002, bilateral swap agreements between Japan, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and China have been initiated. Also the ASEAN swap agreement was 
extended to cover all the 10 member countries. The CMI represents the first 
milestone towards constructing a coordinated intervention policy and currency 
arrangement regionally. Nevertheless, this step is more likely to be more a case of 
“pooling reserve” in dealing with external instability or crises than a commitment 
to bilateral intervention to stabilize regional bilateral exchange rates. Obviously, 
financial cooperation has seen some positive progress among East Asia countries; 
however, incentives for monetary cooperation are still lack (Choo and Choong, 
2009). Although some economic indicators are agreeable, China, Japan and Korea 
do not appear to be economically suitable for monetary cooperation with ASEAN 
(Jikang and Yin, 2005). The uncertain economic times ahead however merit 
discussion on how further integration could help the organization maintain 
economic stability while raising its regional competitive profile. This study finds 
 
 
 
 
that while significant reforms can be made in the absence of such a union, there 
are likely to be considerable benefits that apply only after full integration of 
ASEAN takes place (Chaudhury, 2009).    
4.2 Data Analysis 
4.2.1 Raw Data Analysis 
Data that are used in this research is a secondary data, which is collected in 
a form of literature data that are related to this research. Shape literature data that 
we use in this research are; note, document, and also article data. All the data that 
we gained latter we will manage and process it in order to match it to answer out 
research question and objectives. For this research purpose we require data from 
UNDIP (Diponegoro University) Library at Semarang City to get the International 
Financial Statistics of IMF 2004 and we also surfing searching data on-line 
through internet until finally we found Nation Master, UN data, Asian 
Development Bank, CIA World Fact book that help us to complete the data that 
we gained before from UNDIP library. Data that we have collected from 
International Financial Statistics of IMF 2004 and Nation Master, UN data, Asian 
Development Bank, CIA World Fact book are; 1) Consumer Price Index (CPI), 2) 
Nominal exchange rate, 3) Export, 4) Import, 5) Population, 6) Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  
Methodology that used in this research consists of the EMU (European 
Monetary Union) model principle in launching their single currency Pitchford and 
Cox, 1997 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007) and the sigma convergence 
model (Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007). Pitchford 
 
 
 
 
and Cox, 1997 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007) edited the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) principles for launching single currency for Europe. 
According to the editors the indicators like real income per capita, call money 
rate, consumer price index, real exchange rate, exports, imports and balance of 
payments are vital. In our study we have included the volume of trade both for the 
country specific and as a world relative index. They used the following data series 
to apply the beta convergence criteria to evaluate the possibility of the formation 
of a single currency in the Asia. The list of the selected variables is as follows; 
xiv. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
xv. Real Exchange Rate in US dollars (RER) 
xvi. Growth rates of Foreign Exchange Reserves (GFER) 
xvii. Growth rates of Real Volume of Trade (GRVT)  
xviii. Growth rates of Real Relative Volume of Trade (GRRVT) 
xix. Growth rates of Per Capita Real GDP at factor cost (GRYPC) 
Where; 
GRYPC  = Growth rate of (GDP/ (population)) 
RER   = Nominal Exchange Rate *CPIUS / CPI 
GRVT  = Growth rates of {(Exports + Imports)/CPI} 
GRRVT  = Growth rates of {(Exports + Imports)/CPI}/  
     {(Exports W + Imports W)/CPIW}   
Note; 
 W = indicating world 
 
 
 
 
US = United State country 
Raw data in this research is gain through several process calculations of 
data collection from secondary data source, as describe on above explanation, 
because of that reason data collecting process journey is not as simple as imagine, 
and here are the raw data analysis of this research study; 
(7) Consumer price indices (CPI) of ASEAN-10 Analysis (1992-2009) 
Consumer price indices in this research means as an inflationary 
indicator that measures the change in the cost of a fixed basket of products 
and services, including; housing, electricity, food, and transportation. 
Consumer price indices is also mean as an index of prices used to measure the 
change in the cost of basic goods and services in comparison with a fixed 
base period, which is also called, cost-of-living-index. In this research CPI of 
ASEAN-10 that consist: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are 
selected as raw data. For this panel data regression purpose to sigma 
convergence, the period of time is divided into 1992-2006 as CPI z and 1995-
2009 as CPI w. 
Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 is a combined a cross sectional graph which displays 
separate lines for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.3 and 4.4 is 
individual cross sections displays separate time series graphs for each cross-
section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross sections graph are 
a single graph containing the summary of statistics for each period.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show that in general the summary of statistics of 
both periods of observation are similar. It means that the selection period is 
good for regression. 
Indonesia CPI is described as the only one which has the same 
Individual cross sectional graph on both periods of time. Indonesia CPI shape 
is stays the same, whether it observed far from crisis or close to crisis year 
(see Figure 4.3 and 4.4).   
 
Figure 4.1 
CPI Combined Cross Section Grap
 
              Source: Eviews-6, 2 
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Figure 4.2 
CPI Combined Cross Section Graph (1995-2009). 
 
 
                                      Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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  Figure 4.3 
CPI Individual Cross Section Graph (1992-2006). 
           
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
1. Indonesia 
2. Malaysia 
3. Singapore 
4. Thailand 
5. Philippines 
6. Laos 
7. Brunei Darussalam 
8. Cambodia 
9. Myanmar 
10. Vietnam 
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Figure 4.4 
CPI Individual Cross Section Graph (1995-2009). 
   
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
1. Indonesia 
2. Malaysia 
3. Singapore 
4. Thailand 
5. Philippines 
6. Laos 
7. Brunei Darussalam 
8. Cambodia 
9. Myanmar 
10. Vietnam 
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(8) Real exchange rates in US Dollar (RER) of ASEAN-10 Analysis 
(1992-2009) 
Real exchange rates in US Dollar in this research means as the price 
of one currency expressed in terms of U.S. Dollar which is adjusted for 
inflation. In this research RER of ASEAN-10 that consist: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are selected as raw data. For this panel data 
regression purpose to sigma convergence, the period of time is divided into 
1992-2006 as RER 1 and 1995-2009 as RER 2. 
 Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.5 and 4.6 are cross sections graph which displays separate lines 
for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.7 and 4.8 are individual 
cross sections, which display separate time series graphs for each cross-
section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross sections graph are 
a single graph containing summary statistics for each period.  
Figure 4.5 and 4.6 show that in general the summary statistics of both 
periods of observation are similar, it means that the selection period is good 
for regress. 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand RER’s are described as the only 
countries which have the same Individual cross section graph on both periods 
of time, whereas: Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand RER’s shape stay the 
same, whether it was far from crisis or close to crisis year (see Figure 4.7 and 
4.8). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 
RER Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006). 
       
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Figure 4.6 
RER Combined Cross Section Graph (1996-2009) 
  
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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Figure 4.7 
RER Individual Cross Section Graph (1992-2006). 
    
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
1. Indonesia 
2. Malaysia 
3. Singapore 
4. Thailand 
5. Philippines 
6. Laos 
7. Brunei Darussalam 
8. Cambodia 
9. Myanmar 
10. Vietnam 
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Figure 4.8 
RER Individual Cross Section Graph (1995-2009). 
   
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
1. Indonesia 
2. Malaysia 
3. Singapore 
4. Thailand 
5. Philippines 
6. Laos 
7. Brunei Darussalam 
8. Cambodia 
9. Myanmar 
10. Vietnam 
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(9)  Growth rates of foreign exchange reserves (GFER) of ASEAN-10  
Analysis (1992-2009) 
Growth rates of foreign exchange reserves in this research means the 
amount of increase a deposit of a foreign currency of other countries as assets 
allow government to keep their currencies stable and reduce the effect of 
economic shocks. In this research GFER of ASEAN-10 that consist: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are selected as raw data in this 
research study. For this panel data regression purpose to sigma convergence, 
the period of time is divided into 1992-2006 as GFER 10A and 1993-2007 as 
GFER 10B. 
Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.9 and 4.10 is a combined cross sectional graph which displays 
separate lines for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.11 and 4.12 
are individual cross section which displays separate time series graphs for 
each cross-section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross 
sections graph a single graph containing summary statistics for each period. 
Figure 4.9 and 4.10 show that in general the summary statistics of both 
periods of observation are similar, it means that the selection period is good 
for regress. 
Indonesia GFER for regression is described as the only country which 
has the same Individual cross section graph on both periods of time, whereas 
 
 
 
 
described that Indonesia GFER’s shape stay the same, whether it observed far 
from crisis or close to crisis year (see Figure 4.11 and 4.12). 
 
Figure 4.9 
GFER Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Figure 4.10 
GFER Combined Cross Section Graph (1993-2007) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
-400
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
 1
 - 
92
 1
 - 
00
 2
 - 
93
 2
 - 
01
 3
 - 
94
 3
 - 
02
 4
 - 
95
 4
 - 
03
 5
 - 
96
 5
 - 
04
 6
 - 
97
 6
 - 
05
 7
 - 
98
 7
 - 
06
 8
 - 
99
 9
 - 
92
 9
 - 
00
 1
0 
- 9
3
 1
0 
- 0
1
GFER10A
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
 1
 - 
93
 1
 - 
01
 2
 - 
94
 2
 - 
02
 3
 - 
95
 3
 - 
03
 4
 - 
96
 4
 - 
04
 5
 - 
97
 5
 - 
05
 6
 - 
98
 6
 - 
06
 7
 - 
99
 7
 - 
07
 8
 - 
00
 9
 - 
93
 9
 - 
01
 1
0 
- 9
4
 1
0 
- 0
2
GFER10B
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11 
GFER Individual Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
  
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
1. Indonesia 
2. Malaysia 
3. Singapore 
4. Thailand 
5. Philippines 
6. Laos 
7. Brunei Darussalam 
8. Cambodia 
9. Myanmar 
10. Vietnam 
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 1
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 2
-10
0
10
20
30
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 3
-40
-20
0
20
40
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 4
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 5
-40
0
40
80
120
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 6
-400
0
400
800
1,200
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 7
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 8
-400
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 9
-200
0
200
400
600
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 10
GFER10A
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12 
GFER Individual Cross Section Graph (1993-2007) 
   
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
1. Indonesia 
2. Malaysia 
3. Singapore 
4. Thailand 
5. Philippines 
6. Laos 
7. Brunei Darussalam 
8. Cambodia 
9. Myanmar 
10. Vietnam 
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(10)  Growth rates of real volume of trade (GRVT) of ASEAN-10 
Analysis (1992-2009) 
Growth rates of real volume of trade in this research means the 
amount of increase the number of shares, bonds or contracts, traded during a 
given period, for a security, or an entire exchange that adjusted for inflation. 
In this research GRVT of ASEAN-10 that consist: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, 
Brunei Darussalam are selected as raw data. For this panel data regression 
purpose to sigma convergence, the period of time is divided into 1992-2006 
as GRVT 1 and 1995-2009 as GRVT 2. 
 Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.13 and 4.14 are a combined a cross sectional graph which 
display separate lines for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.15 and 
4.16 are individual cross sections which display separate time series graphs 
for each cross-section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross 
sections graph are a single graph containing the summary of statistics for each 
period. 
Figure 4.13 and 4.14 show in general the summary of statistics of both 
periods of observation are similar, It means that the selection period is good 
for regression. 
All ASEAN countries that consist: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, are dynamics GRVT individual cross sectional graph on both 
 
 
 
 
period of time, whereas described that all ASEAN countries GRVT’s shape is 
dynamics, while it observed far from crisis or close to crisis year (see Figure 
4.15 and 4.16). 
Figure 4.13 
GRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Figure 4.14 
GRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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Figure 4.15 
GRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
       
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
1. Indonesia 
2. Malaysia 
3. Singapore 
4. Thailand 
5. Philippines 
6. Laos 
7. Brunei Darussalam 
8. Cambodia 
9. Myanmar 
10. Vietnam 
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Figure 4.16 
GRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
    
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
1. Indonesia 
2. Malaysia 
3. Singapore 
4. Thailand 
5. Philippines 
6. Laos 
7. Brunei Darussalam 
8. Cambodia 
9. Myanmar 
10. Vietnam 
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(11)  Growth rate of a real relative volume of trade (GRRVT) of 
ASEAN-10 Analysis (1992-2009) 
Growth rate of a real relative volume of trade in this research means 
the amount of increases a measurement of one investment or financial 
instruments value relative to another’s in the number of shares, bonds, or 
contracts which is, traded during a given period for a security or an entire 
exchange that adjusted for inflation. In this research GRRVT of ASEAN-10 
that consist:  Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, 
Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are selected as raw data. For 
this panel data regression purpose to sigma convergence, the period of time is 
divided into 1992-2006 GRRVT 1 and 1995-2009 GRRVT 2. 
 Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.17 and 4.18 is a combined a cross sectional graph which 
displays separate lines for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.19 
and 4.20 is individual cross sections displays separate time series graphs for 
each cross-section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross 
sections graph are a single graph containing the summary of statistics for each 
period. 
Figure 4.17 and 4.18 show that in general the summary of statistics of 
both periods of observation are similar. It means that the selection period is 
good for regression. 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam GRRVT is described as the only countries which has the 
same Individual cross sectional graph on both periods of time.Vietnam 
GRRVT’s is stays the same, whether it observed far from crisis or close to 
crisis year (see Figure 4.19 and 4.20). 
Figure 4.17 
GRRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Figure 4.18 
GRRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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Figure 4.19 
GRRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
      
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
1. Indonesia 
2. Malaysia 
3. Singapore 
4. Thailand 
5. Philippines 
6. Laos 
7. Brunei Darussalam 
8. Cambodia 
9. Myanmar 
10. Vietnam 
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Figure 4.20 
GRRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
   
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
1. Indonesia 
2. Malaysia 
3. Singapore 
4. Thailand 
5. Philippines 
6. Laos 
7. Brunei Darussalam 
8. Cambodia 
9. Myanmar 
10. Vietnam 
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(12) Growth rate of real per capita GDP at factor cost (GRYPC) of 
ASEAN-10 Analysis (1992-2009) 
Growth rate of real per capita GDP at factor cost in this research 
means as the amount of increase an approximation of the value of goods 
produced per person in the country’s GDP divided by the total number of 
people in the country at the total money, time and resources of a firm engaged 
in the business of financing accounts receivable which is the activity known 
as factoring with a purchase or activity that adjusted for inflation. In this 
research GRYPC of ASEAN-10 that consist: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei 
Darussalam are selected as raw data. For this panel data regression purpose to 
sigma convergence, the period of time is divided into 1992-2007 GRYPC 1 
and 1994-2009 as GRYPC 2. 
 Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.21 and 4.22 is a combined cross sectional graph which displays 
separate lines for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.23 and 4.24 is 
individual cross sections displays separate time series graphs for each cross-
section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross sections graph are 
a single graph containing the summary of statistics for each period. 
Figure 4.21 and 4.22 show that in generally the summary of statistics 
of both period of observation are similar. It means that the selection period is 
good for regression. 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam GRYPC is described as the only countries which has the 
same individual cross sectional graph on both periods of time, Vietnam 
GRYPC is stays the same, whether it observed far from crisis or close to 
crisis year (see Figure 4.23 and 4.24). 
Figure 4.21 
GRYPC Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
  
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Figure 4.22 
GRYPC Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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Figure 4.23 
GRYPC Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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Figure 4.24 
GRYPC Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
      
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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4.2.2 Panel Data Analysis 
This research used Panel data. Panel data is a group of individuals object, 
company and etc, in a current period of time of specific unit. Panel data is a 
combination of cross section data and time series data. As we know that this 
model is focuses on the regression analysis and the combination of time series and 
cross section, which is famous called by pooled time series. There are other names 
for panel data, such as pooled data (pooling of time series and cross-sectional 
observations), combination of time series and cross-section data, micropanel data, 
longitudinal data (a study over time of a variable or group of subjects), event 
history analysis (e.g., studying the movement over time of subjects through 
successive states and conditions) (Gujarati, 2003).  
From three panel data method approaches, there are two approaches that 
are commonly used to estimate the regression model in pooled data, they are fixed 
effect model and random effect model. To determine the method between pooled 
least square and fixed effect we can test it through F test and Hausman test will be 
used to determine between random effect and fixed effect (Winarno, 2009).  
Haussman test is used to determine between fixed effect method and 
random effect method. Chi Square value equation of Hausman test, are: 
 Matrix b_diff  = b_fixed – b_random 
 Matrix var_diff = cov_fixed – cov_random 
 Matrix qform  = @transpose(b_diff)*@inverse(var_diff)*b_diff  
Null Hypothesis of Haussman test, are: 
H0 = random effect 
 
 
 
 
H1 = fixed effect 
If Chi Square statistic > Chi Square table or in other word, p-value > 0.005, 
where it means that we should reject null hypothesis H0 and determine that fixed 
effect model is the suitable model to use (Winarno, 2009). Hausman test is also 
available through Eviews-6 command program. 
Table 4.1 
Hausman Test Result 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic p-value Effect 
CPI 7.300554 0.0069 Fixed 
RER 2.667002 0.1024 Fixed 
GFER 4.548718 0.0329 Fixed 
GRVT 0.855584 0.3550 Fixed 
GRRVT 0.857151 0.3545 Fixed 
GRYPC 0.840744 0.3592 Fixed 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note: fixed effect while p-value > 0,005 
4.2.3 Classic Assumption Test Analysis 
a. Normality Test 
Normality test is done by examining Jarque-Bera value through X2 
table. From regression through Eviews 6.0 we find that J-B statistics as 
shown in Table 4.2, where it is described that CPI, RER, GFER, GRVT, 
GRRVT, and GRYPC, has a normal distribution, where are shown from 
their µ residual value. 
 
 
 
 
Positive  
Auto 
correlation 
Zone of 
indecision 
Do not 
reject  
H0 or H1 
or both 
Zone of 
indecision 
 
Negative 
Auto 
correlation 
1.720 1.746 2.254 2.280 4 0 
Table 4.2 
Normality Test Result 
Test Summary Df X2-table Jarque-Bera Result 
CPI 9.139 23.5893 4.0928 Normal Distribution 
RER 9.139 23.5893 1.1423 Normal Distribution 
GFER 9.139 23.5893 0.1963 Normal Distribution 
GRVT 9.139 23.5893 10.0599 Normal Distribution 
GRRVT 9.139 23.5893 15.2685 Normal Distribution 
GRYPC 9.139 23.5893 10.6329 Normal Distribution 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note: Jarque-Bera (JB) test method is measuring value of skewness and kurtosis where if JB < X2 Chi-square value table, it 
means that residual value distribution is normal (Gujarati, 2003).       
 
b. Autocorrelation Test 
One of formal test to detect autocorrelation is Durbin-Watson. This 
test is based on error model shown below; 
Figure 4.25  
Durbin-Watson Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
H0: No positive autocorrelation 
H1: No negative autocorrelation  
 
 
 
 
 
Based on Durbin-Watson, this study found that in this research the 
equations are generally high potential to be free from autocorrelation, as it 
is described on Table 4.3.         
             Table 4.3 
Durbin-Watson Test Result 
Test 
Summary 
K dL Du 
Dw R2 Dw/R2 
Result 
CPI 1 1.720 1.746 1.744521 0.824031 2.117 Negative Autocorrelation 
RER 1 1.720 1.746 1.820670 0.932277 1.953 Negative Autocorrelation 
GFER 1 1.720 1.746 2.280812 0.228518 9.981 Negative Autocorrelation 
GRVT 1 1.720 1.746 2.279058 0.227245 10.029 Negative Autocorrelation 
GRRVT 1 1.720 1.746 2.137546 0.153866 13.892 Negative Autocorrelation 
GRYPC 1 1.720 1.746 2.266261 0.058549 38.707 Negative Autocorrelation 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010.    
c. Heteroscedasticity Test 
Heteroscedasticity test purpose is to know whether all the 
disturbance term are similar variants or not (Gujarati, 2003).  This research 
study used White’s Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Variances and Standard 
Errors. White has shown that this estimate can be performed so that there 
is asymptotically valid (i.e., large-sample) statistically inference can be 
made about true parameter values. As the preceding result show, (White’s) 
heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are considerably larger than 
the OLS standard errors and therefore the estimated t values are much 
smaller than those obtained by OLS. On the basis of the latter, both the 
regressors are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, whereas on the 
basis of White’s estimators they are not. However, it should be pointed out 
that White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors can be larger or 
smaller than the uncorrected standard errors (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 
Heteroscedasticity Test Result 
Test Summary Probability Result 
CPI 0.000000 Heteroscedasticity free 
RER 0.000000 Heteroscedasticity free 
GFER 0.000229 Heteroscedasticity free 
GRVT 0.000060 Heteroscedasticity free 
GRRVT 0.000146 Heteroscedasticity free 
GRYPC 0.000000 Heteroscedasticity free 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Through Eviews-6, this research study examined the heteroscedasticity by 
Eviews-6 Equation Estimation command of White heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors and covariance, where the result is injured by 
heteroscedasticity if the probability is significant, in the other side, the 
result is free from heteroscedasticity if the probability > 0.005. The 
heteroscedasticity test summary result that described in Table 4.4. 
d. Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity is a condition that describes a linear relationship 
across independent variables. Multicollinearity happens when there are 
more than one independent variables in the research study. Whether this 
research study independent variable is only one, because of that reason this 
research study econometric is free from multicollinearity.    
4.2.4 Regression Statistic Test Analysis (Hypothesis Test) 
a. Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F-test) 
F-test goal is to determine the significance of independent variable 
groups in influencing the dependent variable. In this research we use 95% 
degree of freedom (α = 5%). The conclusion of jointly regression 
coefficient test is described in Table 4.5. It means that independent 
 
 
 
 
variable groups influence the dependent variable. It is significant (H0 is 
rejected and H1 is accepted).  
Table 4.5 
Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F test) 
Test Summary Prob (F - statistic) Result 
CPI 0.000000 Significant 
RER 0.000000 Significant 
GFER 0.000229 Significant 
GRVT 0.000060 Significant 
GRRVT 0.000146 Significant 
GRYPC 0.000000 Significant 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
b. Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t-Test) 
Individuality coefficient test regression (t-test) can be seen through 
t-statistic which is described in Table 4.6. The t test purpose is to see if 
independent variable significantly influences the dependent variable. 
Parameter of a variable is called as significantly influencing if probability 
of t statistic < 0.005. 
Table 4.6 
Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t-Test) 
Test Summary t-statistic p-value Result 
CPI -3.5055 0.0006 Significant 
RER 3.5706 0.0005 Significant 
GFER -4.7144 0.0000 Significant 
GRVT -7.1286 0.0000 Significant 
GRRVT -3.5742 0.0005 Significant 
GRYPC -25.1346 0.0000 Significant 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
c. Determination Coefficient Test of R2   
R2 test goal is to show whether independent variables are good to 
explain the dependent variable. R2 values are 0-1 (0 < R2 < 1). If R2 value 
 
 
 
 
is 1, the independent variable perfectly explains the dependent variable. 
Otherwise, if R2 value is 0 if that the independent variable is not strong 
enough to explain the dependent variable. This determination coefficient 
test of R2 is described in Table 4.7. 
            Table 4.7 
Determination Coefficient Test of R2 
Test Summary R2 Result 
CPI 0.89 89% Explained the dependent variable , 11% explained by others  
RER 0.78 78% Explained the dependent variable, 22% explained by others 
GFER 0.21 21% Explained the dependent variable, 79% explained by others 
GRVT 0.23 23% Explained the dependent variable, 77% explained by others 
GRRVT 0.15 15% Explained the dependent variable, 85% explained by others 
GRYPC 0.40 40% Explained the dependent variable, 60% explained by others 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
4.3 Result Interpretation 
This interpretation of this study follows Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from 
Rasheed and Ahmad, 2007) where the sigma convergence model is given as; 
σj = α + βj t + εj  ……………………………………………………….(4.1) 
  In which: 
 σj  = the standard deviations across the member countries 
 jth = indicator (j = 1 to 6) 
 α and β = the parameters of the model 
 t = time period  
 ε = a stochastic error term 
The important analysis result of Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from Rasheed and 
Ahmad, 2007) σ convergence model are: if the result of regression shows a 
negative value of β coefficient, it indicates the possibility of convergence, while, 
 
 
 
 
if the regression result is any other value of β coefficient it implies non-
convergence.   
In Table 4.8, we found out that there are contradicting conditions for CPI, 
although all the β coefficient of CPI are negative, that means convergence 
Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmad, 2007), but only in one 
sample it is statistically significant (p-value < 0.005), this condition showed that 
inflation has remained unstable due to the unsteady because ASEAN during this 
period injured by hard crisis of 1997 which is thus not paving the way for price 
stability, but synchronized movements do demonstrate a possible success of a 
common currency in the ASEAN region. This condition is almost similar 
condition to research study of ‘The Convergence and The SAARC Common 
Currency’ written by Rasheed and Ahmed (2007).     
Table 4.8 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
               CPI on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.0744 -0.0487 
p-value 0.0006 0.3041 
R2 0.82 0.89 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Table 4.9 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
RER on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.0351 -0.0168 
p-value 0.3472 0.8464 
R2 0.96 0.93 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
This research study time period consists of two historical crises. The first 
crisis happened in 1997 which is often called as East Asian Crisis. Thailand was 
 
 
 
 
one of ASEAN member countries, where was injured by this crisis. Then, this 
crisis also gave a bad impact to others ASEAN countries, as: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Brunei Darussalam. 
The second crisis is called Global crisis that happened in U.S (United Stated of 
America), which gave impact to the whole world. The negative impact happened 
to the whole world on real exchange rate (RER) which was shown by the p-value 
that not significant in whole period of time in this research study, this condition is 
described in Table 4.9. The table shows that, ASEAN exchange rate is fragile 
while it was hit by hard crises. This condition is a proof that ASEAN countries are 
not suitable with floating exchange rate system. Which depends on U.S dollar. As 
we know U.S dollar is not backed by gold anymore after the Bretton Woods 
agreement was breakdown in 1970. Table 4.9 also shows that RER in whole 
period of time in this research study which consists both historical crises, are 
Convergence. The β coefficients of the RER are negative. This means that RER 
does reflect a case of a monetary union in ASEAN region.       
Table 4.10 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
GFER on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.0608 -0.2623 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.22 0.20 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Table 4.10 shows that all the estimated coefficients are found to be 
statistically significant. This table also describes that all of the β coefficients are 
negative. It means that the growth rate of foreign exchange reserves is 
 
 
 
 
Convergence. This indicates that there is a harmonized GFER through ASEAN 
countries member. This condition will help establish a currency union in ASEAN 
region.   
Table 4.11 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
GRVT on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.1629 -0.0769 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.23 0.23 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
From Table 4.11, it is apparent that all the time periods in this research 
study estimated β coefficient for the growth rate volume of trade are negative and 
statistically significant. The growth in trade volume (GRVT), therefore, thus 
seems to be synchronizing and presenting a case of a successful formation of a 
common currency.  
Table 4.12 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
GRRVT on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.2298 -0.1202 
p-value 0.0005 0.0007 
R2 0.21 0.15 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Presenting the case of the growth rate of relative trade volume in Table 
4.12, we find significant and negative β coefficient values for the whole periods in 
this research study observations. This observation further of GRRVT strengthens 
the possibility of a single currency case.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.13 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
   GRYPC on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.0592 -0.0948 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.06 0.40 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Finally, for the growth rate of per capita real GDP we have to use annual 
data of 1992-2006 and 1995-2009 where the observation is larger than other 
variables in this research. This research can observe a whole condition in the 
whole the growth rate of per capita real GDP 1992-2009 periods of time 
completely. The results of β coefficient value are presented in Table 4.13 where 
the β value was found negative for all equation coefficients. Although there is 
only one that significant, where is described that there is a big hard impact due to 
1997 crisis to the growth rate of per-capita real GDP at that time period but, thus 
still showing a high likelihood of forming a successful single currency through the 
convergence result of all the GRYPC in the whole period of time in this research 
study. 
Finally this research found, where this research has been differentiate the 
method of the study from the previous study of Chaudhury (2009), because this 
research found out from EMU study by Keenan (2002) research that written by 
Keenan that conclude the weaknesses of OCA, and now there are no reasons for 
this research to follow the previous study of Chaudhury (2009) that used OCA, 
and latter we finally decided that better use Convergence criterion with their 
 
 
 
 
whole advantages and benefits. The important analysis result σ convergence 
model in this research are: if the result of regression shows a negative value of β 
coefficient, it indicates the possibility of convergence, while, if the regression 
result is any other value of β coefficient it implies non-convergence 
(Chowudhury, 2004) in Rasheed and Ahmad (2007). 
We found out that there are contradicting conditions for CPI in this 
research, although all the β coefficient of CPI are negative, but only in one sample 
it is statistically significant (p-value < 0.005). This condition is almost similar 
condition to research study of ‘The Convergence and The SAARC Common 
Currency’ written by Rasheed and Ahmed (2007). 
RER in whole period of time in this research study which consists both 
historical crises, are Convergence. The β coefficients of the RER are negative. 
This means that RER does reflect a case of a monetary union in ASEAN region. 
The growth rate of foreign exchange reserves is Convergence. This indicates that 
there is a harmonized GFER through ASEAN countries member. This condition 
will help establish a currency union in ASEAN region. The GRVT thus seems to 
be synchronizing and presenting a case of a successful formation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
of a common currency. The further observation of GRRVT strengthens the 
possibility of a single currency case, where the result are significant and negative 
β coefficient values for the whole periods in this research study of GRRVT 
observations. Although there is only one that significant, where is described that 
there is a big hard impact due to 1997 crisis to the growth rate of per-capita real 
GDP at that time period but, thus still showing a high likelihood of forming a 
 
 
 
 
successful single currency through the convergence result of all the GRYPC in the 
whole period of time in this research study. 
The result of this study described that the first previous study of Kazushi, 
Shimizu, (2001) where it suggest that monetary integration should be studied after 
deepening market integration by the development of AFTA, it was true. And also 
it was support by the second previous study of Madhur, Srinivasa, (2002) where it 
viewed from this perspective, that the launching of the AFTA and the regional 
resources sharing arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative may perhaps 
posses the potential to gradually lead to greater regional monetary cooperation. 
The result of this study answered the third previous study that was written 
by Bunyaratavej, Kraiwinee, (2003), where the research of them described that the 
ASEAN region as a whole may not be an ideal candidates for forming a currency 
union, as GDP per capita displays a high degree of heterogeneity, by the fact that 
it might be happen to ASEAN-6 as their research focus, although the forth 
previous study that written by Ramayandi, Arief, (2005), result The five largest 
ASEAN countries seem to be suitable candidates to begin with. In the other side 
while the research focus apply in the full integration of ASEAN-10, the answered 
sound be different, where through the convergence of this study result, it totally 
proved that there are likely to be considerable benefits while apply monetary 
union of common currency area after full integration of ASEAN-10 takes place, as 
support by the fifth previous study that was written by Thangavelu, Shandre M. 
(2008), and the sixth previous study that was written by Chaudhury, Rafi, (2009). 
     
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
4.4 Description of Research Objects 
ASEAN is a regional organization in South East Asia. It was established in 
1967 under the Bangkok Declaration, with five original member countries: 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia. Latter it is called 
ASEAN 5. Brunei Darussalam joined in ASEAN in 1984. ASEAN then is called 
ASEAN 6, with relatively developed economies in Southeast Asia. Now ASEAN 
has ten member countries with Vietnam joining in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 
1997 and Cambodia in April 1999. The latest 4 members are called ASEAN 4, or 
CLMV. The whole ASEAN member countries are called ASEAN 10, and if 
Vietnam and Laos are not included, it is called ASEAN 8. Nowadays, the ASEAN 
region has a population of about 500 million, a total area of 4.5million square 
kilometers, a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of US$737 billion, and a 
total trade of US$720 billion. ASEAN FTA (AFTA) is the earliest FTA in Asia, 
which was initiated in 1992 (Yi, 2005).   
Different from the two major regional integrations respectively in Europe 
and the North Americas, EU faced internal pressure politically in Europe internal 
security issue, namely to restrain Germany, and external pressure politically from 
former Soviet Union, and Economically from the U.S. , ASEAN  creation was not 
necessarily logical. If one considers the circumstances of the five original 
countries, each of which was widely diverse, and all of which were linked to 
 
 
 
 
external powers, mainly through former colonial channels. It is doubtful whether a 
clear identity as ASEAN or Southeast Asia, for that matter existed at the 
beginning. This was because that almost every original ASEAN member nation 
had recently gained independence from external powers, and had the extremely 
strong desire to be independent both in politics and economy. One may imagine, 
therefore, that ASEAN was a creation of the Cold War, supported by the U.S. 
strategy for a political and economic formation at the regional level. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that ASEAN had only limited success during its 
early era.  Although the member countries of ASEAN are geographically close, 
the interdependence in economy among ASEAN was minimal. Almost every 
ASEAN member nation adopted the import substitution model which is based on 
a closed economy. In addition, ASEAN was not established for economic 
purpose, so in the establishment stage, economic integration among ASEAN 
almost did not exist. Estimates during the establishment stage showed that the 
share of intra-ASEAN trade of the total trade of the member countries was 
between 12 and 15 percent. In summary, during the establishment stage of 
ASEAN, ASEAN was dominated by ideology, mainly for the purpose of political 
solidarity against communism rather than for the purpose of economic integration, 
although from neither aspects could the integrations be considered successful. 
Although the member countries of ASEAN are geographically close, the 
interdependence in economy among ASEAN was minimal. Almost every ASEAN 
member nation adopted the import substitution model which is based on a closed 
economy. In addition, ASEAN was not established for economic purpose, so in 
 
 
 
 
the establishment stage, economic integration among ASEAN almost did not 
exist. Estimates during the establishment stage showed that the share of intra-
ASEAN trade of the total trade of the member countries was between 12 and 15 
percent. In summary, during the establishment stage of ASEAN, ASEAN was 
dominated by ideology, mainly for the purpose of political solidarity against 
communism rather than for the purpose of economic integration, although from 
neither aspects could the integrations be considered successful (Yi, 2005). 
After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, with the retreat of U.S. power 
in southeastern Asia, the antagonism in ideology became less strong. The ASEAN 
member nations turned more to regional security concerns and domestic stability. 
Border disputes had long existed among ASEAN countries: Malaysia and 
Indonesia over two islands, Malaysia and Singapore over an island, Indonesia and 
the Philippines over some islands, the Philippines, Vietnam and China over some 
islands in the South China Sea. A domestic instability had also long existed in 
most of the member nations. There were many parties and religious factions in 
almost every member country. Some countries were controlled by military 
government, some countries cabinets were changed frequently, other countries 
anti-government armed forces and terrorist activities were furious. This led to the 
first heads of government’s meeting held in Bali in 1976 and the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). The TAC is an 
important non-aggression political pact of ASEAN. It declared the following 
fundamental principles: 
 
 
 
 
• Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, 
territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; 
• The right of every State to lead its national existence free from 
external interference, subversion or coercion; 
• Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
• Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 
• Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and 
• Effective cooperation among themselves. 
The TAC showed that domestic affairs should be free from external interference 
and that mutual disputes should be settled free from the force and threat. This 
demonstrated that the TAC was a political accord of landmark meaning, because it 
displayed the strong determination to be free from external powers interference, 
and to be respected and independent, dealing with the internal affairs among 
ASEAN through equal dialogue and peaceful means. This established a good 
political basis for southeastern regional security. Due to the TAC, ASEAN s 
regional security improved and the Regional security conditions could usually 
build confidence in promoting regional economic integration. In 1977, 
immediately after the conclusion of the TAC, the ASEAN member countries 
signed the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) of 1977, which accorded 
tariff preferences for trade among ASEAN economies, aiming at enhancing the 
economic cooperation among ASEAN. Ten years later, an Enhanced PTA 
Program was adopted at the Third ASEAN Summit in Manila further increasing 
intra-ASEAN trade (Yi, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
Substantial Integration Stage (1992-1997): from the Launching of AFTA 
to before the Eruption of Southeastern Asia Financial Crisis. During this period, 
the ASEAN member countries signed the ASEAN Declaration on the South China 
Sea, Manila, in July 1992. In the Declaration, Article 1 emphasizes by peaceful 
means, without resort to force to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues 
pertaining to the South China Sea; Article 3 resolves to explore the possibility of 
cooperation in the South China Sea relating to the security of maritime navigation 
and communication, protection against pollution of the marine environment, 
coordination of search and rescue operations, efforts towards combating piracy 
and armed robbery as well as collaboration in the campaign against illicit 
trafficking in drugs ; Article 4 advocates a code of international conduct over the 
South China Sea based on the principles contained in the TAC ; art. 5 invite all 
parties concerned to subscribe to this Declaration of principles.  Article 5 is worth 
notice: because China is a major party in the South China Sea. The Declaration, in 
fact, invites China to negotiate with the party concerned South China Sea among 
ASEAN. In December 1995 in Bangkok, in the foreign ministers meeting, 
ASEAN concluded the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. 
It was obvious that ASEAN s political integration still centered surround 
eliminating the regional security concerns. As the Treaty declared that the 
establishment of a Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone will contribute 
towards strengthening the security of States within the Zone. In January 1992 at 
the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992, the Framework 
 
 
 
 
Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation was signed, which included the 
launching of a scheme toward an AFTA, aiming at the elimination of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers and promoting trade liberation among the member countries. In 
1995, the Fifth ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok adopted the Agenda for Greater 
Economic Integration, which included the acceleration of the timetable for the 
realization of AFTA from the original 15-year timeframe to 10 years. Economic 
integration in this period proved greatly successful. ASEANs economies 
developed at a surprising speed. Within the three years from the launching of 
AFTA, exports among ASEAN countries grew from US$ 43.26 billion in 1993 to 
almost US$ 80 billion in 1996, an average yearly growth rate of 28.3 percent 26. 
In the process, the share of intra-regional trade from ASEANs total trade rose 
from 20 percent to almost 25 percent. Tourists from ASEAN countries themselves 
have been representing an increasingly important share of tourism in the region. In 
1996, of the 28.6 million tourist arrivals in ASEAN, 11.2 million or almost 40% 
came from within ASEAN itself. During this period, ASEANs economic 
development obtained a strong reputation. It was called the miracle of Southeast 
Asia in the world. Correspondingly, ASEANs political status rose too (Yi, 2005). 
 Break of ASEAN Regional Economic Integration by the Southeast Asia 
Financial Crisis In February 1997, the Southeast Asia financial crisis (the 
financial crisis) erupted. The ASEAN economies were hit hard and suffered great 
losses, and at the same time the crisis had tremendous impacts on other Asian 
countries and regions and later on developed countries, including the U.S., Japan 
and Europe. The total economic loss of South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia approximated US$ 600 billion, the GDP per Capita in US$ of these 
countries decreased to the level of ten years ago. During only a few months, the 
currency in these countries was devalued by 50 percent, or even 80 percent. The 
financial crisis fully exposed the long-established weakness of ASEAN s regional 
economy. They are: 
5) Heavy Economic Dependence on the U.S. and Japan 
First, ASEAN member countries long and excessively depended on 
foreign capital, especially U.S. and Japanese capital, and the efficiency to 
make good use of the foreign loans was not high. So if the international 
balance of the ASEAN countries was a deficit, then the national currency 
should have devalued in terms of its real value. However, the national 
currency of most ASEAN s countries was pegged to U.S. dollar one way 
or another. Thus, when international balance of payments kept a deficit for 
a long time, the exchange rate of national currency with US dollar could 
not be maintained. The financial crisis erupted. Second, the previous rapid 
growth of ASEANs economy had been based on the export-processing 
model. In the 1970s and the 1980s, member countries processed 
downstream electronics products for Japan; when ASEAN went into the 
1990s, the Japanese economy began to decline and the U.S. economy 
began to rise, ASEANs export became dependent on the U.S. market. 
Once the demand of the two markets was insufficient, the ASEANs 
economy would be affected seriously. 
 
 
 
 
 
6) Excessively Open Capital Market 
The capital market in ASEAN country was excessively open. One World 
Bank study placed Malaysian and Thai trade policies as among the most 
open in developing economies. Opening domestic markets to outside 
money (under an early round of pressure from the IMF [the International 
Monetary Fund) brought a deluge of short term foreign investment and 
spurred heavy short-term borrowing from abroad, fueling a building boom. 
Take Thailand for example, by the mid 90s, a speculative binge in 
everything from high-rise office towers to condos to gold courses 
accounted for nearly 40% of growth in Thailand. 34 When the real estate 
bubble burst, conditioning the rather open capital market, too much capital 
rushed out, too quickly. The excessive inflow of capital reversed itself and 
fled with little regard for the actual strength of a particular economy.  
7) Weak Intra-Regional Economic Interdependence 
The economic interdependence among the member countries was weak. 
The intra regional trade among ASEAN accounted for a small portion of 
the total trade of ASEAN, about no more than 25 percent, far less than the 
level of 40% plus of intra-regional trade among EU and NAFTA; 
moreover, such small portion was mainly produced between Singapore 
and Malaysia,36 the intra-regional trade among other ASEAN s countries 
was even smaller. Therefore once the demand outside ASEAN sharply 
declined, the intra-regional demand could not be spurred to absorb part of 
 
 
 
 
the products diverted from the exportation, and then the national and 
regional economy collapsed together. 
8) Similarities in Industrial Structures Southeastern Asian export industries 
lay in the bottom layer of the global vertical division system, gathering a 
large number of labor-intensive and half capital-intensive industries. It 
became the weakest part in the global economy chains. ASEAN s member 
countries repeated the same development model: absorbed foreign capital, 
invested in the export-processing industries, and their products tended to 
be alike. Whether in their domestic economy or even in the intra-regional 
economy among ASEAN, the development layout of industrial hierarchies 
and diversities was not formed; almost none of the production chains were 
wholly shaped. When the global economic structures were adjusted and 
such adjustments caused the demand for ASEAN s exports to greatly 
decline, ASEAN s downstream processed products would be superfluous 
and ASEAN s economy would be damaged seriously. Due to the financial 
crisis, ASEAN s competition in exportation and attraction of foreign 
investment was unfavorably affected immensely. In addition, because its 
member countries had to engage in dealing with domestic problems caused 
by the financial crisis, the mutual cooperation and coordination among 
ASEAN were suspended. As a result, ASEAN s status and influence both 
in economy and politics declined rapidly either in Asia or in the world. 
The financial crisis provided ASEAN with many lessons. If in the future we are in 
retrospect of the process of ASEAN s regional economic integration and even of 
 
 
 
 
the later East Asian regional economic integration, we will discover that the 
financial crisis undoubtedly acted as a watershed and even a catalyze. Before the 
financial crisis, the rapid economic growth of ASEAN mainly depended on 
foreign capital and markets, based much less on intra economic interdependence 
among ASEAN and their domestic markets. The member countries had no strong 
motivations to enhance a complete integration to close their relationship in 
economy. The financial crisis confronted ASEAN with many new issues for 
discussion. First, the global IMF failed in the financial crisis. It suggested that a 
regional monetary and financial cooperation would be necessary. Second, unlike 
the developed countries, the door of the non-developed countries capital market 
can only open step by step, rather than too fast. Third, the simplification of 
monetary policy, which was only pegged to U.S. dollar, should be changed, 
because once the U.S. dollar s value fluctuates badly, the concerned countries 
monetary and financial system will suffer from great influence. Therefore the 
monetary policy should be diverse, for example, adopt a package of pegged 
moneys. Besides, the similarities of regional industrial structures and weak intra-
regional economic interdependence were viewed as the in-depth causes of the 
financial crisis. It was considered that establishing among ASEAN the diverse and 
hierarchical economies, stretching the production chains, strengthening economic 
complementarities and enhancing the intra-regional economic interdependence 
will effectively form regional competitive force to resist to the external economic 
impacts, making ASEAN a regional trade bloc in a genuine sense. So it was a 
logical consequence that after the financial crisis ASEAN began the complete 
 
 
 
 
intra-regional economic integration in a variety of areas to enhance the intra-
regional economic interdependence (Yi, 2005). 
In responding to the crisis, ASEAN heads of governments in December 
1997 set out their ASEAN ‘Vision 2020’ statement. The vision contained a 
message in favor of moving towards closer cohesion and economic integration. It 
was soon followed by an action plan concluded in the following year at the 
ASEAN summit in Hanoi. The action plan among other things, calls for a 
strengthening of the financial system in the region to maintain regional 
macroeconomic and financial stability, and to intensify cooperation on money, tax 
and other financial related matters. Prior to East Asia crisis, economic integration 
in East Asia has been enhancing via the market driven forces such as cross-border 
trade, FDI (foreign direct investment) and finance. Over the past 20 years, 
international trade and FDI activities have expanded rapidly through multilateral 
international institutions such as World Trade Organization (WTO), Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) as well as unilateral (or multilateral) trade 
liberalization processes. Nevertheless, the patterns of economic cooperation in 
East Asian countries have been changed, especially after the East Asia financial 
crisis erupted in mid-1997. The rapidly changing international environment and 
East Asia crisis have emerged a common interest amongst East Asia countries in 
creating a strong impetus for regional cooperation. This has led to the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) agreement on bilateral swaps and discussion of the possibility of 
creating a monetary union among the ASEAN+3. Indeed, there have been few 
attempts proposed to create cooperative frameworks that help to prevent and 
 
 
 
 
manage future currency crises and to promote economic efficiency by developing 
sound financial systems. Japan, for example, has proposed to create an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF) in September 1997. The members of this Fund would 
contribute some portion of their international reserves to a central fund, which 
would be utilized to provide a financial assistance to countries affected by 
external crises such as financial and currency crises. However, the United States, 
China and the IMF against the establishment of the AMF proposal on two 
reasons: soft conditionality and duplication. As a further step in promoting Asian 
economic integration, Japanese finance minister Miyazawa has made a proposal 
that is called “New Miyazawa Initiative” in October 1998, which aimed to set up a 
financial assistance scheme totaling 30 billion US dollars. This Initiatives, 
however, has met with strong criticism because the proposal is too Japan-centered, 
and the attitude of Japan in regional initiatives is rather ambiguous (Moon, 2000 
(excerpt from Choo and Choong, 2009)). Although this proposals were rejected, 
there were few more successful initiatives have been proposed towards a closer 
monetary cooperation in Asian. For example, a conference was held in Manila in 
November 1997, which consists of deputy finance ministers and central bank 
governors from 14 mostly Asian countries. The outcome of the conference was 
the establishment of Manila Framework Group (MFG), a new framework to 
enhance Asian Regional cooperation and to promote financial stability in the 
region. In addition, the ASEAN finance ministers have agreed to establish the 
ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) in October 1998 to encourage policy 
dialogue based on the peer review and mutual interest among ASEAN member 
 
 
 
 
countries. In November 1999, China, Japan, and South Korea have been invited to 
join ASP, which making “ASEAN+3” reality in financial surveillance (Choo and 
Choong, 2009).         
To reinforce the Hanoi action plan in order to achieve this goal, ASEAN 
nations have also moved forward by looking at a wider region in terms of 
economic and financial cooperation through the Chiang Mai Initiatives (CMI) that 
was launched in May 2000. The initiative aimed to develop a network of bilateral 
swap agreements (local currency to US dollar or Japanese) among Northeast 
Asian countries, and strengthening an intra-ASEAN swap agreement. In May 
2002, bilateral swap agreements between Japan, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and China have been initiated. Also the ASEAN swap agreement was 
extended to cover all the 10 member countries. The CMI represents the first 
milestone towards constructing a coordinated intervention policy and currency 
arrangement regionally. Nevertheless, this step is more likely to be more a case of 
“pooling reserve” in dealing with external instability or crises than a commitment 
to bilateral intervention to stabilize regional bilateral exchange rates. Obviously, 
financial cooperation has seen some positive progress among East Asia countries; 
however, incentives for monetary cooperation are still lack (Choo and Choong, 
2009). Although some economic indicators are agreeable, China, Japan and Korea 
do not appear to be economically suitable for monetary cooperation with ASEAN 
(Jikang and Yin, 2005). The uncertain economic times ahead however merit 
discussion on how further integration could help the organization maintain 
economic stability while raising its regional competitive profile. This study finds 
 
 
 
 
that while significant reforms can be made in the absence of such a union, there 
are likely to be considerable benefits that apply only after full integration of 
ASEAN takes place (Chaudhury, 2009).    
4.5 Data Analysis 
4.5.1 Raw Data Analysis 
Data that are used in this research is a secondary data, which is collected in 
a form of literature data that are related to this research. Shape literature data that 
we use in this research are; note, document, and also article data. All the data that 
we gained latter we will manage and process it in order to match it to answer out 
research question and objectives. For this research purpose we require data from 
UNDIP (Diponegoro University) Library at Semarang City to get the International 
Financial Statistics of IMF 2004 and we also surfing searching data on-line 
through internet until finally we found Nation Master, UN data, Asian 
Development Bank, CIA World Fact book that help us to complete the data that 
we gained before from UNDIP library. Data that we have collected from 
International Financial Statistics of IMF 2004 and Nation Master, UN data, Asian 
Development Bank, CIA World Fact book are; 1) Consumer Price Index (CPI), 2) 
Nominal exchange rate, 3) Export, 4) Import, 5) Population, 6) Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  
Methodology that used in this research consists of the EMU (European 
Monetary Union) model principle in launching their single currency Pitchford and 
Cox, 1997 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007) and the sigma convergence 
model (Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007). Pitchford 
 
 
 
 
and Cox, 1997 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmed, 2007) edited the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) principles for launching single currency for Europe. 
According to the editors the indicators like real income per capita, call money 
rate, consumer price index, real exchange rate, exports, imports and balance of 
payments are vital. In our study we have included the volume of trade both for the 
country specific and as a world relative index. They used the following data series 
to apply the beta convergence criteria to evaluate the possibility of the formation 
of a single currency in the Asia. The list of the selected variables is as follows; 
xx. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
xxi. Real Exchange Rate in US dollars (RER) 
xxii. Growth rates of Foreign Exchange Reserves (GFER) 
xxiii. Growth rates of Real Volume of Trade (GRVT)  
xxiv. Growth rates of Real Relative Volume of Trade (GRRVT) 
xxv. Growth rates of Per Capita Real GDP at factor cost (GRYPC) 
Where; 
GRYPC  = Growth rate of (GDP/ (population)) 
RER   = Nominal Exchange Rate *CPIUS / CPI 
GRVT  = Growth rates of {(Exports + Imports)/CPI} 
GRRVT  = Growth rates of {(Exports + Imports)/CPI}/  
     {(Exports W + Imports W)/CPIW}   
Note; 
 W = indicating world 
 
 
 
 
US = United State country 
Raw data in this research is gain through several process calculations of 
data collection from secondary data source, as describe on above explanation, 
because of that reason data collecting process journey is not as simple as imagine, 
and here are the raw data analysis of this research study; 
(13)  Consumer price indices (CPI) of ASEAN-10 Analysis (1992-
2009) 
Consumer price indices in this research means as an inflationary 
indicator that measures the change in the cost of a fixed basket of products 
and services, including; housing, electricity, food, and transportation. 
Consumer price indices is also mean as an index of prices used to measure the 
change in the cost of basic goods and services in comparison with a fixed 
base period, which is also called, cost-of-living-index. In this research CPI of 
ASEAN-10 that consist: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are 
selected as raw data. For this panel data regression purpose to sigma 
convergence, the period of time is divided into 1992-2006 as CPI z and 1995-
2009 as CPI w. 
Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 is a combined a cross sectional graph which displays 
separate lines for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.3 and 4.4 is 
individual cross sections displays separate time series graphs for each cross-
 
 
 
 
section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross sections graph are 
a single graph containing the summary of statistics for each period.  
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 show that in general the summary of statistics of 
both periods of observation are similar. It means that the selection period is 
good for regression. 
Indonesia CPI is described as the only one which has the same 
Individual cross sectional graph on both periods of time. Indonesia CPI shape 
is stays the same, whether it observed far from crisis or close to crisis year 
(see Figure 4.3 and 4.4).   
 
Figure 4.1 
 
 
 
 
CPI Combined Cross Section Grap
 
              Source: Eviews-6, 2 
Figure 4.2 
CPI Combined Cross Section Graph (1995-2009). 
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                                      Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
  Figure 4.3 
CPI Individual Cross Section Graph (1992-2006). 
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Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
Figure 4.4 
CPI Individual Cross Section Graph (1995-2009). 
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Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
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(14)  Real exchange rates in US Dollar (RER) of ASEAN-10 
Analysis (1992-2009) 
Real exchange rates in US Dollar in this research means as the price 
of one currency expressed in terms of U.S. Dollar which is adjusted for 
inflation. In this research RER of ASEAN-10 that consist: Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are selected as raw data. For this panel data 
regression purpose to sigma convergence, the period of time is divided into 
1992-2006 as RER 1 and 1995-2009 as RER 2. 
 Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.5 and 4.6 are cross sections graph which displays separate lines 
for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.7 and 4.8 are individual 
cross sections, which display separate time series graphs for each cross-
section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross sections graph are 
a single graph containing summary statistics for each period.  
Figure 4.5 and 4.6 show that in general the summary statistics of both 
periods of observation are similar, it means that the selection period is good 
for regress. 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand RER’s are described as the only 
countries which have the same Individual cross section graph on both periods 
of time, whereas: Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand RER’s shape stay the 
same, whether it was far from crisis or close to crisis year (see Figure 4.7 and 
4.8). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 
RER Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006). 
       
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Figure 4.6 
RER Combined Cross Section Graph (1996-2009) 
  
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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Figure 4.7 
RER Individual Cross Section Graph (1992-2006). 
    
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 1
4
6
8
10
12
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 2
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0
4.4
4.8
5.2
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 3
40
60
80
100
120
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 4
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 5
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.2
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 7
0
250,000
500,000
750,000
1,000,000
1,250,000
1,500,000
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 8
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 9
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 10
RER1
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 
RER Individual Cross Section Graph (1995-2009). 
   
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
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(15)  Growth rates of foreign exchange reserves (GFER) of ASEAN-10  
Analysis (1992-2009) 
Growth rates of foreign exchange reserves in this research means the 
amount of increase a deposit of a foreign currency of other countries as assets 
allow government to keep their currencies stable and reduce the effect of 
economic shocks. In this research GFER of ASEAN-10 that consist: 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are selected as raw data in this 
research study. For this panel data regression purpose to sigma convergence, 
the period of time is divided into 1992-2006 as GFER 10A and 1993-2007 as 
GFER 10B. 
Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.9 and 4.10 is a combined cross sectional graph which displays 
separate lines for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.11 and 4.12 
are individual cross section which displays separate time series graphs for 
each cross-section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross 
sections graph a single graph containing summary statistics for each period. 
Figure 4.9 and 4.10 show that in general the summary statistics of both 
periods of observation are similar, it means that the selection period is good 
for regress. 
Indonesia GFER for regression is described as the only country which 
has the same Individual cross section graph on both periods of time, whereas 
 
 
 
 
described that Indonesia GFER’s shape stay the same, whether it observed far 
from crisis or close to crisis year (see Figure 4.11 and 4.12). 
 
Figure 4.9 
GFER Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Figure 4.10 
GFER Combined Cross Section Graph (1993-2007) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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Figure 4.11 
GFER Individual Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
  
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
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Figure 4.12 
GFER Individual Cross Section Graph (1993-2007) 
   
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
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(16)  Growth rates of real volume of trade (GRVT) of ASEAN-10 
Analysis (1992-2009) 
Growth rates of real volume of trade in this research means the 
amount of increase the number of shares, bonds or contracts, traded during a 
given period, for a security, or an entire exchange that adjusted for inflation. 
In this research GRVT of ASEAN-10 that consist: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, 
Brunei Darussalam are selected as raw data. For this panel data regression 
purpose to sigma convergence, the period of time is divided into 1992-2006 
as GRVT 1 and 1995-2009 as GRVT 2. 
 Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.13 and 4.14 are a combined a cross sectional graph which 
display separate lines for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.15 and 
4.16 are individual cross sections which display separate time series graphs 
for each cross-section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross 
sections graph are a single graph containing the summary of statistics for each 
period. 
Figure 4.13 and 4.14 show in general the summary of statistics of both 
periods of observation are similar, It means that the selection period is good 
for regression. 
All ASEAN countries that consist: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, are dynamics GRVT individual cross sectional graph on both 
 
 
 
 
period of time, whereas described that all ASEAN countries GRVT’s shape is 
dynamics, while it observed far from crisis or close to crisis year (see Figure 
4.15 and 4.16). 
Figure 4.13 
GRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Figure 4.14 
GRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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Figure 4.15 
GRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
       
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
-100
0
100
200
300
400
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 1
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 2
-80
-40
0
40
80
120
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 3
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 4
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 5
-10,000
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 6
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 7
-400
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 8
-800
-400
0
400
800
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 9
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
 10
GRVT1
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16 
GRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
    
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
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(17)  Growth rate of a real relative volume of trade (GRRVT) of 
ASEAN-10 Analysis (1992-2009) 
Growth rate of a real relative volume of trade in this research means 
the amount of increases a measurement of one investment or financial 
instruments value relative to another’s in the number of shares, bonds, or 
contracts which is, traded during a given period for a security or an entire 
exchange that adjusted for inflation. In this research GRRVT of ASEAN-10 
that consist:  Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, 
Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam are selected as raw data. For 
this panel data regression purpose to sigma convergence, the period of time is 
divided into 1992-2006 GRRVT 1 and 1995-2009 GRRVT 2. 
 Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.17 and 4.18 is a combined a cross sectional graph which 
displays separate lines for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.19 
and 4.20 is individual cross sections displays separate time series graphs for 
each cross-section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross 
sections graph are a single graph containing the summary of statistics for each 
period. 
Figure 4.17 and 4.18 show that in general the summary of statistics of 
both periods of observation are similar. It means that the selection period is 
good for regression. 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam GRRVT is described as the only countries which has the 
same Individual cross sectional graph on both periods of time.Vietnam 
GRRVT’s is stays the same, whether it observed far from crisis or close to 
crisis year (see Figure 4.19 and 4.20). 
Figure 4.17 
GRRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Figure 4.18 
GRRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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Figure 4.19 
GRRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
      
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
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Figure 4.20 
GRRVT Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
   
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
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(18) Growth rate of real per capita GDP at factor cost (GRYPC) of 
ASEAN-10 Analysis (1992-2009) 
Growth rate of real per capita GDP at factor cost in this research 
means as the amount of increase an approximation of the value of goods 
produced per person in the country’s GDP divided by the total number of 
people in the country at the total money, time and resources of a firm engaged 
in the business of financing accounts receivable which is the activity known 
as factoring with a purchase or activity that adjusted for inflation. In this 
research GRYPC of ASEAN-10 that consist: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei 
Darussalam are selected as raw data. For this panel data regression purpose to 
sigma convergence, the period of time is divided into 1992-2007 GRYPC 1 
and 1994-2009 as GRYPC 2. 
 Eviews-6 provides tools for displaying time series graphs with panel 
data. Figure 4.21 and 4.22 is a combined cross sectional graph which displays 
separate lines for each cross-section in a single graph. Figure 4.23 and 4.24 is 
individual cross sections displays separate time series graphs for each cross-
section. Combined cross section graph and individual cross sections graph are 
a single graph containing the summary of statistics for each period. 
Figure 4.21 and 4.22 show that in generally the summary of statistics 
of both period of observation are similar. It means that the selection period is 
good for regression. 
 
 
 
 
Vietnam GRYPC is described as the only countries which has the 
same individual cross sectional graph on both periods of time, Vietnam 
GRYPC is stays the same, whether it observed far from crisis or close to 
crisis year (see Figure 4.23 and 4.24). 
Figure 4.21 
GRYPC Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
  
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Figure 4.22 
GRYPC Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
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Figure 4.23 
GRYPC Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
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Figure 4.24 
GRYPC Combined Cross Section Graph (1992-2006) 
      
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note:  
11. Indonesia 
12. Malaysia 
13. Singapore 
14. Thailand 
15. Philippines 
16. Laos 
17. Brunei Darussalam 
18. Cambodia 
19. Myanmar 
20. Vietnam 
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4.5.2 Panel Data Analysis 
This research used Panel data. Panel data is a group of individuals object, 
company and etc, in a current period of time of specific unit. Panel data is a 
combination of cross section data and time series data. As we know that this 
model is focuses on the regression analysis and the combination of time series and 
cross section, which is famous called by pooled time series. There are other names 
for panel data, such as pooled data (pooling of time series and cross-sectional 
observations), combination of time series and cross-section data, micropanel data, 
longitudinal data (a study over time of a variable or group of subjects), event 
history analysis (e.g., studying the movement over time of subjects through 
successive states and conditions) (Gujarati, 2003).  
From three panel data method approaches, there are two approaches that 
are commonly used to estimate the regression model in pooled data, they are fixed 
effect model and random effect model. To determine the method between pooled 
least square and fixed effect we can test it through F test and Hausman test will be 
used to determine between random effect and fixed effect (Winarno, 2009).  
Haussman test is used to determine between fixed effect method and 
random effect method. Chi Square value equation of Hausman test, are: 
 Matrix b_diff  = b_fixed – b_random 
 Matrix var_diff = cov_fixed – cov_random 
 Matrix qform  = @transpose(b_diff)*@inverse(var_diff)*b_diff  
Null Hypothesis of Haussman test, are: 
H0 = random effect 
 
 
 
 
H1 = fixed effect 
If Chi Square statistic > Chi Square table or in other word, p-value > 0.005, 
where it means that we should reject null hypothesis H0 and determine that fixed 
effect model is the suitable model to use (Winarno, 2009). Hausman test is also 
available through Eviews-6 command program. 
Table 4.1 
Hausman Test Result 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic p-value Effect 
CPI 7.300554 0.0069 Fixed 
RER 2.667002 0.1024 Fixed 
GFER 4.548718 0.0329 Fixed 
GRVT 0.855584 0.3550 Fixed 
GRRVT 0.857151 0.3545 Fixed 
GRYPC 0.840744 0.3592 Fixed 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note: fixed effect while p-value > 0,005 
4.5.3 Classic Assumption Test Analysis 
e. Normality Test 
Normality test is done by examining Jarque-Bera value through X2 
table. From regression through Eviews 6.0 we find that J-B statistics as 
shown in Table 4.2, where it is described that CPI, RER, GFER, GRVT, 
GRRVT, and GRYPC, has a normal distribution, where are shown from 
their µ residual value. 
 
 
 
 
Positive  
Auto 
correlation 
Zone of 
indecision 
Do not 
reject  
H0 or H1 
or both 
Zone of 
indecision 
 
Negative 
Auto 
correlation 
1.720 1.746 2.254 2.280 4 0 
Table 4.2 
Normality Test Result 
Test Summary Df X2-table Jarque-Bera Result 
CPI 9.139 23.5893 4.0928 Normal Distribution 
RER 9.139 23.5893 1.1423 Normal Distribution 
GFER 9.139 23.5893 0.1963 Normal Distribution 
GRVT 9.139 23.5893 10.0599 Normal Distribution 
GRRVT 9.139 23.5893 15.2685 Normal Distribution 
GRYPC 9.139 23.5893 10.6329 Normal Distribution 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Note: Jarque-Bera (JB) test method is measuring value of skewness and kurtosis where if JB < X2 Chi-square value table, it 
means that residual value distribution is normal (Gujarati, 2003).       
 
f. Autocorrelation Test 
One of formal test to detect autocorrelation is Durbin-Watson. This 
test is based on error model shown below; 
Figure 4.25  
Durbin-Watson Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
H0: No positive autocorrelation 
H1: No negative autocorrelation  
 
 
 
 
 
Based on Durbin-Watson, this study found that in this research the 
equations are generally high potential to be free from autocorrelation, as it 
is described on Table 4.3.         
             Table 4.3 
Durbin-Watson Test Result 
Test 
Summary 
K dL Du 
Dw R2 Dw/R2 
Result 
CPI 1 1.720 1.746 1.744521 0.824031 2.117 Negative Autocorrelation 
RER 1 1.720 1.746 1.820670 0.932277 1.953 Negative Autocorrelation 
GFER 1 1.720 1.746 2.280812 0.228518 9.981 Negative Autocorrelation 
GRVT 1 1.720 1.746 2.279058 0.227245 10.029 Negative Autocorrelation 
GRRVT 1 1.720 1.746 2.137546 0.153866 13.892 Negative Autocorrelation 
GRYPC 1 1.720 1.746 2.266261 0.058549 38.707 Negative Autocorrelation 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010.    
g. Heteroscedasticity Test 
Heteroscedasticity test purpose is to know whether all the 
disturbance term are similar variants or not (Gujarati, 2003).  This research 
study used White’s Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Variances and Standard 
Errors. White has shown that this estimate can be performed so that there 
is asymptotically valid (i.e., large-sample) statistically inference can be 
made about true parameter values. As the preceding result show, (White’s) 
heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are considerably larger than 
the OLS standard errors and therefore the estimated t values are much 
smaller than those obtained by OLS. On the basis of the latter, both the 
regressors are statistically significant at the 5 percent level, whereas on the 
basis of White’s estimators they are not. However, it should be pointed out 
that White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors can be larger or 
smaller than the uncorrected standard errors (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 
Heteroscedasticity Test Result 
Test Summary Probability Result 
CPI 0.000000 Heteroscedasticity free 
RER 0.000000 Heteroscedasticity free 
GFER 0.000229 Heteroscedasticity free 
GRVT 0.000060 Heteroscedasticity free 
GRRVT 0.000146 Heteroscedasticity free 
GRYPC 0.000000 Heteroscedasticity free 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Through Eviews-6, this research study examined the heteroscedasticity by 
Eviews-6 Equation Estimation command of White heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors and covariance, where the result is injured by 
heteroscedasticity if the probability is significant, in the other side, the 
result is free from heteroscedasticity if the probability > 0.005. The 
heteroscedasticity test summary result that described in Table 4.4. 
h. Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity is a condition that describes a linear relationship 
across independent variables. Multicollinearity happens when there are 
more than one independent variables in the research study. Whether this 
research study independent variable is only one, because of that reason this 
research study econometric is free from multicollinearity.    
4.5.4 Regression Statistic Test Analysis (Hypothesis Test) 
d. Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F-test) 
F-test goal is to determine the significance of independent variable 
groups in influencing the dependent variable. In this research we use 95% 
degree of freedom (α = 5%). The conclusion of jointly regression 
coefficient test is described in Table 4.5. It means that independent 
 
 
 
 
variable groups influence the dependent variable. It is significant (H0 is 
rejected and H1 is accepted).  
Table 4.5 
Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F test) 
Test Summary Prob (F - statistic) Result 
CPI 0.000000 Significant 
RER 0.000000 Significant 
GFER 0.000229 Significant 
GRVT 0.000060 Significant 
GRRVT 0.000146 Significant 
GRYPC 0.000000 Significant 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
e. Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t-Test) 
Individuality coefficient test regression (t-test) can be seen through 
t-statistic which is described in Table 4.6. The t test purpose is to see if 
independent variable significantly influences the dependent variable. 
Parameter of a variable is called as significantly influencing if probability 
of t statistic < 0.005. 
Table 4.6 
Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t-Test) 
Test Summary t-statistic p-value Result 
CPI -3.5055 0.0006 Significant 
RER 3.5706 0.0005 Significant 
GFER -4.7144 0.0000 Significant 
GRVT -7.1286 0.0000 Significant 
GRRVT -3.5742 0.0005 Significant 
GRYPC -25.1346 0.0000 Significant 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
f. Determination Coefficient Test of R2   
R2 test goal is to show whether independent variables are good to 
explain the dependent variable. R2 values are 0-1 (0 < R2 < 1). If R2 value 
 
 
 
 
is 1, the independent variable perfectly explains the dependent variable. 
Otherwise, if R2 value is 0 if that the independent variable is not strong 
enough to explain the dependent variable. This determination coefficient 
test of R2 is described in Table 4.7. 
            Table 4.7 
Determination Coefficient Test of R2 
Test Summary R2 Result 
CPI 0.89 89% Explained the dependent variable , 11% explained by others  
RER 0.78 78% Explained the dependent variable, 22% explained by others 
GFER 0.21 21% Explained the dependent variable, 79% explained by others 
GRVT 0.23 23% Explained the dependent variable, 77% explained by others 
GRRVT 0.15 15% Explained the dependent variable, 85% explained by others 
GRYPC 0.40 40% Explained the dependent variable, 60% explained by others 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
4.6 Result Interpretation 
This interpretation of this study follows Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from 
Rasheed and Ahmad, 2007) where the sigma convergence model is given as; 
σj = α + βj t + εj  ……………………………………………………….(4.1) 
  In which: 
 σj  = the standard deviations across the member countries 
 jth = indicator (j = 1 to 6) 
 α and β = the parameters of the model 
 t = time period  
 ε = a stochastic error term 
The important analysis result of Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from Rasheed and 
Ahmad, 2007) σ convergence model are: if the result of regression shows a 
negative value of β coefficient, it indicates the possibility of convergence, while, 
 
 
 
 
if the regression result is any other value of β coefficient it implies non-
convergence.   
In Table 4.8, we found out that there are contradicting conditions for CPI, 
although all the β coefficient of CPI are negative, that means convergence 
Chowdhury, 2004 (excerpt from Rasheed and Ahmad, 2007), but only in one 
sample it is statistically significant (p-value < 0.005), this condition showed that 
inflation has remained unstable due to the unsteady because ASEAN during this 
period injured by hard crisis of 1997 which is thus not paving the way for price 
stability, but synchronized movements do demonstrate a possible success of a 
common currency in the ASEAN region. This condition is almost similar 
condition to research study of ‘The Convergence and The SAARC Common 
Currency’ written by Rasheed and Ahmed (2007).     
Table 4.8 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
               CPI on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.0744 -0.0487 
p-value 0.0006 0.3041 
R2 0.82 0.89 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Table 4.9 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
RER on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.0351 -0.0168 
p-value 0.3472 0.8464 
R2 0.96 0.93 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
This research study time period consists of two historical crises. The first 
crisis happened in 1997 which is often called as East Asian Crisis. Thailand was 
 
 
 
 
one of ASEAN member countries, where was injured by this crisis. Then, this 
crisis also gave a bad impact to others ASEAN countries, as: Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Brunei Darussalam. 
The second crisis is called Global crisis that happened in U.S (United Stated of 
America), which gave impact to the whole world. The negative impact happened 
to the whole world on real exchange rate (RER) which was shown by the p-value 
that not significant in whole period of time in this research study, this condition is 
described in Table 4.9. The table shows that, ASEAN exchange rate is fragile 
while it was hit by hard crises. This condition is a proof that ASEAN countries are 
not suitable with floating exchange rate system. Which depends on U.S dollar. As 
we know U.S dollar is not backed by gold anymore after the Bretton Woods 
agreement was breakdown in 1970. Table 4.9 also shows that RER in whole 
period of time in this research study which consists both historical crises, are 
Convergence. The β coefficients of the RER are negative. This means that RER 
does reflect a case of a monetary union in ASEAN region.       
Table 4.10 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
GFER on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.0608 -0.2623 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.22 0.20 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Table 4.10 shows that all the estimated coefficients are found to be 
statistically significant. This table also describes that all of the β coefficients are 
negative. It means that the growth rate of foreign exchange reserves is 
 
 
 
 
Convergence. This indicates that there is a harmonized GFER through ASEAN 
countries member. This condition will help establish a currency union in ASEAN 
region.   
Table 4.11 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
GRVT on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.1629 -0.0769 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.23 0.23 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
From Table 4.11, it is apparent that all the time periods in this research 
study estimated β coefficient for the growth rate volume of trade are negative and 
statistically significant. The growth in trade volume (GRVT), therefore, thus 
seems to be synchronizing and presenting a case of a successful formation of a 
common currency.  
Table 4.12 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
GRRVT on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.2298 -0.1202 
p-value 0.0005 0.0007 
R2 0.21 0.15 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
Presenting the case of the growth rate of relative trade volume in Table 
4.12, we find significant and negative β coefficient values for the whole periods in 
this research study observations. This observation further of GRRVT strengthens 
the possibility of a single currency case.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4.13 
Panel EGLS (Cross – Section SUR) 
   GRYPC on Time 
Observation Period 
1992-2006 1995-2009 
1995-2009 1992-2006 
Coefficient β -0.0592 -0.0948 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.06 0.40 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
 
Finally, for the growth rate of per capita real GDP we have to use annual 
data of 1992-2006 and 1995-2009 where the observation is larger than other 
variables in this research. This research can observe a whole condition in the 
whole the growth rate of per capita real GDP 1992-2009 periods of time 
completely. The results of β coefficient value are presented in Table 4.13 where 
the β value was found negative for all equation coefficients. Although there is 
only one that significant, where is described that there is a big hard impact due to 
1997 crisis to the growth rate of per-capita real GDP at that time period but, thus 
still showing a high likelihood of forming a successful single currency through the 
convergence result of all the GRYPC in the whole period of time in this research 
study. 
Finally this research found, where this research has been differentiate the 
method of the study from the previous study of Chaudhury (2009), because this 
research found out from EMU study by Keenan (2002) research that written by 
Keenan that conclude the weaknesses of OCA, and now there are no reasons for 
this research to follow the previous study of Chaudhury (2009) that used OCA, 
and latter we finally decided that better use Convergence criterion with their 
 
 
 
 
whole advantages and benefits. The important analysis result σ convergence 
model in this research are: if the result of regression shows a negative value of β 
coefficient, it indicates the possibility of convergence, while, if the regression 
result is any other value of β coefficient it implies non-convergence 
(Chowudhury, 2004) in Rasheed and Ahmad (2007). 
We found out that there are contradicting conditions for CPI in this 
research, although all the β coefficient of CPI are negative, but only in one sample 
it is statistically significant (p-value < 0.005). This condition is almost similar 
condition to research study of ‘The Convergence and The SAARC Common 
Currency’ written by Rasheed and Ahmed (2007). 
RER in whole period of time in this research study which consists both 
historical crises, are Convergence. The β coefficients of the RER are negative. 
This means that RER does reflect a case of a monetary union in ASEAN region. 
The growth rate of foreign exchange reserves is Convergence. This indicates that 
there is a harmonized GFER through ASEAN countries member. This condition 
will help establish a currency union in ASEAN region. The GRVT thus seems to 
be synchronizing and presenting a case of a successful formation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
of a common currency. The further observation of GRRVT strengthens the 
possibility of a single currency case, where the result are significant and negative 
β coefficient values for the whole periods in this research study of GRRVT 
observations. Although there is only one that significant, where is described that 
there is a big hard impact due to 1997 crisis to the growth rate of per-capita real 
GDP at that time period but, thus still showing a high likelihood of forming a 
 
 
 
 
successful single currency through the convergence result of all the GRYPC in the 
whole period of time in this research study. 
The result of this study described that the first previous study of Kazushi, 
Shimizu, (2001) where it suggest that monetary integration should be studied after 
deepening market integration by the development of AFTA, it was true. And also 
it was support by the second previous study of Madhur, Srinivasa, (2002) where it 
viewed from this perspective, that the launching of the AFTA and the regional 
resources sharing arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative may perhaps 
posses the potential to gradually lead to greater regional monetary cooperation. 
The result of this study answered the third previous study that was written 
by Bunyaratavej, Kraiwinee, (2003), where the research of them described that the 
ASEAN region as a whole may not be an ideal candidates for forming a currency 
union, as GDP per capita displays a high degree of heterogeneity, by the fact that 
it might be happen to ASEAN-6 as their research focus, although the forth 
previous study that written by Ramayandi, Arief, (2005), result The five largest 
ASEAN countries seem to be suitable candidates to begin with. In the other side 
while the research focus apply in the full integration of ASEAN-10, the answered 
sound be different, where through the convergence of this study result, it totally 
proved that there are likely to be considerable benefits while apply monetary 
union of common currency area after full integration of ASEAN-10 takes place, as 
support by the fifth previous study that was written by Thangavelu, Shandre M. 
(2008), and the sixth previous study that was written by Chaudhury, Rafi, (2009). 
     
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
AGENDA 
5.1 Conclusions 
Table 5.1 describes that the result of interpretation of ASEAN-10 countries 
six economic indicators that consist of; CPI, RER, GFER, GRVT, GRRVT, and 
GRYPC, are Convergence. This result proved the hypotheses of this research 
study, there are:  
1. There is a good prospect of forming a common currency area in ASEAN-
10 that consist of Indonesia, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. The six 
economic indicators that consist of; (1) Consumer Price Indices (CPI), (2) 
Real Exchange Rate in US dollars (RER), (3) Growth rates of Foreign 
Exchange Reserves (GFER), (4) Growth rates of Real Volume of Trade 
(GRVT), (5) Growth rate of Real Relative Volume of Trade (GRRVT), (6) 
Growth rates of Per Capita Real GDP at factor cost (GRYPC), are 
supporting the feasibility of ASEAN-10 countries to creating common 
currency area. 
2. This research result that there is a possibility for convergence model to be 
alternative of OCA (Optimum Currency Area) model in term of evaluate 
the feasibility of common currency area. 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 
Result Interpretation 
Test Summary β coefficient value Result 
CPI Negative Convergence 
RER Negative Convergence 
GFER Negative Convergence 
GRVT Negative Convergence 
GRRVT Negative Convergence 
GRYPC Negative Convergence 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010. 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research Agenda 
1. This research only observed the feasibility of ASEAN-10 countries for 
‘Common Currency Area’ by forming six economic indicators that consist 
of; CPI, RER, GFER, GRVT, GRRVT, and GRYPC. 
2. Although in the main journal there are seven economic indicators that 
consist of; Call Money Rate, CPI, RER, GFER, GRVT, GRRVT, and 
GRYPC, in this research study author omitted Call Money Rate economic 
indicator, because six economic indicators in this research study are 
enough to support the research model. 
3. Call Money Rate indicator is omitted because of the difficulties in 
collecting data. The data are not available for ASEAN-10 countries. 
4. Further study will certainly be required in order to advance the ASEAN-10 
Single Currency, because this research study is still in the second stage of 
‘The Transition to Monetary Union’ according to (Yuen, 1999).      
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CPI 
(Consumer Price Index) 
  COUNTRY NAME  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia 104.63 117.3 128.7 139.7 153.2 165.2 175.4 277.1 334.6 347.5 
2 Malaysia  105.91 109.3 113.1 117.4 85.9 125.6 129 135.8 139.6 100 
3 Singapore 102.2 105.8 108.2 111.5 96.7 115 117.4 117 117.1 101.1 
4 Thailand 101.2 110 113.7 119.5 82.8 133.8 141.2 152.7 153.2 101.9 
5 Philippines 112.88 129.3 139.1 151.7 108 175.6 185.8 203.9 217.4 152.3 
6 Laos 97.03 124.4 133.5 142.5 170.4 190.8 228.2 433.7 990.6 108.4 
7 Brunei 83.48 84.58 88.17 90.34 95.73 97.64 99.32 98.88 98.47 100 
8 Cambodia 29 58 60.32 7.35 1.06 10.07 3.17 14.81 4.01 0.79 
9 Myanmar (Burma) 97.5 125.96 161.3 212.4 263.9 306.86 384.1 498.1 754.6 893.4 
10 Vietnam 88.31 252.3 273.3 298.9 347.4 105.7 109.1 117.6 122.6 419 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia 391.11 433.5 462 141.27 156.03 145.89 148.67 113.86 113.78 
2 Malaysia  101.42 103.2 104.4 105.86 108.99 102.6 105 114.2 112.5 
3 Singapore 102.1 101.7 102.2 100 100.4 101.4 103.5 110.3 110.5 
4 Thailand 103.5 104.2 106.1 95.3 96.8 99 100 102.3 102.6 
5 Philippines 161.6 166.4 171.4 120.6 129.8 137.9 141.8 155 160 
6 Laos 116.8 129.3 149.3 164.9 176.7 188.7 197.3 203.6 200.3 
7 Brunei 100.6 98.27 98.53 99.36 100.57 102 102.8 105.6 107.4 
8 Cambodia 0.6 3.21 1.22 107.94 114.03 121.46 142.03 126.9 134 
9 Myanmar (Burma) 151.7 288.6 394.3 271.6 297.05 375.17 498.6 630.23 754.38 
10 Vietnam 434.4 448.5 462.4 114.9 124.38 133.71 144.8 178.1 190.39 
 
 
 
 
RER 
(Real Exchange Rate in US dollars) 
  
COUNTRY 
NAME  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia 3.430 3283.05 3441.92 3437.72 3290.09 5769.65 6683.17 4891.06 6259.49 
2 Malaysia  5 4.78 4.76 6.75 5 7 6 6 9 
3 Singapore 3 2.97 2.86 3.33 3 3 3 3 4 
4 Thailand 45 44.98 45.88 69.41 44 73 55 56 96 
5 Philippines 38 39.88 35.18 55.38 34 47 44 43 74 
6 Laos 1.124 1076.84 1102 1235.93 1117.18 2512.09 2273.89 1772.19 17186.51 
7 Brunei 3 2.67 2.53 2.27 2 2 3 3 3 
8 Cambodia 6.728 7652.57 76560.86 543766.5 61439.78 237014.3 58742.82 217153.2 1120648 
9 Myanmar 10 7.69 5.99 4.95 4 4 3 2 2 
10 Vietnam 8.170 7945.11 8079.99 7234.91 24055.58 25 27 26 8 
 
 
 
 
 
  COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia 5904.91 5071.88 1028.4 11553.78 11273.46 13422.9 12937.31 16718.52 18436.26 
2 Malaysia  8 9 10 7 7 7 7 6.37 6.4 
3 Singapore 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 2.87 2.77 
4 Thailand 95 102 102 83 82 82 80 70.88 70.35 
5 Philippines 71 78 89 86 85 81 76 63.24 60.1 
6 Laos 18042.16 20313.12 19199.04 12051.56 11789.07 11571.14 10893.82 9971.07 9459.75 
7 Brunei 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.16 3.19 
8 Cambodia 1441578 301105.5 894308.2 7004.46 6931.06 6798.66 6066.53 6766.48 6569.7 
9 Myanmar 10 5 4 4 4 3 1 0.43 0.34 
10 Vietnam 8 8 9 25 25 24 23 19.02 18.8 
 
 
 
 
GFER 
(Growth rates of Foreign Exchange Reserves) 
  COUNTRY NAME  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia 11.26 7.92 7.57 12.57 33.93 -9.72 39.24 17.16 7.75 
2 Malaysia  61.06 59.76 -7.18 -7.81 13.99 -23.48 23.56 19.98 -7.54 
3 Singapore 16.87 21.16 20.54 18.03 11.88 -7.34 5.05 2.6 4.2 
4 Thailand 15.76 20.32 19.96 27.77 4.87 -30.91 10.65 18.89 -5.54 
5 Philippines 34.43 6.14 29.48 6.32 58.66 -27.71 27.46 43.65 -1.28 
6 Laos 40.35 52.68 -17.08 55.91 104.05 -37.42 6.53 -4.72 37.33 
7 Brunei 20.57 -3.65 76.76 34.05 2.16 533.23 -47.37 -97.41 -20.99 
8 Cambodia -66.58 45.82 1107.06 72.32 42.59 13.76 9.69 -59.53 81.54 
9 Myanmar (Burma) 8.48 8.04 39.41 32.98 -59.17 9 25.97 -15.67 -16 
10 Vietnam 1622.22 -13.93 116.83 50.73 30.17 14.8 1.35 66.26 2.75 
 
 
 
 
    
  COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia -1.6 13.7 12.97 -0.05 -5.18 24.11 3.8 25.58 -3.25 
2 Malaysia  4.38 13.22 31.93 51.75 6.87 17.8 0.58 27.49 -0.38 
3 Singapore -5.73 8.53 17.05 17.15 3.45 17.37 0.36 13.94 8.69 
4 Thailand 1.3 17.6 7.68 18.39 4.13 28.99 2.81 11.97 1317.33 
5 Philippines 2.9 -1.14 2.44 -4.02 21.73 25.89 15.48 45.01 8.53 
6 Laos -8.18 45.49 2.13 9.72 5.93 41.76 7.09 53.6 48.98 
7 Brunei -4.14 11.84 9.99 4.89 -2.16 -6.92 35.87     
8 Cambodia -14.06 237.36 28.57 15.8 14.79 860.69 -87.17 17.79 177.74 
9 Myanmar (Burma) 79.45 17.5 17.07 22.17 14.64 60.33 1.02 41.18 28.38 
10 Vietnam 7.14 12.59 50.98 13.16 28.53 47.88 1.55 26.27 32.75 
 
 
 
 
 
GRVT 
(Growth rates of Real Volume of Trade) 
  COUNTRY NAME  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia -42.35 93.27 2.03 8.77 -0.04 -3.38 -49.35 -20.88 26.62 
2 Malaysia  41.15 11.13 22.91 75 -29.31 -2.01 -20.73 10.88 67.71 
3 Singapore 15.73 -33.32 109.83 40.41 -50.4 -1.36 49.23 4.93 -23.69 
4 Thailand 22.11 9.99 13.49 85.16 -37.64 -11.16 -25.25 10.97 82.36 
5 Philippines 9.34 9.49 10.46 79.2 -26.81 10.12 -12.61 6.57 58.42 
6 Laos 0.64 28.46 40.53 -16.37 -0.77 -8.03 -52.17 -64.97 813.84 
7 Brunei -1.3 17.14 -2.4 4.05 -22.47 35.9 12.63 0.42 -36.1 
8 Cambodia -50 -4 949.92 1202.01 -81.32 358.03 -78.59 269.33 407.59 
9 Myanmar 595.32 -526.55 -8.97 5.25 -17.5 10.41 -0.78 -39.42 -1.13 
10 Vietnam -64.99 -43.45 3.79 16.77 937.89 13.03 -7.23 9.62 -63.42 
 
 
 
 
 
  COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia -18.77 -7.71 -1.65 301.13 15.49 28.18 13.33 31.67 29.88 
2 Malaysia  -54.75 105.82 3.47 -6 49.4 13.82 8.25 781.85 -29.11 
3 Singapore -14.7 89.03 12.3 -0.88 48.31 34.5 1.77 -0.09 -23.05 
4 Thailand -4.55 4.02 15.93 -48.3 187.39 11.01 13.22 -6.25 34.47 
5 Philippines -17 5.88 0.77 31.03 10.54 11.36 4.7 -187.6 1.29 
6 Laos -7.19 -20.96 11.35 -17.1 42884.87 61.83 41.64 42.64 -99.67 
7 Brunei 11.9 16.99 -0.26 14.24 50.62 7.27 -8.8 120.07 15.59 
8 Cambodia 31.67 -64.32 175.64 -98.08 56.94 27.81 -3.63 121.22 4.73 
9 Myanmar 664.87 -46.04 -38.06 43.11 -4.67 28.2 -10.32 92.17 -11.97 
10 Vietnam -0.33 12.48 21.24 279 50.64 8.35 23.29 82.41 -0.04 
 
 
 
 
 
GRRVT 
(Growth rates of Real Relative Volume of Trade) 
  COUNTRY NAME  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia -34.7 131.39 4.39 11.8 2.54 -1.83 -44.68 -25.28 26.59 
2 Malaysia  59.87 33.05 25.76 79.89 -27.49 -0.45 -13.42 4.72 67.67 
3 Singapore 31.08 -20.17 114.69 44.33 -49.12 0.21 62.97 -0.89 -23.71 
4 Thailand 38.3 31.69 16.11 90.33 -36.02 -9.74 -18.37 4.81 82.32 
5 Philippines 23.84 31.08 13.02 84.19 -24.92 11.88 -4.56 0.65 58.38 
6 Laos 13.99 67.34 -0.02 -14.04 1.79 -6.56 -47.76 -66.92 813.63 
7 Brunei 11.79 44.49 -0.36 6.95 -20.47 38.07 22.99 -5.16 -36.11 
8 Cambodia -43.37 15.12 0.21 1238.35 -80.84 365.35 -76.62 248.81 407.48 
9 Myanmar 36.99 9.85 -0.08 8.18 -15.36 12.17 8.35 -42.77 -1.15 
10 Vietnam -60.35 -16.54 -0.1 20.03 964.73 14.84 1.31 3.53 -63.43 
 
 
 
 
 
  COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia -4.03 -19.12 -18.11 244.05 11.26 15.25 3.69 -84.13 76.39 
2 Malaysia  -46.54 80.37 -13.84 -19.38 43.94 2.34 -0.97 6.28 -3.72 
3 Singapore 0.78 65.65 -6.49 -14.98 42.89 20.93 -6.89 -87.96 4.51 
4 Thailand 12.77 -8.84 -3.47 -55.66 176.89 -0.19 3.58 -88.7 82.63 
5 Philippines -1.99 -7.21 -16.09 12.38 6.5 0.12 -4.21 -89.44 37.56 
6 Laos 9.65 -30.73 -7.29 -28.9 41313.67 45.5 29.58 -91.32 -99.56 
7 Brunei 32.2 2.53 -16.95 -2.01 45.12 -3.55 -16.57 -86.69 56.98 
8 Cambodia 55.56 -68.73 129.51 -98.35 51.21 14.91 -11.84 -85.84 42.23 
9 Myanmar 803.65 -52.7 -48.41 22.74 -8.14 15.25 -17.94 -90.27 19.54 
10 Vietnam 17.75 -1.43 0.95 225.07 45.14 -2.58 12.79 -87.79 35.75 
 
 
 
 
 
GRYPC 
(Growth rates of Per Capita Real GDP at Factor Cost) 
  COUNTRY NAME  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia 6.77 11.81 10.29 12.66 10.93 -6.41 -56.36 44.74 16.33 
2 Malaysia  17.23 10.13 8.44 16.2 10.65 -3.16 -29.69 7.09 11.58 
3 Singapore 11.76 14.05 17.76 15.71 5.49 0.19 -16.87 -0.48 10.39 
4 Thailand 11.92 10.69 14.16 14.79 6.99 -17.83 -26.62 8.29 -0.64 
5 Philippines 13.99 0.33 15.28 13.17 9.42 -2.66 -22.46 14.54 -2.26 
6 Laos 6.53 14.41 13.12 11.34 3.69 -8.87 -28.28 11.36 16.94 
7 Brunei 2.25 -1.64 4.53 16.06 -1.83 -4.63 -25.83 5.41 -0.01 
8 Cambodia 17.34 23.65 7.09 20.2 -0.84 -4.15 -11.26 10.59 1.89 
9 Myanmar -1.8 29.79 23.96 44.04 -0.57 22.59 6.67 -0.61 4.53 
10 Vietnam 0.58 31.01 21.27 25.05 16.79 7.19 -0.04 4.06 8.51 
 
 
 
 
 
  COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia -4.05 20.33 18.39 7.93 10.22 25.59 -30.98 7.29 75.69 
2 Malaysia  -4.62 5.98 7.19 11.82 8.42 12.04 -15.76 5.98 46.96 
3 Singapore -10.33 2.03 4.51 14.79 6.11 11.93 -10.85 8.59 13.91 
4 Thailand -6.73 8.82 11.43 12.14 8.3 16.15 -4.65 6.08 28.09 
5 Philippines -7.97 5.85 1.78 6.94 11.49 16.72 -7.15 15.41 16.17 
6 Laos -0.56 2.68 15.37 15.44 13.1 16.04 7158.6 6.97 65.55 
7 Brunei -5.5 -0.02 8.37 13.18 14.15 -89.51 41.75 882.185 108.73 
8 Cambodia 6.24 5.62 5.08 12.38 15.39 13.85 -5.91 -11.42 70.12 
9 Myanmar 5.92 14.31 -0.01 -1.08 -1.33 1.88 20.03 6.09 -40.08 
10 Vietnam 2.89 6.49 11.13 407.92 10.09 10.11 2.27 -16.08 7.61 
 
 
 
 
 
CPI 
(Consumer Price Index) 
  COUNTRY NAME  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia 104.63 117.3 128.7 139.7 153.2 165.2 175.4 277.1 334.6 347.5 
2 Malaysia  105.91 109.3 113.1 117.4 85.9 125.6 129 135.8 139.6 100 
3 Singapore 102.2 105.8 108.2 111.5 96.7 115 117.4 117 117.1 101.1 
4 Thailand 101.2 110 113.7 119.5 82.8 133.8 141.2 152.7 153.2 101.9 
5 Philippines 112.88 129.3 139.1 151.7 108 175.6 185.8 203.9 217.4 152.3 
6 Laos 97.03 124.4 133.5 142.5 170.4 190.8 228.2 433.7 990.6 108.4 
7 Brunei 83.48 84.58 88.17 90.34 95.73 97.64 99.32 98.88 98.47 100 
8 Cambodia 29 58 60.32 7.35 1.06 10.07 3.17 14.81 4.01 0.79 
9 Myanmar (Burma) 97.5 125.96 161.3 212.4 263.9 306.86 384.1 498.1 754.6 893.4 
10 Vietnam 88.31 252.3 273.3 298.9 347.4 105.7 109.1 117.6 122.6 419 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia 391.11 433.5 462 141.27 156.03 145.89 148.67 113.86 113.78 
2 Malaysia  101.42 103.2 104.4 105.86 108.99 102.6 105 114.2 112.5 
3 Singapore 102.1 101.7 102.2 100 100.4 101.4 103.5 110.3 110.5 
4 Thailand 103.5 104.2 106.1 95.3 96.8 99 100 102.3 102.6 
5 Philippines 161.6 166.4 171.4 120.6 129.8 137.9 141.8 155 160 
6 Laos 116.8 129.3 149.3 164.9 176.7 188.7 197.3 203.6 200.3 
7 Brunei 100.6 98.27 98.53 99.36 100.57 102 102.8 105.6 107.4 
8 Cambodia 0.6 3.21 1.22 107.94 114.03 121.46 142.03 126.9 134 
9 Myanmar (Burma) 151.7 288.6 394.3 271.6 297.05 375.17 498.6 630.23 754.38 
10 Vietnam 434.4 448.5 462.4 114.9 124.38 133.71 144.8 178.1 190.39 
 
 
 
 
RER 
(Real Exchange Rate in US dollars) 
  
COUNTRY 
NAME  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia 3.430 3283.05 3441.92 3437.72 3290.09 5769.65 6683.17 4891.06 6259.49 
2 Malaysia  5 4.78 4.76 6.75 5 7 6 6 9 
3 Singapore 3 2.97 2.86 3.33 3 3 3 3 4 
4 Thailand 45 44.98 45.88 69.41 44 73 55 56 96 
5 Philippines 38 39.88 35.18 55.38 34 47 44 43 74 
6 Laos 1.124 1076.84 1102 1235.93 1117.18 2512.09 2273.89 1772.19 17186.51 
7 Brunei 3 2.67 2.53 2.27 2 2 3 3 3 
8 Cambodia 6.728 7652.57 76560.86 543766.5 61439.78 237014.3 58742.82 217153.2 1120648 
9 Myanmar 10 7.69 5.99 4.95 4 4 3 2 2 
10 Vietnam 8.170 7945.11 8079.99 7234.91 24055.58 25 27 26 8 
 
 
 
 
 
  COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia 5904.91 5071.88 1028.4 11553.78 11273.46 13422.9 12937.31 16718.52 18436.26 
2 Malaysia  8 9 10 7 7 7 7 6.37 6.4 
3 Singapore 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 2.87 2.77 
4 Thailand 95 102 102 83 82 82 80 70.88 70.35 
5 Philippines 71 78 89 86 85 81 76 63.24 60.1 
6 Laos 18042.16 20313.12 19199.04 12051.56 11789.07 11571.14 10893.82 9971.07 9459.75 
7 Brunei 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.16 3.19 
8 Cambodia 1441578 301105.5 894308.2 7004.46 6931.06 6798.66 6066.53 6766.48 6569.7 
9 Myanmar 10 5 4 4 4 3 1 0.43 0.34 
10 Vietnam 8 8 9 25 25 24 23 19.02 18.8 
 
 
 
 
GFER 
(Growth rates of Foreign Exchange Reserves) 
  COUNTRY NAME  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia 11.26 7.92 7.57 12.57 33.93 -9.72 39.24 17.16 7.75 
2 Malaysia  61.06 59.76 -7.18 -7.81 13.99 -23.48 23.56 19.98 -7.54 
3 Singapore 16.87 21.16 20.54 18.03 11.88 -7.34 5.05 2.6 4.2 
4 Thailand 15.76 20.32 19.96 27.77 4.87 -30.91 10.65 18.89 -5.54 
5 Philippines 34.43 6.14 29.48 6.32 58.66 -27.71 27.46 43.65 -1.28 
6 Laos 40.35 52.68 -17.08 55.91 104.05 -37.42 6.53 -4.72 37.33 
7 Brunei 20.57 -3.65 76.76 34.05 2.16 533.23 -47.37 -97.41 -20.99 
8 Cambodia -66.58 45.82 1107.06 72.32 42.59 13.76 9.69 -59.53 81.54 
9 Myanmar (Burma) 8.48 8.04 39.41 32.98 -59.17 9 25.97 -15.67 -16 
10 Vietnam 1622.22 -13.93 116.83 50.73 30.17 14.8 1.35 66.26 2.75 
 
 
 
 
    
  COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia -1.6 13.7 12.97 -0.05 -5.18 24.11 3.8 25.58 -3.25 
2 Malaysia  4.38 13.22 31.93 51.75 6.87 17.8 0.58 27.49 -0.38 
3 Singapore -5.73 8.53 17.05 17.15 3.45 17.37 0.36 13.94 8.69 
4 Thailand 1.3 17.6 7.68 18.39 4.13 28.99 2.81 11.97 1317.33 
5 Philippines 2.9 -1.14 2.44 -4.02 21.73 25.89 15.48 45.01 8.53 
6 Laos -8.18 45.49 2.13 9.72 5.93 41.76 7.09 53.6 48.98 
7 Brunei -4.14 11.84 9.99 4.89 -2.16 -6.92 35.87     
8 Cambodia -14.06 237.36 28.57 15.8 14.79 860.69 -87.17 17.79 177.74 
9 Myanmar (Burma) 79.45 17.5 17.07 22.17 14.64 60.33 1.02 41.18 28.38 
10 Vietnam 7.14 12.59 50.98 13.16 28.53 47.88 1.55 26.27 32.75 
 
 
 
 
 
GRVT 
(Growth rates of Real Volume of Trade) 
  COUNTRY NAME  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia -42.35 93.27 2.03 8.77 -0.04 -3.38 -49.35 -20.88 26.62 
2 Malaysia  41.15 11.13 22.91 75 -29.31 -2.01 -20.73 10.88 67.71 
3 Singapore 15.73 -33.32 109.83 40.41 -50.4 -1.36 49.23 4.93 -23.69 
4 Thailand 22.11 9.99 13.49 85.16 -37.64 -11.16 -25.25 10.97 82.36 
5 Philippines 9.34 9.49 10.46 79.2 -26.81 10.12 -12.61 6.57 58.42 
6 Laos 0.64 28.46 40.53 -16.37 -0.77 -8.03 -52.17 -64.97 813.84 
7 Brunei -1.3 17.14 -2.4 4.05 -22.47 35.9 12.63 0.42 -36.1 
8 Cambodia -50 -4 949.92 1202.01 -81.32 358.03 -78.59 269.33 407.59 
9 Myanmar 595.32 -526.55 -8.97 5.25 -17.5 10.41 -0.78 -39.42 -1.13 
10 Vietnam -64.99 -43.45 3.79 16.77 937.89 13.03 -7.23 9.62 -63.42 
 
 
 
 
 
  COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia -18.77 -7.71 -1.65 301.13 15.49 28.18 13.33 31.67 29.88 
2 Malaysia  -54.75 105.82 3.47 -6 49.4 13.82 8.25 781.85 -29.11 
3 Singapore -14.7 89.03 12.3 -0.88 48.31 34.5 1.77 -0.09 -23.05 
4 Thailand -4.55 4.02 15.93 -48.3 187.39 11.01 13.22 -6.25 34.47 
5 Philippines -17 5.88 0.77 31.03 10.54 11.36 4.7 -187.6 1.29 
6 Laos -7.19 -20.96 11.35 -17.1 42884.87 61.83 41.64 42.64 -99.67 
7 Brunei 11.9 16.99 -0.26 14.24 50.62 7.27 -8.8 120.07 15.59 
8 Cambodia 31.67 -64.32 175.64 -98.08 56.94 27.81 -3.63 121.22 4.73 
9 Myanmar 664.87 -46.04 -38.06 43.11 -4.67 28.2 -10.32 92.17 -11.97 
10 Vietnam -0.33 12.48 21.24 279 50.64 8.35 23.29 82.41 -0.04 
 
 
 
 
 
GRRVT 
(Growth rates of Real Relative Volume of Trade) 
  COUNTRY NAME  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia -34.7 131.39 4.39 11.8 2.54 -1.83 -44.68 -25.28 26.59 
2 Malaysia  59.87 33.05 25.76 79.89 -27.49 -0.45 -13.42 4.72 67.67 
3 Singapore 31.08 -20.17 114.69 44.33 -49.12 0.21 62.97 -0.89 -23.71 
4 Thailand 38.3 31.69 16.11 90.33 -36.02 -9.74 -18.37 4.81 82.32 
5 Philippines 23.84 31.08 13.02 84.19 -24.92 11.88 -4.56 0.65 58.38 
6 Laos 13.99 67.34 -0.02 -14.04 1.79 -6.56 -47.76 -66.92 813.63 
7 Brunei 11.79 44.49 -0.36 6.95 -20.47 38.07 22.99 -5.16 -36.11 
8 Cambodia -43.37 15.12 0.21 1238.35 -80.84 365.35 -76.62 248.81 407.48 
9 Myanmar 36.99 9.85 -0.08 8.18 -15.36 12.17 8.35 -42.77 -1.15 
10 Vietnam -60.35 -16.54 -0.1 20.03 964.73 14.84 1.31 3.53 -63.43 
 
 
 
 
 
  COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia -4.03 -19.12 -18.11 244.05 11.26 15.25 3.69 -84.13 76.39 
2 Malaysia  -46.54 80.37 -13.84 -19.38 43.94 2.34 -0.97 6.28 -3.72 
3 Singapore 0.78 65.65 -6.49 -14.98 42.89 20.93 -6.89 -87.96 4.51 
4 Thailand 12.77 -8.84 -3.47 -55.66 176.89 -0.19 3.58 -88.7 82.63 
5 Philippines -1.99 -7.21 -16.09 12.38 6.5 0.12 -4.21 -89.44 37.56 
6 Laos 9.65 -30.73 -7.29 -28.9 41313.67 45.5 29.58 -91.32 -99.56 
7 Brunei 32.2 2.53 -16.95 -2.01 45.12 -3.55 -16.57 -86.69 56.98 
8 Cambodia 55.56 -68.73 129.51 -98.35 51.21 14.91 -11.84 -85.84 42.23 
9 Myanmar 803.65 -52.7 -48.41 22.74 -8.14 15.25 -17.94 -90.27 19.54 
10 Vietnam 17.75 -1.43 0.95 225.07 45.14 -2.58 12.79 -87.79 35.75 
 
 
 
 
 
GRYPC 
(Growth rates of Per Capita Real GDP at Factor Cost) 
  COUNTRY NAME  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1 Indonesia 6.77 11.81 10.29 12.66 10.93 -6.41 -56.36 44.74 16.33 
2 Malaysia  17.23 10.13 8.44 16.2 10.65 -3.16 -29.69 7.09 11.58 
3 Singapore 11.76 14.05 17.76 15.71 5.49 0.19 -16.87 -0.48 10.39 
4 Thailand 11.92 10.69 14.16 14.79 6.99 -17.83 -26.62 8.29 -0.64 
5 Philippines 13.99 0.33 15.28 13.17 9.42 -2.66 -22.46 14.54 -2.26 
6 Laos 6.53 14.41 13.12 11.34 3.69 -8.87 -28.28 11.36 16.94 
7 Brunei 2.25 -1.64 4.53 16.06 -1.83 -4.63 -25.83 5.41 -0.01 
8 Cambodia 17.34 23.65 7.09 20.2 -0.84 -4.15 -11.26 10.59 1.89 
9 Myanmar -1.8 29.79 23.96 44.04 -0.57 22.59 6.67 -0.61 4.53 
10 Vietnam 0.58 31.01 21.27 25.05 16.79 7.19 -0.04 4.06 8.51 
 
 
 
 
 
  COUNTRY NAME  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Indonesia -4.05 20.33 18.39 7.93 10.22 25.59 -30.98 7.29 75.69 
2 Malaysia  -4.62 5.98 7.19 11.82 8.42 12.04 -15.76 5.98 46.96 
3 Singapore -10.33 2.03 4.51 14.79 6.11 11.93 -10.85 8.59 13.91 
4 Thailand -6.73 8.82 11.43 12.14 8.3 16.15 -4.65 6.08 28.09 
5 Philippines -7.97 5.85 1.78 6.94 11.49 16.72 -7.15 15.41 16.17 
6 Laos -0.56 2.68 15.37 15.44 13.1 16.04 7158.6 6.97 65.55 
7 Brunei -5.5 -0.02 8.37 13.18 14.15 -89.51 41.75 882.185 108.73 
8 Cambodia 6.24 5.62 5.08 12.38 15.39 13.85 -5.91 -11.42 70.12 
9 Myanmar 5.92 14.31 -0.01 -1.08 -1.33 1.88 20.03 6.09 -40.08 
10 Vietnam 2.89 6.49 11.13 407.92 10.09 10.11 2.27 -16.08 7.61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Hausman Test Result of CPI 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: CPI    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 7.300554 1 0.0069 
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010     
 
 
 
 
The Hausman Test Result of RER 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: RER    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 2.667002 1 0.1024 
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010     
 
 
 
 
 
The Hausman Test Result of GFER 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: GFER    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 4.548718 1 0.0329 
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010     
 
 
The Hausman Test Result of GRVT 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: GRVT    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 0.855584 1 0.3550 
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010     
 
 
 
 
 
The Hausman Test Result of GRRVT 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: GRRVT    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 0.857151 1 0.3545 
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010     
 
 
The Hausman Test Result of GRYPC 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: GRYPC    
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     
Cross-section random 0.840744 1 0.3592 
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Normality Test Result of CPI 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
Normality Test Result of RER 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
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Normality Test Result of GFER 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
Normality Test Result of GRVT 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
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Normality Test Result of GRRVT 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
Normality Test Result of GRYPC 
 
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
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Mean      -1.57e-16
Median  -0.125808
Maximum  3.125591
Minimum -1.968314
Std. Dev.   1.001573
Skewness   0.692475
Kurtosis   3.724483
Jarque-Bera  15.26853
Probability  0.000484
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 1992 2007
Observations 160
Mean      -9.31e-17
Median  -0.005787
Maximum  3.171071
Minimum -2.853533
Std. Dev.   0.972513
Skewness   0.103443
Kurtosis   4.245845
Jarque-Bera  10.63288
Probability  0.004910
 
 
 
 
Durbin Watson Final Result of CPI 
Dependent Variable: CPI   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:10   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.824031    Mean dependent var 9.370010 
Adjusted R-squared 0.811372    S.D. dependent var 65.37834 
S.E. of regression 1.038373    Sum squared resid 149.8722 
F-statistic 65.09138    Durbin-Watson stat 1.744521 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Durbin Watson Final Result of RER 
Dependent Variable: RER   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:10   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.932277    Mean dependent var 3.089471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.927405    S.D. dependent var 14.88461 
S.E. of regression 1.038155    Sum squared resid 149.8095 
F-statistic 191.3491    Durbin-Watson stat 1.820670 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Durbin Watson Final Result of GFER 
Dependent Variable: GFER   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/16/10   Time: 00:56   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.228518    Mean dependent var 0.486169 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173016    S.D. dependent var 1.180662 
S.E. of regression 1.021011    Sum squared resid 144.9023 
F-statistic 4.117281    Durbin-Watson stat 2.280812 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000055    
     
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Durbin Watson Final Result of GRVT 
Dependent Variable: GRVT   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:13   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.227245    Mean dependent var 0.396072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.171651    S.D. dependent var 1.144405 
S.E. of regression 1.038610    Sum squared resid 149.9409 
F-statistic 4.087593    Durbin-Watson stat 2.279058 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000060    
     
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Durbin Watson Final Result of GRRVT 
Dependent Variable: GRRVT   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:15   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.153866    Mean dependent var 0.376995 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092993    S.D. dependent var 1.046113 
S.E. of regression 1.036975    Sum squared resid 149.4690 
F-statistic 2.527658    Durbin-Watson stat 2.137546 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007931    
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Durbin Watson Final Result of GRYPC 
Dependent Variable: GRYPC   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 21:27   
Sample: 1992-2007   
Periods included: 16   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.058549    Mean dependent var 59.64766 
Adjusted R-squared -0.004636    S.D. dependent var 569.7549 
S.E. of regression 571.0740    Sum squared resid 48592699 
F-statistic 0.926632    Durbin-Watson stat 2.266261 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.510598    
     
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test of CPI 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 0.274797    Prob. F(2,146) 0.7601 
Obs*R-squared 0.558783    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.7562 
Scaled explained SS 6.717934    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0348 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 11:26   
Sample: 2 150    
Included observations: 149   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 16421.54 6665.855 2.463530 0.0149 
D(CPI) 50.44809 57.57364 0.876236 0.3823 
(D(CPI))^2 0.029485 0.063189 0.466617 0.6415 
     
     
R-squared 0.003750    Mean dependent var 16885.02 
Adjusted R-squared -0.009897    S.D. dependent var 84206.17 
S.E. of regression 84621.84    Akaike info criterion 25.54970 
Sum squared resid 1.05E+12    Schwarz criterion 25.61018 
Log likelihood -1900.453    Hannan-Quinn criter. 25.57427 
F-statistic 0.274797    Durbin-Watson stat 1.575418 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.760118    
     
     
       Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test of RER 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 2.692105    Prob. F(2,146) 0.0711 
Obs*R-squared 5.299412    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0707 
Scaled explained SS 78.25573    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/15/10   Time: 02:11   
Sample: 2 150    
Included observations: 149   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 2.19E+10 1.12E+10 1.958803 0.0520 
D(RER2) 143830.6 160197.4 0.897833 0.3708 
(D(RER2))^2 0.160606 0.153492 1.046349 0.2971 
     
     
R-squared 0.035567    Mean dependent var 2.62E+10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022355    S.D. dependent var 1.45E+11 
S.E. of regression 1.43E+11    Akaike info criterion 54.23265 
Sum squared resid 2.99E+24    Schwarz criterion 54.29313 
Log likelihood -4037.333    Hannan-Quinn criter. 54.25723 
F-statistic 2.692105    Durbin-Watson stat 1.423391 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.071101    
     
     
 
 
     Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test of GFER 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 0.062347    Prob. F(2,147) 0.9396 
Obs*R-squared 0.127131    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.9384 
Scaled explained SS 3.214791    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.2004 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 11:32   
Sample: 1 150    
Included observations: 150   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 14630.89 8435.529 1.734436 0.0849 
GFER 49.42840 67.88638 0.728105 0.4677 
GFER^2 -0.041424 0.050985 -0.812460 0.4178 
     
     
R-squared 0.000848    Mean dependent var 15365.32 
Adjusted R-squared -0.012746    S.D. dependent var 111119.3 
S.E. of regression 111825.2    Akaike info criterion 26.10706 
Sum squared resid 1.84E+12    Schwarz criterion 26.16727 
Log likelihood -1955.029    Hannan-Quinn criter. 26.13152 
F-statistic 0.062347    Durbin-Watson stat 2.034553 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.939582    
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010     
 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test of GRVT 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 0.070572    Prob. F(2,147) 0.9319 
Obs*R-squared 0.143887    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.9306 
Scaled explained SS 10.24163    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0060 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 11:37   
Sample: 1 150    
Included observations: 150   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 12442438 12409342 1.002667 0.3177 
GRVT -22181.91 22692.29 -0.977509 0.3299 
GRVT^2 0.510489 0.522533 0.976951 0.3302 
     
     
R-squared 0.000959    Mean dependent var 11311538 
Adjusted R-squared -0.012633    S.D. dependent var 1.37E+08 
S.E. of regression 1.38E+08    Akaike info criterion 40.34477 
Sum squared resid 2.80E+18    Schwarz criterion 40.40498 
Log likelihood -3022.858    Hannan-Quinn criter. 40.36923 
F-statistic 0.070572    Durbin-Watson stat 2.015963 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.931892    
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test of GRRVT 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 0.098904    Prob. F(2,147) 0.9059 
Obs*R-squared 0.201574    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.9041 
Scaled explained SS 14.34762    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0008 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 11:41   
Sample: 1 150    
Included observations: 150   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 12630088 12593812 1.002880 0.3176 
GRRVT -30015.60 31244.19 -0.960678 0.3383 
GRRVT^2 0.719155 0.749167 0.959940 0.3387 
     
     
R-squared 0.001344    Mean dependent var 11311513 
Adjusted R-squared -0.012243    S.D. dependent var 1.37E+08 
S.E. of regression 1.38E+08    Akaike info criterion 40.34437 
Sum squared resid 2.80E+18    Schwarz criterion 40.40459 
Log likelihood -3022.828    Hannan-Quinn criter. 40.36884 
F-statistic 0.098904    Durbin-Watson stat 2.016822 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.905890    
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test of GRYPC 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: White  
     
     
F-statistic 0.183219    Prob. F(2,147) 0.8328 
Obs*R-squared 0.372986    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.8299 
Scaled explained SS 25.67423    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.0000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 11:43   
Sample: 1 150    
Included observations: 150   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 274726.2 269980.2 1.017579 0.3105 
GRYPC 12985.20 13496.34 0.962127 0.3376 
GRYPC^2 -32.93655 34.22327 -0.962402 0.3374 
     
     
R-squared 0.002487    Mean dependent var 344393.1 
Adjusted R-squared -0.011085    S.D. dependent var 4109169. 
S.E. of regression 4131881.    Akaike info criterion 33.32616 
Sum squared resid 2.51E+15    Schwarz criterion 33.38637 
Log likelihood -2496.462    Hannan-Quinn criter. 33.35062 
F-statistic 0.183219    Durbin-Watson stat 2.021717 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.832776    
     
     
Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F test) of CPI 
Dependent Variable: CPIZ   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/12/10   Time: 05:26   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.893436    Mean dependent var 37.19267 
Adjusted R-squared 0.885769    S.D. dependent var 80.79127 
S.E. of regression 1.037009    Sum squared resid 149.4790 
F-statistic 116.5376    Durbin-Watson stat 1.774320 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
     
           Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F test) of RER 
Dependent Variable: RER1   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 21:05   
Sample: 1994-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.779725    Mean dependent var 419850.7 
Adjusted R-squared 0.763878    S.D. dependent var 331336.7 
S.E. of regression 137296.3    Sum squared resid 2.62E+12 
F-statistic 49.20291    Durbin-Watson stat 1.005814 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
     
                          Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F test) of GFER 
Dependent Variable: GFER10A   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/12/10   Time: 05:32   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.208671    Mean dependent var 0.424142 
Adjusted R-squared 0.151741    S.D. dependent var 1.231802 
S.E. of regression 1.037345    Sum squared resid 149.5758 
F-statistic 3.665381    Durbin-Watson stat 1.980927 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000229    
     
     
     
                         Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F test) of GRVT 
Dependent Variable: GRVT1   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:13   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.227245    Mean dependent var 0.396072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.171651    S.D. dependent var 1.144405 
S.E. of regression 1.038610    Sum squared resid 149.9409 
F-statistic 4.087593    Durbin-Watson stat 2.279058 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000060    
     
     
     
                      Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F test) of GRRVT 
Dependent Variable: GRRVT2   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/12/10   Time: 05:38   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.215075    Mean dependent var 0.249436 
Adjusted R-squared 0.158605    S.D. dependent var 1.088180 
S.E. of regression 1.022807    Sum squared resid 145.4128 
F-statistic 3.808692    Durbin-Watson stat 2.102288 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000146    
     
     
      
    Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Jointly Regression Coefficient Test (F test) of GRYPC 
Dependent Variable: GRYPC01   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 14:13   
Sample: 1994-2009   
Periods included: 16   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.403191    Mean dependent var 0.304740 
Adjusted R-squared 0.363137    S.D. dependent var 1.239788 
S.E. of regression 1.004618    Sum squared resid 150.3793 
F-statistic 10.06611    Durbin-Watson stat 2.015043 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
     
         Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t-Test) of CPI 
Dependent Variable: CPI   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:10   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 192.9422 3.589929 53.74540 0.0000 
CPI -0.074370 0.021215 -3.505541 0.0006 
     
     
Source: Eviews-6,2010    
 
Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t-Test) of RER 
 
Dependent Variable: RER   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 13:45   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 25372.48 2668.570 9.507893 0.0000 
RER 0.271431 0.076017 3.570641 0.0005 
          Source: Eviews-6,2010   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t-Test) of GFER 
 
Dependent Variable: GFER10   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 13:58   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. 
corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 34.05601 1.187934 28.66826 0.0000 
GFER -0.060816 0.012900 -4.714400 0.0000 
          Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t-Test) of GRVT 
 
Dependent Variable: GRVT   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 14:04   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 387.4942 7.564075 51.22823 0.0000 
GRVT -0.162962 0.022860 -7.128640 0.0000 
          Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t-Test) of GRRVT 
 
Dependent Variable: GRRVT   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 14:08   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 382.7303 22.65222 16.89593 0.0000 
GRRVT -0.229850 0.064308 -3.574230 0.0005 
          Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
Individuality Coefficient Regression Test (t-Test) of GRYPC 
Dependent Variable: GRYPC   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 21:27   
Sample: 1992-2007   
Periods included: 16   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 62.78007 0.124626 503.7482 0.0000 
GRYPC -0.059168 0.002354 -25.13457 0.0000 
     
       Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R2 Determination Coefficient Test of CPI 
Dependent Variable: CPIZ   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/12/10   Time: 05:26   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.893436    Mean dependent var 37.19267 
Adjusted R-squared 0.885769    S.D. dependent var 80.79127 
     
     
                         Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
R2 Determination Coefficient Test of RER 
Dependent Variable: RER1   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 21:05   
Sample: 1992 2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.779725    Mean dependent var 419850.7 
Adjusted R-squared 0.763878    S.D. dependent var 331336.7 
     
     
                          Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
R2 Determination Coefficient Test of GFER 
Dependent Variable: GFER10A   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/12/10   Time: 05:32   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.208671    Mean dependent var 0.424142 
Adjusted R-squared 0.151741    S.D. dependent var 1.231802 
     
     
     
                         Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
R2 Determination Coefficient Test of GRVT 
Dependent Variable: GRVT1   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:13   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.227245    Mean dependent var 0.396072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.171651    S.D. dependent var 1.144405 
S.E. of regression 1.038610    Sum squared resid 149.9409 
F-statistic 4.087593    Durbin-Watson stat 2.279058 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000060    
     
     
     
                         Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
R2 Determination Coefficient Test of GRRVT 
Dependent Variable: GRRVT1   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:15   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.153866    Mean dependent var 0.376995 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092993    S.D. dependent var 1.046113 
S.E. of regression 1.036975    Sum squared resid 149.4690 
F-statistic 2.527658    Durbin-Watson stat 2.137546 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007931    
     
     
     
                          Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
R2 Determination Coefficient Test of GRYPC 
Dependent Variable: GRYPC01   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 14:13   
Sample: 1994-2009   
Periods included: 16   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.403191    Mean dependent var 0.304740 
Adjusted R-squared 0.363137    S.D. dependent var 1.239788 
S.E. of regression 1.004618    Sum squared resid 150.3793 
F-statistic 10.06611    Durbin-Watson stat 2.015043 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
     
          Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of CPI 
 
Dependent Variable: CPIW   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:10   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 192.9422 3.589929 53.74540 0.0000 
CPIZ -0.074370 0.021215 -3.505541 0.0006 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.824031    Mean dependent var 9.370010 
Adjusted R-squared 0.811372    S.D. dependent var 65.37834 
S.E. of regression 1.038373    Sum squared resid 149.8722 
F-statistic 65.09138    Durbin-Watson stat 1.744521 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.489614    Mean dependent var 180.3168 
Sum squared resid 1905506.    Durbin-Watson stat 1.305477 
     
     
           Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of CPI 
 
Dependent Variable: CPIZ   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/12/10   Time: 05:26   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 178.5497 8.514524 20.97001 0.0000 
CPIW -0.048720 0.047228 -1.031592 0.3041 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.893436    Mean dependent var 37.19267 
Adjusted R-squared 0.885769    S.D. dependent var 80.79127 
S.E. of regression 1.037009    Sum squared resid 149.4790 
F-statistic 116.5376    Durbin-Watson stat 1.774320 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.404309    Mean dependent var 169.7647 
Sum squared resid 1891760.    Durbin-Watson stat 1.290747 
     
      
                           Source: Eviews-6, 2010                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of RER 
 
Dependent Variable: RER2   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/15/10   Time: 06:33   
Sample: 1992 2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 36133.48 1306.627 27.65401 0.0000 
RER1 -0.035109 0.037221 -0.943269 0.3472 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.964923    Mean dependent var 5.027249 
Adjusted R-squared 0.962399    S.D. dependent var 18.84473 
S.E. of regression 1.038749    Sum squared resid 149.9811 
F-statistic 382.3695    Durbin-Watson stat 1.777051 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.322644    Mean dependent var 34900.98 
Sum squared resid 3.02E+12    Durbin-Watson stat 1.300617 
     
     
  Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of RER 
 
 
Dependent Variable: RER1   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/15/10   Time: 06:32   
Sample: 1992 2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 35691.97 3025.876 11.79558 0.0000 
RER2 -0.016827 0.086699 -0.194079 0.8464 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.932277    Mean dependent var 3.089471 
Adjusted R-squared 0.927405    S.D. dependent var 14.88461 
S.E. of regression 1.038155    Sum squared resid 149.8095 
F-statistic 191.3491    Durbin-Watson stat 1.820670 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.331913    Mean dependent var 35104.70 
Sum squared resid 2.98E+12    Durbin-Watson stat 1.395856 
     
     
 
     Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of GFER 
Dependent Variable: GFER10B   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/16/10   Time: 00:56   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 34.05601 1.029247 33.08827 0.0000 
GFER10A -0.060816 0.006004 -10.12921 0.0000 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.228518    Mean dependent var 0.486169 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173016    S.D. dependent var 1.180662 
S.E. of regression 1.021011    Sum squared resid 144.9023 
F-statistic 4.117281    Durbin-Watson stat 2.280812 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000055    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.135072    Mean dependent var 31.42213 
Sum squared resid 1997646.    Durbin-Watson stat 2.386959 
     
     
    Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of GFER 
 
Dependent Variable: GFER10A   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/12/10   Time: 05:32   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 51.55102 1.195721 43.11291 0.0000 
GFER10B -0.262300 0.041766 -6.280198 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.208671    Mean dependent var 0.424142 
Adjusted R-squared 0.151741    S.D. dependent var 1.231802 
S.E. of regression 1.037345    Sum squared resid 149.5758 
F-statistic 3.665381    Durbin-Watson stat 1.980927 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000229    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.104858    Mean dependent var 43.30900 
Sum squared resid 4306429.    Durbin-Watson stat 1.379488 
     
      
                             Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of GRVT 
Dependent Variable: GRVT1   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:13   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 359.6479 1.945268 184.8835 0.0000 
GRVT2 -0.076913 0.005747 -13.38307 0.0000 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.227245    Mean dependent var 0.396072 
Adjusted R-squared 0.171651    S.D. dependent var 1.144405 
S.E. of regression 1.038610    Sum squared resid 149.9409 
F-statistic 4.087593    Durbin-Watson stat 2.279058 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000060    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.065826    Mean dependent var 334.0314 
Sum squared resid 1.71E+09    Durbin-Watson stat 2.308973 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of GRVT 
 
Dependent Variable: GRVT2   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/12/10   Time: 05:36   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 387.4942 7.564075 51.22823 0.0000 
GRVT1 -0.162962 0.022860 -7.128640 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.228723    Mean dependent var 0.361431 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173235    S.D. dependent var 1.098662 
S.E. of regression 1.028618    Sum squared resid 147.0695 
F-statistic 4.122048    Durbin-Watson stat 2.068482 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000054    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.058012    Mean dependent var 333.0598 
Sum squared resid 1.72E+09    Durbin-Watson stat 2.337577 
     
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of GRRVT 
 
Dependent Variable: GRRVT1   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 03/15/10   Time: 04:15   
Sample: 1995-2009   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 354.5263 11.77159 30.11711 0.0000 
GRRVT2 -0.120239 0.034846 -3.450621 0.0007 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.153866    Mean dependent var 0.376995 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092993    S.D. dependent var 1.046113 
S.E. of regression 1.036975    Sum squared resid 149.4690 
F-statistic 2.527658    Durbin-Watson stat 2.137546 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.007931    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.064727    Mean dependent var 317.2757 
Sum squared resid 1.59E+09    Durbin-Watson stat 2.326318 
     
          Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of GRRVT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: GRRVT2   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/12/10   Time: 05:38   
Sample: 1992-2006   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 150  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 382.7303 22.65222 16.89593 0.0000 
GRRVT1 -0.229850 0.064308 -3.574230 0.0005 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.215075    Mean dependent var 0.249436 
Adjusted R-squared 0.158605    S.D. dependent var 1.088180 
S.E. of regression 1.022807    Sum squared resid 145.4128 
F-statistic 3.808692    Durbin-Watson stat 2.102288 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000146    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.044146    Mean dependent var 309.8044 
Sum squared resid 1.62E+09    Durbin-Watson stat 2.359298 
     
       Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of GRYPC 
 
Dependent Variable: GRYPC02   
Method: Panel EGLS (Period random effects)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 21:27   
Sample: 1992-2007   
Periods included: 16   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
White period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 62.78007 0.124626 503.7482 0.0000 
GRYPC01 -0.059168 0.002354 -25.13457 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period random  23.33440 0.0017 
Idiosyncratic random 572.9759 0.9983 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.058549    Mean dependent var 59.64766 
Adjusted R-squared -0.004636    S.D. dependent var 569.7549 
S.E. of regression 571.0740    Sum squared resid 48592699 
F-statistic 0.926632    Durbin-Watson stat 2.266261 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.510598    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.058463    Mean dependent var 59.64766 
Sum squared resid 48668989    Durbin-Watson stat 2.265895 
                        Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Final Result of GRYPC 
 
Dependent Variable: GRYPC01   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section SUR)  
Date: 06/14/10   Time: 14:13   
Sample: 1994-2009   
Periods included: 16   
Cross-sections included: 10   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 58.59564 1.838066 31.87897 0.0000 
GRYPC02 -0.094799 0.002706 -35.02649 0.0000 
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.403191    Mean dependent var 0.304740 
Adjusted R-squared 0.363137    S.D. dependent var 1.239788 
S.E. of regression 1.004618    Sum squared resid 150.3793 
F-statistic 10.06611    Durbin-Watson stat 2.015043 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.058264    Mean dependent var 52.94113 
Sum squared resid 48033317    Durbin-Watson stat 1.155305 
     
          Source: Eviews-6, 2010 
 
 
 
